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ABSTRACT1 
 
This dissertation argues that there is an agreed upon commonsense view of violence, but 
beyond this view, definitions for kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally, 
politically ideological, given that the political itself is an essentially contested concept defined in 
relation to ideologies that oppose one another.  The first chapter outlines definitions for a 
commonsense view of violence produced by Greene and Brennan.  This chapter argues that there 
are incontestable instances of violence that are almost universally agreed upon, such as when an 
adult intentionally smashes a child’s head against a table, purposefully causing harm.  It is also 
claimed that, because political, ideological distinctions between kinds of violence arise from the 
creation of moral equivalences to the commonsense view of violence, political ideology is the 
source of disagreement.  The second chapter argues that the concept of violence and of the 
political are essentially contested concepts.  Gallie’s criteria for what counts as an essentially 
contested concept are utilized in order to argue that violence is an essentially contested concept 
at the level of the political, though not at the level of the commonsense view of violence.  In fact, 
the paradigmatic cases that the commonsense view of violence pertains to serve as the core cases 
that are then interpreted as kinds of violence at the ideological level.  To define violence as 
altogether wrong, or to define kinds of violence as acceptable and others as wrong is itself a 
politically ideological move to make, such as when liberalism defines its own uses of violence as 
                                                          
1 In this dissertation, I draw on a number of ideas/passages that appeared earlier in my paper “The Efficacy of 
Scapegoating and Revolutionary Violence," in Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions:  A Journal of the World 
Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies, ed. William Sweet, 10(2014), 203-219.  I am grateful to the editors 
of the journal for permission to draw on this material here.  
 
 v 
justified and legitimate, and its enemy’s violence as unjustifiable and illegitimate.  The World 
Health Organization and Bufacchi’s definitions for violence are presented, as are the definition 
for terroristic violence defined by Nagel.  Erlenbusch’s critique of a liberal view, such as that of 
Nagel and the World Health Organization, is addressed as a reflection on the fact that, beyond 
the commonsense view of violence, violence is an essentially contested concept for which an 
ideologically, politically non-neutral definition is unlikely.  The third chapter outlines numerous 
definitions produced by various philosophers, historians, and theorists, such as Machiavelli, 
Arendt, Hobbes, Kant, Treitschke, Weber, Bakunin, Sorel, Žižek, and Benjamin.  The definitions 
produced by each demonstrates that person’s political ideological assumptions.  Their definitions 
demonstrate an ongoing disagreement, in the sense of Rancière’s formulation for what counts as 
a disagreement in that each theorist defines kinds of violence under the yoke of their own 
political ideology.  They all might agree that a single act is violent, under the commonsense view 
of violence, but they disagree concerning what kind of violence it is.  So, though they may point 
to the same events and actions as examples of violence, what they mean fundamentally differs, 
and this means that they disagree.  Their disagreement arises due to their respective political 
ideologies. This disagreement shows that there is no neutral justification for the neutrality of a 
state, particularly if a neutral state must defend itself.  The state is instead defined in historically 
contextual terms of how the state relates to kinds of violence, and the distinctions between kinds 
of violence are not themselves politically, ideologically neutral.  So, the concept of violence, 
beyond the commonsense view, is an essentially contested concept for which a non-neutral 
definition is unlikely.  Beyond the commonsense view, political ideology is inextricably bound 
up within distinctions between kinds of violence.  The fourth chapter then examines arguments 
on the question of whether nonviolence counts as a kind of violence.  If distinctions between 
 vi 
kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally defined, and nonviolence is defined 
as distinct from violence, then it follows that nonviolence is an essentially contested concept for 
which no non-neutral definition is possible, at least beyond a commonsense view of nonviolence. 
 A commonsense view of nonviolence is defined as the assumption that nonviolence is not 
violent in the way that the commonsense view defines violence.  That is, nonviolence occurs 
when there is no action or event that most people would define as a violent one.  Definitions for 
nonviolence, civil disobedience, nonviolent political actions, and nonviolent direct actions are 
then outlined.  These definitions aim at showing that the doctrine of nonviolence does not merely 
refer to nonviolent acts, but to a strategy that is a means to defeating violence.  Given that what 
counts as the nonviolence that defeats violence is ideologically a matter of disagreement, 
nonviolence, in this sense, can count as a kind of violence.  The fifth chapter concludes, raising 
questions concerning how violence can be valued, the degree to which a state cannot neutrally 
justify its neutrality, and the degree to which, beyond the commonsense view of violence, there 
ever could be agreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  THE COMMONSENSE VIEW OF VIOLENCE 
 
1.1 Introduction:  A Commonsense View of Violence 
 There is a difference between a commonsense view of violence and distinctions between 
kinds of violence.  A commonsense view, in the sense meant here, typically defines violence as a 
physical means intentionally used by a person to produce physical or psychological harms or 
destruction.  It is a commonsense view in that most people agree that the action or event is an 
instance of violence.  For example, most agree that an adult’s intentionally smashing a child’s 
head against a table for the sake of causing harm is an instance of violence.  Most people react to 
such actions and events by defining them as violent ones.  Most people consider these to be 
wrong.  Likewise, hitting, punching, slapping, beating, torturing, raping, murdering, shooting, 
exploding, and other things that harm or destroy a person or group of people, physically or 
psychologically, fall under this commonsense view of violence.   
Disagreements arise when we claim that, although violence is wrong, some violence is 
not wrong because it is justified, or when distinctions between kinds of violence are defined.  
The issue is that, though there is common agreement that violence, in paradigm cases, is wrong, 
indeed is the paradigm of wrongness, there is disagreement concerning what kinds of violence 
are not wrong, and how kinds of violence are to be distinguished.  For example, one might claim 
that defensive violence is not wrong, but is legitimate and legal, but another can question 
whether an instance of violence is defensive, and thereby can define the violence as illegitimate 
and illegal.  So, though there is agreement on the wrongness of the paradigm cases of acts of 
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violence, there is a disagreement concerning what counts as equivalent to the paradigm cases of 
violence.   
A commonsense view of violence is based on the uncontested fact that there are 
paradigmatic actions and events that all agree are instances of violence.  The paradigmatic cases 
serve as those kinds of actions that are raw examples that are commonly agreed upon as counting 
as instances of violence.  The action or event is itself, at the same time, conceptualized as 
“violent.”  However, as noted in the previous paragraph, there is disagreement concerning when 
violent actions and events are equivalent to things like self-defensive violence, legitimate 
violence, and oppressive violence.  An argument should be produced in order to demonstrate that 
a violent action is equivalent to self-defensive violence, but only examples can be given, 
inductively showing that major accounts of this kind are political.  When a person has 
demonstrated that an act of violence is equivalent to self-defensive violence, for example, the 
person has produced a justification for that act of violence by claiming that it is not equivalent to 
the paradigm cases.  Though violence is entirely wrong, according to a commonsense view, the 
act of violence that is defined as morally equivalent to self-defensive violence is justified.  
Justifications built upon equivalence claims like this one move away from the paradigmatic cases 
that define violence as wrong.  As another example, when a theorist defines some violence as 
legitimate, the theorist defines its legitimacy in moral equivalence relationships to other things, 
such freedom, justice, or the existence of a state.  These moral equivalence definitions for kinds 
of violence produce definitions for violence that do not unite the concept of a kind of violence to 
the act of violence in the same way that the paradigm cases do.  Instead, because violent acts and 
events are defined as equivalent to other things, which are then defined so that these violent acts 
and events are justified, these definitions serve as grounds for disagreements.  Unlike the 
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paradigmatic cases, for which the act or event itself is that which defines them as paradigmatic 
cases, distinctions between kinds of violence extend the concept of violence, connecting some 
instances of violence to some things, while disconnecting some other instances of violence from 
those same things.   
For example, in the context of slavery in the United States, John Brown’s 1859 raid of 
Harper’s Ferry in Virginia, which involved violence in the form of people being shot, in 
accordance with the paradigm examples of violence, can be defined as a justified kind of 
violence by producing moral equivalence relationships to other things, such as self-defense.  The 
violent actions of Brown and his raiding party could be defined as terroristic, or as emancipatory 
by connecting it to other things, such as to an attack on the United States, or to the higher and 
anti-violent good of the abolition movement, respectively.  The violent actions of the soldiers, 
likewise, can be defined as oppressive or as legitimate in relation to the experiences of slaves or 
to the United States, respectively.  So, a paradigm case core conception of violence is that which 
is agreed upon, and distinctions between kinds of violence extend this view of violence to other 
things, producing moral equivalence relationships between some acts of violence and some other 
things.   
There is a paradigm case core conception of violence, and there are distinctions between 
kinds of justifiable violence.  This dissertation aims to show that, in the case of all the standard 
major philosophical accounts of violence, these distinctions between kinds of violence are 
produced in relation to particular political ideologies that oppose one another.  Altogether this 
shows that, despite agreement upon a paradigmatic examples of violence, violence, in the 
standard philosophical literature, is an essentially contested concept due to the dependence of 
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each of these conceptions of violence on opposed political ideologies that fundamentally 
disagree within one another.   
An ideology is “a systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, economics, or 
society and forming the basis of action or policy; a set of beliefs governing conduct.”2  An 
ideology is “political” insofar as it constitutes the set and system of beliefs pertaining to a 
collective of people, their common interests, or to what they conceive of as “good.”   Though 
there is no disagreement at the level of the paradigm case core conception of violence, 
distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contested.  Furthermore, agreement with a 
distinction between kinds of violence is a belief in that distinction, and does not eliminate the 
essential contestedness of concepts of kinds of violence that are not themselves the paradigmatic 
examples of violence.  In other words, agreement with a distinction between kinds of violence 
suggests one’s political ideology, though not necessarily.  Agreement with a distinction between 
kinds of violence does not, in principle, mean that one shares the same political ideology of the 
person who defines distinctions between kinds of violence.  Political ideology reflects a belief in 
a distinction between kinds of violence.  However, because there are various, opposed ways that 
kinds of violence can be defined in moral equivalence relationships to political ideologies, 
definitions of kinds of violence are not neutral.  A neutral definition would be one that does not 
favor any particular political ideology.  Because distinctions between kinds of violence are 
produced from the perspectives of theorists situated historically in their respective contexts, a 
neutral definition is not possible.  This suggests, but cannot establish that a neutral distinction 
between kinds of violence cannot be achieved, given opposed distinctions between kinds of 
violence.  The argument here is necessarily inductive, based on the extant theories of violence.  
                                                          
2 “Ideology,” Oxford English Dictionary, accessed October 21, 2016, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91016?redirectedFrom=ideology.  
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But the pattern strongly suggests that no alternative account of violence that extends beyond the 
paradigm cases will not also be dependent on political ideologies.  So, in short, the thesis of this 
dissertation is that, in consideration of a necessarily incomplete set of examples of definitions 
that define violence as equivalent to other things, it is likely that no defined kind of violence is 
politically neutral, except, perhaps, the paradigm case core conception of violence, which defines 
actions as violence based on the wrongness of intentional uses of physical means for the sake of 
causing physical or psychological harms or destruction.  This list is necessarily incomplete 
because novel ways of defining violence can always be produced by defining violence as 
equivalent to other things.  Because this list of definitions is necessarily incomplete, the 
conclusion cannot be proven with certainty.  However, in relation to one another, definitions for 
kinds of violence show that the concept of violence is essentially contested.  And, since any 
essentially contested concept is not politically neutral, no definition for violence is politically 
neutral.   
In order to analyze commonsense views of violence, the definitions of commonsense 
views of violence produced by Joshua Greene and Jason Brennan are discussed next.  Greene 
argues that the human brain neurologically defines what counts as commonsensical, 
“prototypical” violence, and Brennan focuses on what he considers to be the commonsensical 
wrongness of violent killings.  Brennan means to argue that private citizens are justified to use 
defensive violence against government agents and officials, even in liberal democracies.  Once 
their arguments are discussed, then it is shown that their definitions agree at the level of the 
paradigm case core conception of violence, but disagree when their respective discussions 
concerning violence move beyond the paradigm conception of violence, thereby becoming non-
neutral, politically ideologically speaking.   
 6 
1.2 Joshua Greene on the Moral Psychology of Prototypical Violence 
In his book, Moral Tribes:  Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them, Greene 
argues that humans have a “dual-process” moral brain, neurologically at work, automatically 
producing emotional gut reactions, on the one hand, and manually reflecting upon those 
automatic reactions, rationally calculating what should be done, on the other.3  He means to 
argue that the dual-process theory indicates that humans should adopt “deep pragmatism,” i.e. a 
utilitarian, manual-mode approach to compromising and cooperating with groups of people 
(“Them”) who are not of our tribe (“Us”).4  In order to show that people neurologically, 
automatically, and emotionally react to uses of personal, violent force in particular, Greene 
utilizes The Trolley Problem, which was first introduced by Philippa Foot, and later discussed by 
Judith Jarvis Thomson.5    
 For our purposes here, only two versions of the Trolley Problem are needed, namely the 
switch dilemma and the footbridge dilemma.  In the switch dilemma, a trolley is running down a 
track toward five people, and the subject has the option of throwing a switch so that the trolley 
goes onto an alternative track, but kills one person.  In the footbridge dilemma, a trolley is 
running down a track toward five people, and the subject is standing on a footbridge next to a 
man wearing a backpack, and has the option of pushing this man in front of the trolley so that his 
backpack and body stop the trolley from killing the five people.  In both cases, one person is 
                                                          
3 Joshua Greene, Moral Tribes:  Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them (New York:  Penguin Books, 
2013), 14, 120.  Greene’s intention, in this book, is to produce an argument for what he calls “deep pragmatism,” 
which is a kind of utilitarianism that can be used for the sake of globally and domestically serving the greater good, 
resolving “Us vs. Them” disagreements, and not only for serving the greater good of one's own people (“Us” or 
“tribe,” in Greene's terminology).  It is only the moral psychology concerning how people typically respond to 
violence that is relevant here, insofar as it shows how people share a commonsense view of violence.   
4 Ibid. 14, 153-4, 289-294. 
5 Ibid. 113-6.  See Philippa Foot, "Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," Oxford Review 5(1967):  1-5; 
and Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem,” The Monist 59(1976):  204-217; “The 
Trolley Problem,” Yale Law Journal 94(1985): 1395-1415; and, “Turning the Trolley,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 36(2008):  359-374. 
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killed so that five can live.  A utilitarian, rational calculation would have the subject decide to 
save the five people in both cases.  However, studied subjects are typically unwilling to push the 
man from the bridge (only 31% said they would push the man), but are typically willing to throw 
the switch (87% said they would throw the switch).6 
 Using the data he gathers, Greene argues that the different responses produced by 
subjects are due to the human brain's ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and amygdala, 
which are responsible for emotional responses.7  Greene had people read and respond to the 
switch and footbridge dilemmas while their brains were scanned using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI).  In the switch dilemma, there is only the utilitarian commitment to 
serve the greater good, which is an unemotional calculation.  However, in the footbridge 
dilemma, because the subject is directly pushing the man with the backpack to his death, the 
automatic, emotional response to this action provides an explanation for why people are typically 
unwilling to push.   
In both dilemmas, there is an increase of activity in the VMPFC (an emotional response 
is triggered), but in the case of the footbridge dilemma the increase is greater and the result is 
less people willingly pushing one person to his death in order to save five.8  In contrast, in the 
switch case, there was increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which is 
responsible for cognitive control (“the ability to orchestrate thought and action in accordance 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 222.  Greene and his colleagues utilize numerous variations of these two dilemmas in order to test whether 
their results are accurate, and whether the brain neurologically causes people not to want to push the man in front of 
the trolley.  Some of these variations involve the subject being at a distance from the man and some of them involve 
the subject’s touching or not touching when pushing him in front of the trolley.  They found that it is not spatial 
distance, but the personal touching that matters.  See pages 214-6. 
7 Ibid. 118, 124.  Greene argues this because he and others have studied subjects with a damaged VMPFC or 
amygdala, and the responses of these subjects demonstrate less emotional concern for pushing the man off the 
footbridge.  See especially page 125, but also 118, 122, and 142. 
8 Ibid. 120. 
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with internal goals”).9  In the switch dilemma, despite that the studied subjects know that they are 
killing one person to save five, 87% of them find this acceptable because they do not touch the 
person who is killed.10  In contrast, in the footbridge dilemma, the subjects directly touch the 
victim who is pushed to his death, which explains why only 31% are willing to push.11  The 
footbridge case is “personal,” and the switch case is not.  In the end, Greene argues that the 
studies show that “emotional responses cause people to say no to the footbridge dilemma.”12   
 The evidence produced from these studies leads Greene to argue that his dual-process 
moral brain theory is confirmed.  The human brain has automatic, emotional settings and a 
“manual-mode” that is cognitive control.13  The automatic settings are efficient and inflexible 
because they immediately respond to stimulants and consistently respond in the same way.  The 
manual mode is inefficient but flexible because it more slowly thinks through what the person 
experiences, and can do in order to achieve goals, evaluating positives and negatives in utilitarian 
terms.  Emotions are fast and automatic in the sense that a person cannot choose to have an 
emotion, but can only trigger that emotion by thinking of things that bring the emotion about.14  
Emotions, though, also exert pressure on what a person does, or is willing to do, despite what the 
manual-cognitive-decision-making mode would tell the person to do.15  Reasoning and emotions 
are not independent from another because emotions can influence what a person decides to do, 
                                                          
9 Ibid. 119-20.  This is neuroscientist Jonathon Cohen's definition of “cognitive control,” Greene’s colleague. 
10 Ibid. 216.  Greene used variations of the footbridge and switch dilemmas, in which the subjects are either more 
closely touching, or less closely touching, or not touching the one person who is killed to save five.  His results 
show that the more closely a person has to touch the one person to kill him and save five lives, the less the subjects 
are willing to perform the action.  See pp. 215-6. 
11 Ibid. 124-6. 
12 Ibid. 125. 
13 Ibid. 133. 
14 Ibid. 134. 
15 Ibid. 135. 
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and decisions can trigger emotions.  However, can reject emotional urges through the use of 
manual-mode cognitive control.16   
 What is common amongst people, Greene assumes, is that they generally want to have 
positive experiences, and tend to have the same kinds of automatic, emotional, moral settings, 
such as “empathy, anger, disgust, guilt, shame, and discomfort with certain forms of personal 
violence.”17  Pushing a man from a bridge is a use of personal, physical force, which is 
commonly, negatively reacted to.  Pushing a man from a bridge is not an experience that people 
typically want to have (69% of the time, according to results of the footbridge dilemma).  The 
significant factor that makes a difference toward why people are willing to switch the trolley to a 
different track and kill someone to save five, but are not willing to push a man from a footbridge 
to save, is “the direct application of personal force (pushing vs. hitting a switch) and whether the 
victim is harmed as a means versus side effect.”18  That is, the studies show that what matters is 
how these factors are combined.  87% of people approve of using personal force that indirectly 
kills someone as a side effect (the switch dilemma).  When a person is directly harmed as a 
means, but not through a use of personal force and instead as a side effect (such as when the 
switch is thrown and the trolley kills one instead of five), this is also acceptable to most people.  
However, “if you harm someone as a means and you use personal force, then the action seems 
wrong to most people,” as with the footbridge dilemma.19  Commonly, the use of personal force 
in order to cause direct harm upon another person produces an emotional reaction that influences 
the decision not to use personal force that will cause direct harm.  These are paradigm cases of 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 136-7. 
17 Ibid. 194.  My italics.  I return to the significance of Greene’s claim that people commonly want to have positive 
experiences below, in relation to how the common view that violence is wrong is transformed into something good. 
18 Ibid. 222.  The death of the man wearing the backpack is used as a means to stopping the trolley to save five, 
while the man standing on the alternative track, to which the train is switched, dies as a side effect. 
19 Ibid. 222. 
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violence.  Most people agree that these acts are violent, and most people refuse engaging in them 
because most people consider such acts to be wrong. 
 An issue that arises, for Greene, concerns the fact that many of the things we do not do 
result in others being harmed.  However, he argues that people typically consider harms caused 
by direct actions, and as results of uses of means, to be worse than harms of omission, which 
occur when certain actions are not performed.20  His reason for this lies in the means vs. side 
effect distinction.  For example, people would typically not directly starve a person to death, but 
will allow it to happen anyway, fully knowing that there are starving people in the world.  Such 
people do not act toward alleviating starvation, and thereby indirectly, and possibly 
unintentionally, cause harms, but these harms are side effects of each person’s pursuit of his or 
her own goals.  Omissions, such as not feeding starving people, may produce worse harms than 
direct actions, such as directly starving one or a few people, but Greene’s point is that the brain 
plans and is goal-oriented, which means that it is not thinking of all the things omitted from the 
plan and its possible side effects.  Instead, the brain only thinks of a limited number of actions 
performed as means to goals.  A person’s ability to think of only a limited number of things 
when planning actions as means to goals indicates that a person is unable to think of all the 
things she is not doing, or that might happen as side effects.21  This indicates that “harmful 
omissions don't push our emotional moral buttons in the same way that harmful actions do.”22  
Omissions are not directly enacted, so, they do not trigger the automatic, emotional response.  
So, commonly, in Greene’s view, people automatically, emotionally respond to direct uses of 
personal force as a means to producing harm, and not to omissions nor side effects. 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 240. 
21 Ibid. 241. 
22 Ibid. 245. 
 11 
Greene’s evidence for the existence of a commonsense view of violence arises from his 
inference that humans commonly have an alarm system that automatically tells them what not to 
do, and which protects people from the vengeance of others, and stops them from engaging in 
indiscriminate uses of violence, thereby supporting cooperation.  “An automated antiviolence 
system in our brains” makes it possible for people to inspect action-plans, assessing possible 
means to goals, for the sake of avoiding being casually violent because, emotionally, people take 
seriously their own direct uses of personal violence as means to goals.23  This alarm system stops 
us from engaging in what could be dangerous plans.   
Greene adds that “to say that this automatic alarm system responds to violence probably 
gets things backwards... [Instead,] our conception of violence is defined by this automatic alarm 
system.”24  That is, people like the 69% of subjects who automatically, emotionally reject the 
violence of pushing a man from a footbridge have an emotional responses that define what 
counts as violence.  Increased activity in these areas, when deciding what to do with the 
footbridge dilemma, means the brain neurologically, emotionally responds in a causal way.  
However, neurologically, we are not all the same.25  As his studies show, if some part of the 
brain has been damaged, then whether a person rejects uses of personal force depends upon 
whether the person's emotions are functioning “normally” in the way the emotions of the 69%, 
who rejected pushing the man from the footbridge, function. 
 The antiviolence alarm system, Greene adds, “may respond more to harms caused using 
personal force not because personal force matters per se, but because the most basic nasty things 
that humans can do to one another (hitting, pushing, etc.) involve the direct application of 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 226-7. 
24 Ibid. 248. 
25 Greene and his colleagues test people with frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer’s, and damage to their 
ventromedial prefrontal cortext (VMPFC).  See 121-6. 
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personal force.26  “The most basic nasty things” are included in the things people can do, and 
these are the negatively evaluated, rejected instances of “the direct application of personal 
force,” which implies that there is nothing nastier than this direct use of personal force that a 
person could do.  In this sense, “our alarm gizmo responds to actions that are prototypically 
violent – things like hitting, slapping, punching, beating with a club, and...pushing.”27  This 
prototypical violence that our brain's “alarm gizmo” automatically, emotionally responds to is a 
direct use of means of personal force for the sake of causing harm.  Prototypical violence 
corresponds to what has been thus far referred to as paradigm examples of violence. 
However, Greene adds that anyone whose “antiviolence gizmo” does not function in this 
way is abnormal.28  “If you don't feel that it's wrong to push the man off the footbridge, there's 
something wrong with you,” he writes.29  The “antiviolence gizmo” normally functions as a part 
of the planning of means toward goals, tracking direct uses of personal force and the active 
harms that may result, such that the passive, indirectly produced harms that result from side 
effects and omissions matter less.  This is a neurological claim, and not a prima facie moral or 
political one.  Most people, normally, refuse to perform actions that require their own personal 
use of direct force for the sake of causing harm.  This refusal is the core response that identifies 
the immediate negative evaluation of violence, on which all accounts of violence depend. 
For example, one person is sacrificed in the switch dilemma, but Greene does not 
criticize those who decide to throw the switch as having something neurologically wrong with 
them.  He assumes that what is normal, neurologically speaking, is what most people exhibit.  In 
the switch case, the death of one person is a side effect, and since this does not produce increased 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 249. 
27 Ibid. 247. 
28 Ibid. 249-50. 
29 Ibid. 251. 
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activity in the areas of the brain responsible for emotion, it is “normal” for people to decide to 
throw the switch.  However, by claiming that there are normal people he implies a group of 
abnormal people.  Despite that 31% were willing to push the man from the footbridge, these 
people are abnormal and have something wrong with them, neurologically speaking. 
 
1.3 Does the Automatic Antiviolence System Provide a Commonsense Definition for 
Violence? 
 
The prototypical violence defined by Greene fits a paradigm case core conception of 
violence.  If one responds to prototypical violence automatically and emotionally, then one is 
normal, descriptively speaking, and also has what can a normal, commonsensical view that 
intentional (direct) uses of physical means (personal force) for the sake of producing physical 
harms should not be used.  However, Greene does not address psychological harms.  
Psychological harms might not be thought of as consequences of one’s actions.  They might 
result from uses of hurtful words.  Such harms might be kinds of “side effects,” and so perhaps 
they produce no emotional impact when one decides how to act or speak, but Greene’s studies do 
not address this.   
If there is an alarm gizmo that automatically, emotionally responds to intentional, active, 
and direct uses of personal force that results in harms, then this provides evidence for a 
commonsense view of violence.  However, even if there is a normal, commonsense view of what 
counts as violence at the neurological level of automatic, emotional rejection of kinds of actions 
that characteristically involve a use of personal force as a direct means to harming someone, the 
commonsense view and the automatic, emotional rejection of kinds of violent actions do not 
address the fact that prototypical violence is also that which can be defined as a normal, good, 
legal, and legitimate means to use.  This also does not capture other ways that harms are 
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produced unintentionally and nonphysically.  Distinctions between defined kinds of violence do 
capture these other ways of defining kinds of violence.  That is, distinctions between kinds of 
violence do explain how what might otherwise count as abnormal uses of personal force for the 
sake of causing harms, can count as normal, and even as desirable.  So, the automatic alarm 
gizmo corresponds to a paradigm case core conception of violence, which can count as a 
commonsense view, but beyond this, the automatic alarm gizmo does no explain how instances 
of paradigmatic cases of violence are justified normatively. 
In Greene’s study, 69% refused pushing the man in front of the trolley, and 31% chose to 
push the man because the wrongness of the action did not produce emotions that were strong 
enough to lead them to choose not to push the man.  The automatic, emotional response of those 
who chose to push was not strong enough to stop them from deciding to push.  This decision to 
save five by pushing one takes place manually, as a rational utilitarian calculation, but Green 
argues that this is abnormal, given the results of his research.  If Greene is correct that emotions 
cause decisions, then those who decided to push the man from the footbridge were either able to 
transform a negative emotion associated with pushing the man into a positive one, or they were 
unable to have the emotional response in the first place.  If the studied subjects did have the 
negative emotion, then it seems that the goal of saving the other five people overrode the 
strength of this emotion, but the neurological studies do not explain why or how this happens.  
At the level of the definition of prototypical violence and a commonsense view of violence, this 
revaluation of the negative emotional response to an act of violence into something positive is 
neurologically abnormal.  At the level of distinctions between kinds of violence, kinds are 
evaluated as not entirely wrong in ways that transform the abnormal into a justified kind of 
violence.   
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Greene bases his distinction between normal and abnormal responses to violence on the 
authority of his scientific studies.  His focus on prototypical violence, as defined by the 
automatic antiviolence system, limits his ability to make sense of why people still choose to use 
and justify violence.  He can only claim that those who push the man from the bridge are 
abnormal, if they do not feel that it is wrong to do so.   
Like the paradigm case core conception of violence, Greene negatively evaluates 
violence based on the increased activity in the VMPFC that occurs in 69% of the studied 
patients.  The paradigm case core conception of violence evaluates violence as wrong, but does 
not need neurological evidence of increased emotional activity in the brain in order to do so.  The 
paradigm case core conception of violence is defined by those actions and events that most 
people consider to be wrong.  Greene argues that a person is abnormal if they do not feel that it is 
wrong to push the man.  This may have some descriptive accuracy.  Normatively, the wrongness 
of the pushing of the man from the bridge does not necessarily follow from his evidence.  There 
is only increased activity in the VMPFC, which amounts to brute scientific data that might 
explain why people choose not to perform certain actions.  Whether or not this data indicates the 
normative wrongness of prototypical violence itself is not necessarily within the scope of his 
data.  So, when Greene says that those who do not feel this wrongness are abnormal, he points to 
the paradigm case core conception of violence, but why we need this neurological evidence in 
the first place is questionable, given the common agreement concerning paradigmatic examples 
of violence. 
Since the automatic antiviolence system demonstrates increased emotional activity in the 
VMPFC, it is not clear that it defines prototypical or a commonsense view of violence in the way 
Greene claims.  What would be interesting is to see what happens when the studied subjects are 
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asked about performing actions that are not captured by the paradigm case core conception of 
violence, but that might still be claimed to count as violence.  For example, some might claim 
that violence occurs when a person draws a cartoon of something offensive (such as of a 
religious figure performing a debaucherous act), or when someone is unable to afford the 
medication that would save her life.  Perhaps the choice would be for the patient to decide 
whether to draw the cartoon, or whether to withhold the funding that the person needs in order to 
afford her medication.  The point is that it is not clear that this automatic antiviolence system 
would reject these actions, which some people might count as kinds of violence.  The trolley 
problems already involve what many would consider an act of violence that falls under the 
paradigm case core conception of violence.  So, it is not clear that the automatic antiviolence 
gizmo can tell us very much about violence beyond the paradigm case core conception.  Perhaps 
it does, perhaps not, but the paradigm case core conception of violence persists nonetheless.  
Most people would agree that killing a person is itself a violent act and wrong, and whether or 
how they emotionally respond to having to decide to kill a person is irrelevant.   
In the next section, Jason Brennan’s argument concerning the justification for uses of 
defensive violence is discussed next, particularly in light of the distinction between violence as a 
wrong and violence as not-wrong.  As soon as we begin to distinguish between whether violence 
is wrong or not-wrong, we are no longer defining violence itself, and have moved beyond the 
paradigm case core conception of violence.  Given that distinctions between kinds of violence no 
longer address violence itself, there is disagreement between opposed distinctions between kinds 
of violence, politically ideologically grounded in the way that distinctions between kinds of 
violence are connected to other things.  The automatic alarm gizmo does not address or explain 
how kinds of violence are evaluated as justifiable. 
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1.4 Brennan on Killing as Defensive Violence 
 Jason Brennan produces a definition for a commonsense view of violence, in his article 
“When May We Kill Government Agents?  In Defense of Moral Parity.” 30  Brennan's definition 
differs from the one given above, particularly in that he is only concerned with showing that, 
though violence is altogether wrong, it is sometimes permissible in liberal democratic societies 
for private citizens to kill government agents, leaders, and police officers in self-defense, or in 
the defense of others.  He writes, “violence in self-defense and defense of others is warranted, on 
commonsense moral grounds, only to protect oneself or others from severe harm or injustice.”31  
Though he assumes “commonsense moral grounds,” Brennan is not defining violence itself in 
terms of a commonsense view.  Instead, Brennan begins from a normative evaluation of 
violence, namely that it can be “warranted” when used defensively. 
Here, we see what Brennan considers to be commonsensical: 
Killing is wrong.  However, a person can become liable to be 
killed by performing certain wrongful or unjust actions.  A person 
is liable to be killed when he is doing something deeply wrong, 
unjust, or harmful to others, and when killing him would serve a 
defensive purpose, such as self-defense, the defense of others, or to 
prevent him from causing greater injustice.  Killing is also 
restricted by a doctrine of necessity:  at minimum, when a 
nonlethal alternative is equally effective at stopping someone from 
committing injustice, it is not permissible to kill him.32 
 
Brennan begins with the general assumption that “killing is wrong,” but then immediately 
indicates when killing is not wrong.  Killing, of course, is a kind of violence, and not violence 
itself, according to the paradigm case core conception of violence.  Killing can serve as a 
paradigmatic example of violence, but as an example, it is not a definition for violence.  So, 
                                                          
30 Jason Brennan, “When May We Kill Government Agents?  In Defense of Moral Parity,” Social Philosophy and 
Policy 32(2016):  40-61. 
31 Ibid. 49.  Brennan argues that this commonsense moral view is common because it is a part of the tradition 
handed down from English common law, which includes doctrines of defense and self-defense.  See page 44. 
32 Ibid. 44. 
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Brennan begins from the assumption that killing is wrong, and immediately posits an exception 
to the general assumption that “killing is wrong.”  A person may be killed, if the person has 
performed a “wrongful or unjust action,” and self-defense or the defense of others is necessitated 
as a last resort.  The wrongfulness of killing can be justified when used defensively against a 
person who does wrong to others.  Self-defense and the defense of others, when no other 
alternative is available, are the conditions that qualify an action counting as an exception to the 
rule that “killing is wrong.”  However, the commonsense view of violence as described by 
Brennan does not define violence itself as wrong.  It does not define killing as wrong.  Brennan 
assumes a commonsense view that is supposed to provide a point of agreement upon which he 
can argue in favor of a justification for defensive violence.  Brennan’s claim that there is a 
“common moral ground” assumes normative evaluations of violence that are beyond the 
paradigm cases of violence. 
Brennan adds that there is a liberal democratic assumption that only government agents 
and officials may kill for the sake of defending lives from threats, to uphold the law, and attain 
justice.  In liberal democratic societies, Brennan argues, the typical assumption is that killing is 
wrong, but because these societies assume that killing should never occur, they assume that 
“only nonviolent resistance to state injustice is permissible...[and that] we must defer to 
democratic government agents, even when these agents act in deeply unjust, harmful, and 
destructive ways.”33  Brennan's intention is not to urge people to kill government agents, but is 
instead to show that such people can be justifiably killed.  He means that, even if we should aim 
to nonviolently combat injustices, it is incorrect to infer that citizens can never justifiably kill 
state leaders, agents, and police.  So, he wants to show that the commonsense view of defensive 
violence in liberal democratic societies is incorrect in its assumptions.   
                                                          
33 Ibid. 40. 
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In Brennan’s view, the exception that allows for killing to count as “defensive,” and as 
not-wrong, applies in all cases and not only in those cases when a defensive killing is used 
against private citizens.  If a government official, agent, police officer, etc. is not killing for the 
sake of defending herself or others, then those against whom the intention to kill is directed are 
justified to kill in defense of themselves and others.  This suggests that even a commonsense 
view of violence that allows for self-defense itself requires political premises in order to 
distinguish genuine self-defense from self-defense which is not properly regarded as self-defense 
because it is illegitimate.  With this concept of defensive violence, we come to political 
questions. 
In terms of legitimacy, from the perspective of the state, the state can (because it is 
“permitted” in Brennan’s sense of the term ‘legitimacy’) make the claim that private citizens can 
justifiably use violence in self-defense and defense of others against other private citizens, but 
not against government agents.34  The authority of the state’s legitimate claim is lacking, in his 
view, because private citizens will not necessarily, obediently submit to it, particularly when 
needing to defend themselves or others from government officials and agents whose violence is 
not self-defensive or in defense of others.  Brennan writes, “it is a part of commonsense moral 
thinking…that we are presumed not to have a duty to follow unjust orders. This duty must be 
justified.”35  That is, it would be unjust for a government to demand that private citizens 
obediently submit to government agents, police officers, and military personnel when they kill 
private citizens.  The state bears the burden of providing justification for why citizens must 
obediently submit to its government officials and agents who aggressively, and not defensively, 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 34. 
35 Ibid. 53. 
 20 
kill private citizens, but the state’s justification might not bear weight when a government agent 
or official is aggressively aiming to kill oneself or others.   
Brennan argues that violence is only justifiable, and not wrong, when used defensively.  
However, that a use of violence could count as defensive in the first place, and as not wrong, is a 
matter of disagreement because the justification for a use of violence against government agents 
is political.  This violence is not wrong, but is justified, if it is used in response to unjust acts, 
where “justice” is defined in the political sense relating to just authority, which is itself defined 
in accordance with Brennan’s political ideology.  If it cannot always be shown for certain that a 
private citizen or government official was using defensive violence, then whose violence counts 
as defensive, and as not wrong, is an issue that is not easily settled.   
For example, the issue concerning whose violence is defensive is irrelevant, at least for 
pacifists, because an authentic pacifist’s strict commitment to peace and nonviolence would not 
endorse any kind of violence as justified, whether it is defensive or not.  Defensiveness does not 
indicate that an instance of violence is not wrong because violence is completely wrong, in a 
pacifist’s view.  The pacifist’s commitment to nonviolence, peace and to the view that violence 
is only wrong means that the pacifist disagrees with every justification for violence.  Brennan’s 
so-called commonsense moral thinking is contestable.  Whose violence counts as defensive and 
as not wrong is contestable.  Beyond his defined commonsense view, Brennan’s view encounters 
disagreements concerning kinds of violence, wrong and not wrong ones, and defensive and 
aggressive instances of it.   
The view that violence is wrong is the view of the paradigm case core conception of 
violence, but political ideologies appropriate this wrongness when they justify kinds of violence.  
Disagreements emerge when, from the perspectives of political ideologies, violent acts and 
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events are defined as equivalent to other things for the sake of justifying those actions and 
events.  The violence that is claimed to be not wrong and defensive is defined as an instance of 
killing a government agent in self-defense or in defense of others.  The connection between 
killing being not wrong when used defensively, but wrong otherwise, is a condition for 
disagreement. 
 
1.5 The Obscurity of Defensive Violence 
One approach toward determining whose violence is defensive is to attempt to answer the 
question, who started it?  Is the government official, police officer, or military personnel 
defending himself and others from a private citizen, or is the private citizen using defensive 
violence against the violence of these government officials, officers, and personnel?  Any answer 
to these questions will favor one side over another, and requires an analysis of what happened, in 
what order, and such analyses cannot always perfectly reproduce a sequence of events.  If there 
are others who can be referenced as those for whom the violence is defensive, then the difficulty 
of knowing whose violence is defensive increases.  We can imagine a heated exchange between 
involved individuals taking place such that one party claims to be defending a group of people 
from the other party, and this other party claims to be defending the very same people.  If 
violence is not only defensive when self-defensive, but also when used to defend others, then 
claims can be made concerning whose violence was defensive in relation to some group of 
people whose situation required defensive violence.  Whose violence counts as defensive, then, 
is a ground for political disagreement. 
The point is that, though a commonsense view of morality may consider violence to be 
wrong, except when used defensively, it does not itself distinguish between defensive and 
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aggressive violence.  Whether an act of violence is defensive depends on how that action is 
evaluated, and such evaluations will connect events together in ways that could be connected in 
other ways.  For example, if a government official intentionally and aggressively causes 
psychological harms to private citizens by threatening them with physical violence that is not 
actually used, and these are not immediately obvious to others because they are psychological 
harms that these others have not themselves experienced, then for the private citizens who suffer 
these harms, their own violence may count as defensive violence from their own point of view, 
but not from the point of view of those who did not experience those psychological harms.  
Likewise, a victim of rape and sexual assault, particularly women, who kills the perpetrator may 
consider her own killing to be defensive, but a judge might decide that the killing of the 
perpetrator was not defensive, for whatever reasons, but namely because the judge connects the 
events together in a different way.  For those who use violence (in the sense that a commonsense 
view defines it), they might evaluate its use as a defensive one, while others see it as not being a 
defensive use of violence, and as “wrong,” because they evaluate the event differently, from an 
opposed perspective or from another context.  When this is the case the violence is and is not 
defensive, which obscures what defensive violence is.  
 
1.6 Violence as a Wrong 
As noted, Brennan’s version of the commonsense view of violence first assumes that 
violent killings are wrong, but then indicates that defensive violence is an exception and not 
wrong.  The first assumption is a generalization about all violence being wrong, which many 
probably commonly share as an assumption.  The second assumption focuses on a particular kind 
of violence that many likely agree counts as not-entirely-wrong, defensive violence.  However, if 
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a particular kind of violence is not wrong because it is defensive, then the general assumption 
that all violence is wrong seems incorrect.  To define violence as a wrong is not to objectively 
define violence, but is instead to evaluate violence, but commonly, people do consider violence 
to be wrong.  This is why there are paradigmatic examples of violence.  Most everyone agrees 
that a gang rape is an instance of violence, for example. 
The point of looking at these claims concerning the wrongness of violence and its 
relationship to defensive violence is that the paradigm case core conception of violence does not 
make sense of these relationships.  A commonsense view would be limited to the paradigm cases 
that are unambiguously wrong.  But, the commonsense views characterized by Greene and 
Brennan extend the paradigm conception of violence into claims concerning when violence is 
wrong and when it is not wrong, and when people are normal, despite that they kill a person, and 
when abnormal.  These evaluations extend the paradigm conception of violence.   
The core of any commonsense view is that, in paradigm cases, violence is wrong.  
Evaluations in which violence is defined as not wrong are likely to generate disagreements.  
Distinctions between when violence is wrong and when it is not wrong can be produced, but 
these distinctions are not necessarily matters of common agreement.  Distinctions between kinds 
of violence are inevitable because the core notion of violence in the paradigm cases does not 
itself value kinds of violence as not wrong.  It instead defines what counts as violence based on 
the wrongness of the events and actions that involve an intentional use of physical means for the 
sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction.  When the core of the paradigm 
cases of wrongness is extended into versions of a commonsense view, and also into distinctions 
between kinds of violence, though all violence is wrong, some is defined in the standard 
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philosophical literature as not wrong, and disagreements emerge from these evaluations of the 
wrongness of violence that transform that wrongness into a valued not wrong kind of violence.   
 
1.7 Disagreements Concerning a Commonsense View of Violence 
There are competing commonsense views of violence, as we have seen.  But, at the core 
of these conceptions of violence are paradigmatic cases that most people agree count as violence.  
To think of such events as not counting as violence would be odd, and “abnormal,” as Greene 
puts it.  Greene’s research indicates who is normal and abnormal, neurologically speaking, 
according to how the brains of subjects respond to situations in which they have a choice to use 
“prototypical” violence.  Prototypically, violence is defined by the automatic antiviolence 
system, and a normal, common thing people do is emotionally reject this violence.  Brennan, 
though, begins with the common assumption that violence (which he defines in terms of 
“killing”) is wrong in order to show that defensive violence is justifiable, even against 
government officials and agents.  Greene’s definition defines violence, in a commonsense way, 
and Brennan’s definition evaluates killing, in a different commonsense way.  Brennan and 
Greene’s assumptions concerning commonsense violence are embedded within their respective, 
neuroethical and political projects, which cannot be separated from how they define 
commonsense views of violence. 
On the other hand, these disagreements over what the commonsense view is indicate why 
there is disagreement concerning kinds of violence.  Disagreements arise due to how violence 
itself is valued.  Evaluations of kinds of violence distinguish between wrong and not-wrong, 
defensive and non-defensive, legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, emancipatory and 
oppressive, normal and abnormal, vengeful and sacrificial violence.  This list is incomplete 
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because there are many other ways that kinds of violence could be distinguished.  However, what 
we see is that these evaluations generally follow a formula.  A positively evaluated kind of 
violence is defined as superior in relation to the negatively evaluated kind of violence.  The 
positively evaluated kind of violence (such as defensive violence) is superior because it is 
defined as that which defeats the inferior kind of violence.  Yet, an opposed view can define 
those very same actions and events in an inverted way.  What counts as defensive violence, from 
the perspective of a private citizen, can be defined as illegal, and criminal from the perspective of 
the government agent that the private citizen attacks.  Even though it may be commonly agreed 
that the action or event itself is violent, the kind of violence it is depends upon what one connects 
the violence to.  The government agent connects the private citizen’s use of violence to a 
violation of law, and the assumption that private citizens cannot use violence against public 
officials.  The private citizen connects his use of violence against the government agent to his 
own right to defend his life, or that of others, possibly because there is a duty to protect life, or to 
the claim that it is natural for life to protect itself.  These connections between kinds of violence 
and other things, evaluated in relationships of superiority and inferiority produces conditions for 
disagreement. 
In fact, this shows that commonsense views of violence are not neutral.  The wrongness 
of violence is extended so that kinds of violence reflect this wrongness, some of them being 
entirely wrong, and others not being entirely wrong because they are defined as that which 
defeats the kind of violence that is entirely wrong.  Agreement that violence is an intentional use 
of physical means to cause physical or psychological harms or destruction does not mean that 
everyone will always agree in each case that an event or act is violent.  Instead, there are 
divergences within commonsense views of violence.   
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1.8 The Politicization of the Concept of Violence 
Commonsense views arise as reactions to the wrongness of paradigmatic cases.  Without 
the general recognition of the wrongness of these paradigmatic cases, there would be no 
commonsense view.  The paradigmatic cases, such as smashing someone’s face for the sake of 
causing harm, are altogether wrong, but it is also generally agreed that when such actions are 
instances of self-defense, then they are justified.  However, what counts as self-defense is 
defined in connection to other things, which opens the door for political disagreements 
concerning whose violence is self-defensive, and therefore, justified.  For example, if one 
prioritizes the role of defense played by police violence, proletarian violence, or anarchistic 
violence, then it is because one believes these to be superior to other things, particularly those 
things these kinds of violence are defined as capable of defeating, because these are defined as 
connected to things that need defended.  A commonsense definition for violence may be useful 
to garner agreements in relation to which people form groups.  And it also seems to be the case 
that whether an act of violence, in a commonsense view of the term, is a kind of violence 
depends upon which group, community, society, or state one belongs to and believes in.  It might 
be that the act or event is evaluated negatively as a kind of violence, if it interferes with the goals 
and vision the group, community, society, or state has of itself, so that for example, if our 
violence achieves our freedom it is good, but the violence of them is bad, even if they also aim 
toward freedom.  Because a group of people, whether as a community, society, or state aims 
toward sustaining their existence as a people, in the name of the good, justice, freedom, rights, 
religion, or something else, these “group-vision” distinctions between kinds of violence are non-
neutrally political.   
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Brennan explicitly politicizes his justification for defensive violence used against 
government agents and officials when he reveals his political preference for liberal democratic 
regimes, despite that he justifies violence against the agents who are representative of those 
regimes.  He explicitly indicates what he is not endorsing.  He writes, “totalitarian communist 
regimes do not value individual human life,” and then he uses as evidence the assassinations of 
four US Presidents, thirteen US congresspersons, as well as the targeting of these kinds of people 
to indicate that liberal democratic regimes handle assassinations of government agents and 
officials much better than “totalitarian communist regimes” who respond to attempted 
assassinations by terrorizing their citizens, such as when Fanni Kaplan failed to assassinate Lenin 
in 1918.36  His point is that defensive violence used against government officials and agents 
within liberal democratic regimes is more likely to be handled well than in totalitarian 
communist ones.  Anyone who agrees with this may be led to agree that in liberal democratic 
regimes defensive violence against government officials is not as bad as in totalitarian 
communism itself.  This evaluates defensive violence in liberal democratic regimes as superior to 
totalitarian communist regimes.  Of course, someone who prefers an opposed political ideology 
could agree with Brennan that private citizens may justifiably kill government agents in self-
defense or in the defense of others, but disagree with his claim that liberal democratic regimes 
handle this better.  This demonstrates how a definition of a kind of violence is politicized in 
relation to the groups of individuals who agree with the definition and in relation to those who do 
not. 
Despite common agreement upon paradigm cases of violence, no commonsense 
definition of violence or distinction between kinds of violence is politically neutral because even 
here there are disagreements concerning what counts as a kind of violence.  The disagreements 
                                                          
36 Brennan, 60-1. 
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within the commonsense views of violence are extended in the philosophical literature and in the 
writings of political ideologists.  There are many accounts of violence produced by diverse 
figures situated in particular historical contexts.  For everyone, and not only these figures, the 
question is, whose account is believable, and therefore legitimate?  As a historical matter, 
legitimacy is contingent on beliefs and beliefs are held within the particular contexts that 
influence having them.   
 
1.9 Definitions for Violence and a Logic of Exception 
 Distinctions between kinds of violence, including those within commonsense views of 
violence, are formulated according to a logic of exception.  In general, an action or event counts 
as violence or a kind of violence, except when X, where X is anything that the definition does not 
capture.  For example, the paradigm case core of commonsense views of violence identifies 
violence with an intentional use of physical means for the sake of causing physical or 
psychological harms or destruction.  Commonsense views of violence already extend this 
conception to allow for exceptions.  If an action or an event is an exception to this definition, 
then that action or event does not count as violence.  This means that some unintentional uses of 
physical means that result in harms or destruction do not count as violence.  Likewise, if there is 
the intentional use of physical means, but no harms or destruction result, then no violence has 
occurred.  Unless an action or event fits a definition, it is excluded from counting as violence, or 
as a kind of violence.   
 It is also in this sense of this logic of exception that definitions for violence are not 
politically neutral, including commonsense views.  Distinctions between violence and 
nonviolence, legitimate and illegitimate violence, legal and criminal violence, prototypical and 
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atypical violence, and defensive and aggressive violence, for example, operate according to this 
logic of exception.  An act or event is a kind of violence, except when it does not fit that kind of 
violence, and whether it fits that kind of defined violence depends upon whether one or a people 
connect that act or event to a kind of defined violence.  Since another person or people can 
connect that act or event to an opposed kind of defined violence, the opposition between these 
people demonstrate that definitions for violence and kinds of violence are not politically neutral. 
For example, if legitimate violence is that which law defines as legitimate violence, and 
the law defines legitimate violence by excluding illegitimate kinds of violence that threaten law's 
power (its ability to dominate over lives), then no violence is legitimate except that violence that 
defeats the illegitimate violence that threatens law's power.  That is, no violence is legitimate, 
except the violence law defines as legitimate in relation to law’s power.  This logic of exception 
is the way in which definitions for violence exclude some things, except those things that are 
included, as counting as kinds of violence.  By focusing only on what is obviously violent and 
that most people would agree counts as violence, a commonsense view apparently excludes 
political evaluations of kinds of violence.  Instead, it is a definition that includes the criteria that 
an act or event is violent only if there is an intentional use of physical means for the sake of 
causing physical or psychological harms or destruction.  People agree with this definition 
because people generally, immediately and emotionally, reject such actions and events as wrong.  
When exceptions are considered, as they inevitably are even within a commonsense view, they 
rest on other considerations. 
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1.10 Transforming the “Abnormal” Failure to Reject Prototypical Violence into a 
“Normal” Approval of Kinds of Prototypical Violence 
 
 A person can begin from the paradigm case core conception of violence, and then 
distinguish it into kinds so that not all prototypical violence, in Greene’s sense of the term, is 
objectionable.  This is exactly what Brennan has done.  When some individuals act violently 
against government officials, their violence is not objectionable when it is defensive.  Brennan 
achieves this by defining violence as wrong, but then indicates the exceptional cases in which it 
is not wrong.  Police violence, for example, can be assumed to be defined as good in relation to a 
goal of successful law enforcement, which is itself defined as a good.  This violence is not 
wrong, but justified in relation to the goal that is itself evaluated positively.  Any use of violence 
except this use is neither justified, nor good.  Definitions for kinds of violence, in this way, 
transform the violence that would typically be rejected into something that is approved for a 
reason that is itself defined in connection to a use of a kind of violence.  The definition of a kind 
of violence as good and justified in relation to a goal, such as freedom for example, is that which 
conceptually transforms violence into something positive, thereby overriding the automatic 
antiviolence alarm system Greene infers from his research.  That is, distinctions between kinds of 
violence transform the abnormal into the normal.  The “normal” emotional rejection of personal 
uses of violence has to be overridden, and doing so requires a sufficient amount of positive 
meaning defined in relation to a kind of violence. 
A simple kind of transformation of abnormal violence into normal violence occurs when 
some violence is defined as that which defeats violence.  The violence that defeats violence is 
defined in positive value terms of its ability to defeat violence, and the negative evaluation of 
violence in general is transformed into kinds of violence, that which defeats violence and that 
which does not.  The logic of exception, here, is that violence is wrong, except that violence that 
 31 
defeats violence.  But, when is violence not wrong?  If the answer is when violence defeats 
violence, then because there is disagreement concerning the violence that defeats violence, a 
commonsense view of defensive violence (that it is not-entirely-wrong) is already participating 
in producing a distinction between kinds of violence. 
However, it is possible to define more complex relationships between kinds of violence.  
For example, a kind of intentional use of personal force that is defined as emancipatory, good, 
and brings about or is a manifestation of freedom, rights, or justice because it causes harms 
serves to transform the violence that people typically reject into a positively valued means 
against that which is excluded from counting as that which brings about or is emancipatory, 
good, freedom, rights, or justice.  Defined distinctions between kinds of violence transform the 
assumed wrongness of violence into something that is sometimes, in particular situations, in the 
hands of some people, not wrong.  However, whether these kinds of violence actually are what 
one defines them as, and are connected to what one claims them to be connected to, is a matter of 
disagreement, and depends upon what political ideology one believes in. 
 Again, legitimate violence is itself defined in a way that serves to rationally justify uses 
of violence (those kinds defined by the paradigm case core conception of violence), and thereby 
override the automatic rejection of the wrongness of uses of personal force as means to goals.  
This legitimate violence is justified because it is defined in terms of its connections to other 
things.  Power, the state, and a legal order can be valued as superior.  If the law defines police 
violence as that which enforces law, maintains a legal order, and is therefore legitimate, then it is 
difficult to question the legitimacy of police violence without also simultaneously putting the law 
itself into question because the legitimacy of police violence and the legal order constitutive of 
the law that police violence maintains are defined as essentially connected.   
 32 
So, in connection to one another, terms like “power,” “legitimate,” “violence,” and other 
terms like “freedom” and “justice” are defined in terms of its relationships, and the definitions 
follow a logic of exception.  For example, the violence that defeats illegitimate violence is not 
itself illegitimate violence because it is an exception that proves the rule, namely that legitimate 
violence is that which is defined as not being illegitimate violence.  Without law being defined as 
connected to power and legitimacy, the law cannot justify uses of legitimate violence.  This does 
not indicate what violence is, but only indicates that there are kinds of violence valued in diverse 
ways, in essential connections to other things, and thus transforming kinds of violence into 
normatively negative wrongs and normatively positive not-wrong kinds.   
 
1.11 Willem Schinkel’s Rejection of the Claim that Violence is an Essentially Contested 
Concept 
 
In the following chapter, it will be argued that, beyond the paradigm case core conception 
of violence, violence is an essentially contested concept.  Willem Schinkel, in his “Regimes of 
Violence and the Trias Violentiae,” argues that there are four strategies that social theorists and 
social scientists utilize when addressing violence, one of which is the strategy arguing that 
violence is an essentially contested concept.37  He argues against the assumption that a 
commonsense view of violence is sufficient.  Instead of a commonsense view, he argues that 
there is a “regime of violence,” which is “the regime of regulation through which different forms 
of violence become discernible in the first place.”  A regime of violence controls which forms of 
violence are acknowledged as violence, and which not.  In other words, what counts as violence 
                                                          
37 Willem Schinkel, “Regimes of Violence and the Trias Violentiae,” European Journal of Social Theory 16(2013):  
311.  The other three strategies include the strategy of not defining violence, the strategy of “enumerating a number 
of acts among which some form of family resemblance is found to exist that is then called ‘violence,’” and the 
strategy of stipulating a definition that “specifies, usually at an ontic and not an ontological level what counts as 
violence.” 
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depends on those who define it. 
Schinkel also argues that the strategy of arguing that violence is an essentially contested 
concept does not work.  He writes that “approaches intent on regarding violence as ‘essentially 
contested’…lose the ability to contest…[the] contingent outcomes [of variously defined kinds of 
violence] and in practice they will be led to observe violence only where private violence and 
state violence clash.”38  So, Schinkel rejects a commonsense view of violence as insufficient, and 
rejects the view that argues that violence is an essentially contested concept.  His main point is 
that there is a regime of violence that regulates what is recognized as kinds of violence, including 
the violence of the state and the violence of private individuals.  In particular, he argues that 
recognition of this regime of violence is “a refusal to reify and ratify state conceptions of 
violence.”  However, Schinkel’s rejection of the view that the concept of violence is essentially 
contestable is itself reflective of his own political ideological assumption that only his definition 
of a regime of violence can effectively scrutinize a state’s ability to distinguish between kinds of 
violence.  That is, Schinkel’s rejection of the view that the concept of violence is essentially 
contestable is itself contestable, and non-neutrally political.       
 
1.12 Conclusion:  The Persistence of the Core of the Commonsense View of Violence 
Two definitions can agree that an event or action is violent, according to the paradigm 
case core conception of violence, but disagree on the kind of violence it happens to be, and on 
what kind of value the violence bears.  One’s preferred political ideology is indicated by the way 
in which one distinguishes between valued and disvalued violence, in connection to other things 
that are also valued and disvalued.  Likewise, social-political and historical context influence the 
way in which one defines kinds of violence.  Kinds of violence exist only insofar as one defines 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 323. 
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them as such in relation to other things.  Yet, the paradigm case core of commonsense views of 
violence persists.     
 Given the persistence of the general agreement on what paradigmatically counts as 
violence, the question is why is there less agreement concerning kinds of violence?  Why is it 
that the anarchist's violence is illegitimate according to democratic liberalism, if they both aim 
for freedom?  Why is it that the same action, such as blowing up a building, can count as both 
terrorism and as emancipatory?  How can freedom be valued, but when an adversary pursues 
freedom, his violence is disvalued, while one’s own use of violence toward freedom is valued?  
Perhaps it is because, beyond the paradigm case core, distinctions between kinds of violence are 
essentially contestable, and this implies that they are not politically neutral.  Two opposed 
political ideologies can agree upon a goal, such as justice or freedom, but consider one another's 
uses of violent means toward that goal as illegitimate.  The following chapter will pursue this 
line of thought, arguing that violence, beyond the paradigm case core conception of violence, is 
an essentially contested concept.     
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CHAPTER TWO:  WHEN VIOLENCE IS AN ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The paradigm case core of the concept of violence involves cases of the intentional use of 
physical means for the sake of causing physical or psychological harm or destruction.  Most 
people would agree with this definition, and it would be unusual for someone to disagree with it.  
Most people consider violence to be a wrong.  For example, it would be unusual for someone to 
think that no violence has occurred when a person has intentionally crushed another person’s 
skull with a cinder block.  This is an instance of an intentional use of physical means (the body 
of the person who crushes with the cinder block, the body/skull of the person who is crushed by 
the cinder block, and the cinder block itself) for the sake of causing harm and destruction (the 
crushing of the skull, and likely, the death or severe cranial damage of the victim).  Assuming 
that most agree that this is a violent act or event, this example serves as a paradigmatic example 
of violence.  However, as soon as we ask if this action is wrong, or why the action took place, or 
if it was a justified act, we are confronted with a disagreement because we are valuing the kind 
of violence we believe it to be.  Perhaps the action is justified, and perhaps not, but either way, 
the action will be evaluated by a person in its connection to other things.  This indicates that, 
though there is agreement concerning a core of paradigm cases of violence, as soon as we move 
away from this core to consider justifications of violence, disagreements emerge. 
The political ideologies of liberalism, nationalism, communism, and anarchism all justify 
the uses of violence, explicitly or implicitly, as a means toward their goals.  The issue is that 
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justifications for uses of violence, such as those given within the purview of these political 
ideologies, conflict with one another.  These political ideologies sometimes compete against one 
another theoretically, and in actual practice, vying to gain their goals, and to destroy one another.  
They can fundamentally disagree with one another politically ideologically, and they can 
disagree with one another’s uses of violence toward goals.  Each considers its own depiction of 
human existence, and of relationships between humans, to be the correct or best one.  These 
opposed political ideologies agree on the wrongness of violence in the paradigm cases, but 
disagree upon what kind of violence those actions and events happen to be.  Examples of 
definitions of violence produced by Vittorio Bufacchi, the World Health Organization, Thomas 
Nagel, and Verena Erlenbusch are outlined in order to show that Walter Bryce Gallie's and 
Alasdair MacIntyre's characterizations of essentially contested concepts are fulfilled by the 
concept of violence. 
 Here, two points are made concerning distinctions between kinds of violence.  First, what 
counts as kinds of violence is essentially contested, and second, because there is agreement 
concerning the wrongness of violence in the paradigm cases, the concept of violence plays a 
special role within political philosophy.  Because there is agreement in relation to wrongness 
with respect to the paradigm cases, it is rhetorically effective to extend the concept to apply to 
other kinds of acts.   
 
2.2 Vittorio Bufacchi on What Violence is Not 
 Vittorio Bufacchi, in his recent (2013) encyclopedia entry “Violence,” distinguishes 
violence from what it is not, namely, power, coercion, harm, and force.39  He means to zero in on 
one defining set of characteristics that is unique to violence, and that significantly distinguishes 
                                                          
39 International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette, (Hoboken:  Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), s.v. “Violence.”   
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violence from power, coercion, harm, and force.  On power, for example, he conceives of it as “a 
dispositional concept, something that people who possess it have the option to use,” and violence 
as “not something we possess or [do] not possess; it is not a capability we either have or [do] not 
have.  Instead, violence is something we do; it is an act.”  This indicates that there is a difference 
between a person's ability to act and a person’s performance of that act.  A person has the power 
(ability) to be violent, and then when the person is violent, that power is enacted as an act of 
violence.  This means that power precedes violence, and is connected to violence, but is not 
violence itself.  Violence is not something that is possessed as a capability, but is instead an 
act.40   
 On the distinction between violence and coercion, Bufacchi explains that “while violence 
can be used to coerce, in which case violence is a form of coercion, not all acts of violence are 
necessarily acts of coercion, since it is possible for coercion to occur without violence.”  This 
distinction between violence and coercion amounts to the claim that violence and coercion can 
occur together, but not necessarily.  Violence is sometimes coercive, but not always.  Bufacchi 
adds the distinction that “coercion is...by definition an act that undermines voluntariness,” and 
violence does not always “undermine voluntariness.”   
 On the distinction between violence and harm, Bufacchi writes that, ““harm” is a term we 
use to describe the consequences of violence, but it is not necessarily what constitutes the act of 
violence in itself.  In other words, the experience of harm is a consequence or sign of violence; to 
define violence in terms of the harm is to mistake the symptom for the disease.”  Here, Bufacchi 
is distinguishing between actions and what results from them.  First there is the power (ability) to 
                                                          
40 Bufacchi also provides reasons for thinking of violence as distinct from “excessive force,” which are the same as 
the reasons he gives for thinking that violence is distinct from power.  He writes, “force (as with power) is a 
dispositional concept, to the extent that it refers to an ability or potentiality.”   
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be violent, then the violent act itself is performed, and then harms result.  Violence produces 
harms, but we should not refer to the harm itself as violence.  So, altogether, violence is 
sometimes coercive and sometimes “undermine[s] voluntariness,” but not always; violence is an 
act and is not possessed as an ability in the way that power is possessed as an ability; violence is 
not the harms that result from violent acts.   
 In addition to indicating what violence is not, Bufacchi adds that “violence is an 
evaluative concept, perhaps even a normative concept.”  This means that an action is evaluated 
as counting as a violent act.  As indicated in the discussion above concerning the paradigm case 
core conception of violence, an action or event may commonly count as being a violent one, but 
beyond the core cases, there are distinctions between kinds of violence.  So, in addition to this 
evaluation of an action as counting as a violent one, there are also evaluations of the kind of 
violence the action happens to be, which Bufacchi does not discuss.  Instead, he next focuses on 
defining violence on the basis of its etymological relationship to the concept of violation.  
 
2.3 Newton Garver's Influential Argument Concerning the Relationship between a 
Violation and Violence 
 
 In order to relate the concept of violence to the concept of “to violate,” Bufacchi utilizes 
Newton Garver's influential What Violence Is because Garver defines violence in terms of a 
violation, and notes that “following Garver, many contemporary theorists of violence have 
converged on the idea of defining violence in terms of a violation, although there seems to be 
some disagreement about what exactly is being violated when an act of violence takes place.”41  
                                                          
41 Newton Garver, “What Violence Is,” in Violence:  A Philosophical Anthology, ed. Vittorio Bufacchi (New York:  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 5338.  Here is Garver on the relationship between the concept of violence and the 
concept of violation.  He writes, “Violence in human affairs is much more closely connected with the idea of 
violation than with the idea of force. What is fundamental about violence is that a person is violated...because a 
person has certain rights which are undeniably, indissolubly, connected with being a person. One of these is a right 
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There may be convergence on this etymological relationship, but disagreement persists.  Perhaps 
this disagreement persists because we tend to use the word ‘violence’ in many ways.  For 
example, we might say that a person violently slams on the breaks of his car to avoid a collision.  
However, whether the braking mechanism, the car itself, or the possibility of a collision are 
violated is highly debatable.  So, the etymological relationship between violence and “to violate” 
may be informative, but does not indubitably establish what counts as violence.   
 
2.4 An Etymological Relationship between Violence and Violate 
 The etymological relationship between 'violence' and 'violate' exists because the terms 
share the Latin root ‘vis.’  The term “violent” comes from the Latin violentus, which is composed 
of vis and -olentus.  Vis means “strength, force, power, energy, [and] hostile strength.”42  -
olentus means “having in quantity, full of.”  So, violentus means “forcible, violent, vehement, 
impetuous, [and] boisterous.”43  The Latin word for “violation” is violātus, which is the 
participle of violo.  Violo means “to treat with violence, injure, dishonor, outrage, violate.”44  So, 
there appears to be a strong etymological relationship between the terms “violation” and 
“violence,” but this relationship constitutes only one way of thinking about what violence is.  It 
only tells us that violence and violate have an etymological relationship.  It does not tell us what 
violence is.  Also, the Latin root, 'vis,' includes “force” and “power,” which disagrees with 
Bufacchi’s distinctions between violence and power.  This etymological relationship does not 
provide a static, agreed upon definition of the concept of violence.  All it does is relate the word 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to one’s body…Apart from a body, what is essential to one's being a person is dignity…[and] autonomy is essential 
to being human.”  A violation of a body, of dignity, or of autonomy counts as violence. 
 
42 Charlton Thomas Lewis, An Elementary Latin Dictionary (New York:  American Book Company, 1890), 924. 
43 Ibid. 922. 
44 Ibid. 922. 
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'violence' to the word 'violate' on the vague foundation of their share root, 'vis.'  There is a 
difference between an etymological relationship between concepts and how those concepts are 
used. 
 Additionally, in order to rebut a claim that this etymological relationship indicates a 
definition for violence only requires finding an instance in which we claim that violence has not 
occurred, but a violation has, or that a violation has not occurred, but violence has.  If such 
situations are tenable, then the etymological relationship is not a strong one.  We can separate the 
concept of violence from the concept of violate in a way that erodes the claim that the 
etymological relationship is significant.  As long as it is debatable whether every instance of 
violence involves a violation, and whether every instance of a violation involves violence, this 
etymological relationship does not serve as a ground for a definition of the concept of violence, 
and does not reveal what violence is. 
 
2.5 Bufacchi on Three Kinds of Violence 
 
 Bufacchi distinguishes between (1) a Minimalist Conception of Violence (MCV), which 
equates to a deliberate use of physical force for the sake of producing suffering or injury, (2) 
psychological violence, which does not necessarily involve a use of physical force, and (3) 
structural or institutional violence, which he refers to as “the Comprehensive Conception of 
Violence” (CCV).45  The general distinction between MCV, and CCV, is that the prior entails a 
“notion of excessive force,” while the latter implies “the notion of a violation of rights.”  One 
commonsense view of violence, discussed earlier, includes the first two kinds of violence 
                                                          
45 Bufacchi, 5339.  Garver characterizes four kinds of violence:  “Violence in human affairs amounts to violating 
persons. It occurs in several markedly different forms, and can usefully be classified into four different kinds based 
on two criteria, whether the violence is personal or institutionalized, and whether the violence is overt or covert and 
quiet.” 
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Bufacchi defines.  Here, Bufacchi relates “excessive force” to violence, however, he also 
associates “force” with power on the grounds that force and power are dispositional, in the sense 
of abilities and potentialities.  So, he argues that because force “is a dispositional concept, to the 
extent that it refers to an ability or potentiality,” and because “violence is an evaluative concept,” 
these concepts are distinct.  It is difficult to see how violence can be defined in a politically 
neutral way, in that excessiveness is relevant to the goals in question.     
Bufacchi also suggests a “third way” to define violence “as a violation of integrity,” and 
an “integrity” is “something that has not been broken, or that has not lost its original form.”46  It 
is “integrity as wholeness or completeness.”  That is, “violence can be defined as a violation of 
integrity to the extent that violence damages or destroys a pre-existing unity.”  The paradigm 
case core conception does not depend on notions of integrity, unity, wholeness, or completeness.  
We might ask why does there have to be a damaged or destroyed integrity in order for it to be 
said that violence has occurred?  If it is the case that whenever something is a pre-existing unity 
that has been violated or broken, violence has occurred, then it could be said that there is a lot of 
this kind of violence that occurs.  The violence of disrupting a serene pond, the violence of an 
airplane flying through a cloud, the violence of eating a sandwich.  Perhaps poetically, this 
makes sense, but it does not agree with paradigmatic cases of violence, such as when one person 
purposefully uses a sledge hammer to break the ankles of another person. 
In relation to CCV (the Comprehensive Conception of Violence), which implies “a 
violation of rights,” again there arises the problem with establishing what rights are.  If social-
political and historical context matters, and there is no reason to think it does not, then what 
counts as a violation of rights is going to vary from one place in history to another.  Under a kind 
of slavery, for example, if a slave has no legal rights, but is merely considered the subhuman 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 5340. 
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property of an owner, a slave might not count as suffering “structural or institutional violence” 
because the slave does not even count as a full-fledged right-bearing human in the way that we 
would say the person does suffer this once slavery is abolished.  The point is that, whether there 
is a violation of rights, and an occurrence of “structural or institutional violence,” can depend 
upon historical and geographical context to the point that on one day, a person does not suffer 
this kind of violence, but the next week the person does suffer it.  So, whether a person is 
violated, and suffers “Comprehensive Violence” is not clear, given the various ways that people 
are and are not considered rights-holders within specific places and times.   
 Historical and geographical context also applies to the second kind of psychological 
violence Bufacchi distinguishes, because whether a person is psychologically violated depends 
on the psychology of that person in relation to the historically contextual understanding of 
psychology and practice of social norms at a particular time and place.  Verbal castigations, 
deception, and coercion may or may not count as psychological violence, if the people in the 
context in which these take place consider them to be more or less “normal” things for one 
person to say or do to particular others.  In relation to the paradigm case core conception of 
violence, Bufacchi’s distinctions between these three kinds of violence, though useful for 
critiquing social practices, institutions, and governments, are not likely to be commonly shared.  
What counts as psychological or comprehensive violence from the perspective of one person, or 
a group of people, may not count as these kinds of violence from the perspective of another 
person, or group of people. 
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2.6 Bufacchi's Definition of Violence 
 
 Disregarding for now the criticisms that can be raised against Bufacchi's distinctions 
between kinds of violence, force, excessive force, and power, let’s look at how he actually 
defines it.  Bufacchi writes, 
An act of violence occurs when the integrity or unity of a subject 
(person or animal) or object (property) is intentionally or 
unintentionally violated, as a result of an action or omission.  The 
violation may occur at the physical or psychological level, through 
physical or psychological means.  A violation of integrity will 
usually result in the subject being harmed or injured, or the object 
being destroyed or damaged. 
 
This definition extends far beyond the paradigm case core conception of violence, given that it 
includes unintentional violations of an integrity or unity, and omissions.  It also specifies that 
violence can occur against objects.  Bufacchi's aim with this definition of violence is to 
comprehensively cover a variety of kinds of violence so that anything that could qualify as an 
instance of violence is accounted for. 
Additionally, Bufacchi indicates that an act of violence can be psychological, 
unintentional and an omission, which means that whether we are aware of this violence is 
relative to whether it ever even becomes clear to us that this unintentionally missing thing is 
psychologically affecting us.  That violence can be psychological, unintentional, and an omission 
opens the door to a variety of possible claims concerning kinds of violence.  For example, 
events, or significant things that happen within the course of history, are significant in relation to 
someone who thinks of them as significant.  If an event is significant because it did not happen, 
or unintentionally happened, or only happened psychologically, then there are many significant 
things not taking place that destroy some kind of possible integrity or unity.  This means that, 
given all the things that are unintentionally not happening, and that are psychologically affecting 
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us because they are not happening, there is a lot of violence taking place in nonphysical ways of 
which we are unaware.   
One can always point out that something did not occur due to no one's direct intention, 
and that one suffers “psychological violence” or “comprehensive violence” as a result, but this 
could result in too many things being described as violence that we might otherwise not count as 
violence.  For example, a person might complain that they did not receive a good upbringing, not 
because the person's parents intentionally neglected that person, but because they unintentionally 
forgot to buy the person the right kind of shoes, which caused psychological issues in relation to 
the person's friends who have high standards when it comes to the shoes one wears.   
 
2.7 Bufacchi on the Identity and Consequentialist Arguments for Justified Violence 
 
 Bufacchi goes on to argue that “violence is bad and prima facie wrong, yet there are 
times when, at least in principle, violence can and ought to be justified,” and this means that we 
are justifying an “evil” when we justify violence.  But, he adds that we might think of violence as 
both good and bad, depending on how it is used.  In order to indicate what he means, Bufacchi 
produces an “Identity Argument,” which says that “violence is good if, through an act of 
violence, the perpetrator is able to reestablish his or her own identity as a person of equal moral 
value, deserving the respect of others.”  But, he adds that this Identity Argument “makes it too 
easy to justify violence,” since someone could use it as an excuse.  The Identity Argument 
assumes that violence can be good when it defeats other kinds of violence.  According to this 
Argument, violence is justified and good only when it reestablishes a person’s identity such that 
the person is deserving of respect.  Otherwise, a use of violence is bad.  The person’s identity is 
reestablished when that person is “of equal moral value.” 
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 In contrast to the Identity Argument, which assumes violence to be both good and evil, 
but good only when it reestablishes a person’s identity such that the person is deserving of equal 
moral respect, Bufacchi also produces a “Consequentialist Argument,” which considers violence 
to be evil, and only justifies violence “when it is a necessary evil, an indispensable means 
toward preventing an even greater evil and/or promoting a greater good.”  This Consequentialist 
Argument justifies violence only if violence is necessary toward eliminating something worse.  It 
considers all violence to be evil.  It follows from this Consequentialist Argument that violence 
can only be known to be a necessary evil, and not merely evil, retrospectively.  It has to be 
shown that the violence does not merely make things worse, but eliminates something worse, 
which cannot be known at the time the violence occurs.  If the violence eliminates something 
worse, then this can only be known after the violence has occurred.  So, the point at which 
violence becomes a necessary evil, and not only evil violence cannot be the point at which the 
violence is used.  A use of violence can be defined as a necessary evil only on the assumption 
that one knows what will happen when that violence, but this can only be confirmed after the 
fact. 
 Overall, then, Bufacchi's distinctions between violence and other things such as power, 
force, coercion, and harm, as well as his definitions of kinds of violence extend far beyond the 
paradigm case core concept of violence, and do not only focus on intentional uses of physical 
means for the sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction.  The Identity 
Argument and Consequentialist Argument are each ways in which violence could be justified.  
Both arguments evaluate violence, defining it as evil, but sometimes as good, or sometimes as a 
necessary evil.  In the next section, Bufacchi's definitions are compared to the definition of 
violence produced by the World Health Organization. 
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2.8 The World Health Organization's Definition of Violence and the Role of Intentions 
 The World Health Organization defines violence as “the intentional use of physical force 
or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, 
which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment, or deprivation.”47  The obvious difference between Bufacchi's definition and 
this one is that the WHO does not include unintentional violence, violence as an omission, and 
violence against objects.  The WHO only includes the criteria of “the intentional use of physical 
force, threatened or actual” as that which distinguishes what counts as violence.  One significant 
difference between the definitions produced by the WHO and Bufacchi is that the WHO requires 
the intention to use violence as a criterion for an action to qualify as an act of violence, while 
Bufacchi does not.  According to the WHO’s definition, an unintended threat to cause harm, 
destruction, or damage does not count as violence.  Despite the fact that intentions are 
psychological, and are not always obvious for that reason, the WHO's definition relies on a 
transparency of intentions.  However, the WHO’s definition reflects the universally agreed upon 
wrongness of paradigmatic cases of violence. 
 The WHO, and most versions of commonsense views of violence, reflect an assumption 
that people are only ever violent when they intend to be.  Bufacchi’s definition, in contrast, 
counts unintentional uses of excessive force that results in harms or destruction as kinds of 
violence.  Bufacchi’s definition thus has a political implication:  it makes it possible to hold 
individuals and collectives of people accountable for the harms and destruction they produce, 
even if they did not mean to produce those harms and that destruction. 
 
                                                          
47 “Health Topics:  Violence,” World Health Organization, accessed March 14, 2014,   
http://www.who.int/topics/violence/en/  
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2.9 Diverse Perspectives, Ideology, and Fundamental Disagreements 
 The point is not that the definition of violence produced by the WHO is worse in relation 
to Bufacchi's.  My goal here is not to produce some sort of hierarchy concerning better and 
worse kinds of definitions of violence, but only to indicate that there is a fundamental 
disagreement concerning what violence is.  That is, beyond the paradigm case core conception of 
violence, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contestable.  There are 
similarities between the definitions produced by various individuals, particularly in that violence 
is typically treated as a means, intentions can but do not necessarily matter, and something is 
harmed or destroyed, but the differences between definitions abound, and these indicate that the 
concept of violence is an essentially contested one.   
The issue is that definitions for violence, beyond the paradigm case core conception of 
violence, differ.  From the perspective of one definition, some act or event can count as a violent 
one, but not necessarily from the perspective of other definitions.  Likewise, from the 
perspectives of a person, collective of people, state, or institution, what counts as violence, and 
as a kind of violence is not always what everyone would agree is violence.  The violence of an 
individual differs from collective violence, state violence, and institutional violence.  The four of 
these do not necessarily correspond to any commonsense view of violence, if the violent acts and 
events these produce are something other than an intentional use of physical means for the sake 
of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction.  To complicate matters, there are 
kinds of violence besides those that produce physical or psychological harms or destruction, 
intentionally or unintentionally.  We have already seen, via the Identity argument and 
Consequentialist Arguments discussed by Bufacchi, that violence can be defined and justified, as 
a good, even if it is evaluated as an evil, or wrong.  Definitions can be produced for symbolic, 
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linguistic, objective, subjective, creative, destructive, legal, illegal (criminal), legitimate, 
illegitimate, vengeful, and emancipatory, and revolutionary violence.  Later, in the fourth 
chapter, it is also argued that non-violence itself can count as a kind of violence.  Whether an 
action or event counts as a kind of violence, and possibly as justified, depends on the definition 
one agrees with.  The core paradigm case conception, because it evaluates all cases that fit the 
paradigm violence as wrong, does not serve to justify any kind of violence, though it could be 
used in order to indicate what is and is not violence.  The paradigm core cases may be useful for 
establishing an agreement upon what counts as violence, but in relation to other definitions for 
and distinctions between kinds of violence, one can disagree, arguing that a given definition does 
not account for other kinds of violence.  Given the diversity of possible perspectives pertaining 
to kinds of violence, it appears that distinctions between kinds are possible, but these distinctions 
extend the paradigm case core conception of violence as a wrong.   
 
2.10 The Application of Gallie's Criteria for Essentially Contested Concepts to the Concept 
of Violence 
 
 In his seminal article, Essentially Contested Concepts, Walter Bryce Gallie argues that an 
essentially contested concept is a concept that is used in different ways within arguments 
produced by theorists such that it is obvious that “there is no one clearly definable general 
use...which can be set up as the correct or standard use.”48  I will apply Gallie's argument to the 
concept of violence because violence is a concept “the proper use of which inevitably involves 
endless disputes about [its] proper uses on the part of the users.”49  Despite that there is common 
agreement concerning paradigmatic examples of violence, the proper use of the term ‘violence’ 
                                                          
48 Walter Bryce Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56(1955-6):  
168. 
49 Ibid. 169. 
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beyond this paradigm case core conception of violence is inevitably disputed.  From the 
standpoint of one political ideology, the concept of violence can be defined, evaluated, and 
justified in a way that is “proper” according to that political ideology, but “improper” according 
to a different political ideology.  So, since a proper use of the concept of violence is contestable, 
the actions and events that are claimed to be instances of kinds of violence, and therefore as 
justified or not, are not necessarily agreed upon as being instances of those kinds of violence.   
 In order to qualify as an essentially contested concept, the concept of violence must meet 
seven conditions, outlined by Gallie, which reveal that violence is an essentially contested 
concept, and not merely a concept about which theorists are radically confused.  These 
conditions that qualify a concept as an essentially contested one are first outlined, and then the 
concept of violence is shown to satisfy each of these seven conditions.  
1. [The concept] must be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or 
accredits some kind of valued achievement.   
2. This achievement must be of an internally complex character, 
for all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole. 
3. Any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to 
the respective contributions of its various parts or features; yet 
prior to experimentation there is nothing absurd or contradictory 
in any one of a number of possible rival descriptions of its total 
worth, one such description setting its component parts or 
features in one order of importance, a second setting them in a 
second order, and so on. In fine, the accredited achievement is 
initially variously describable. 
4. The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of 
considerable modification in the light of changing 
circumstances; and such modification cannot be prescribed or 
predicted in advance...[T]he concept of any such achievement 
[is] “open” in character. 
5. Each party recognizes the fact that its own use of [the concept] 
is contested by those of other parties, and that each party must 
have at least some appreciation of the different criteria in the 
light of which the other parties claim to be applying the concept 
in question. More simply, to use an essentially contested 
concept means to use it against other uses and to recognize that 
one's own use of it has to be maintained against these other 
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uses. Still more simply, to use an essentially contested concept 
means to use it both aggressively and defensively. 
6. [There must be a] derivation of any such concept from an 
original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the 
contestant users of the concept, and 
7. The probability or plausibility, in appropriate senses of these 
terms, of the claim that the continuous competition for 
acknowledgment as between the contestant users of the concept, 
enables the original exemplar's achievement to be sustained 
and/or developed in optimum fashion.50 
 
In short, an essentially contested concept is one that is “an appraisive term [that] signif[ies] an 
achievement that is internally complex, variously describable and “open”...[and is] used both 
“aggressively” and “defensively.””51  The penultimate and final conditions, (6) and (7), indicate 
that the concept is not merely “radically confused,” but actually is an essentially contested one.  I 
will first discuss conditions (6) and (7) in order to show that we are not dealing with a radical 
confusion here.  Then, I return to conditions (1) through (5) because these are the conditions that, 
without exception, arise within the political, ideological assumptions of theorists who write on 
violence, defining and evaluating it in ways that extend beyond the paradigm cases of violence.
 Condition (6) indicates that a concept is contested, and not radically confused, because 
there is some exemplar upon which all agree that the concept is applicable.  In contemporary 
society, the events of 9/11, and the nuclear bombing of noncombatants in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki both serve as exemplars that are variously described as violence.  The paradigm case 
core conception of violence defines these as violent events, just as it defines someone’s 
intentionally smashing another person’s knee cap with a hammer as violence.  Such examples 
serve as exemplars, paradigmatic examples.  The events of September 11, 2001 often serves as a 
primary exemplar in contemporary literature, though the actions of ISIS/ISIL (The Islamic State 
in Syria/The Islamic State in Libya), mass shootings in the United States by US citizens, the 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 171-2, 180. 
51 Ibid. 180-1. 
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killing of unarmed citizens by police, and wars in general are discussed as well.  Ideologues, 
such as Thomas Nagel and Verena Erlenbusch, who are discussed below, produce criteria, 
according to which such exemplars qualify as violence, and as kinds of violence.  In short, 
though, the paradigm case core conception of violence that pertains to actions and events that 
most everyone agrees count as instances of violence serve as the exemplars, and this means that 
disputes concerning the meaning of the concept of violence are not due to radical confusions. 
Condition (6) only shows that disagreement occurs not because of a radical confusion.  
Instead, the meaning of the concept of violence is contested.  Condition (6) is not alone sufficient 
for the concept to be an essentially contested one.  Together with condition (7), a concept fulfills 
the conditions set out by Gallie for qualifying as an essentially contested concept.  All could 
agree that an exemplar for a concept exists, but not continuously compete with one another.  In 
this case, the concept would not be contested essentially.  Without continuous competition for 
recognition of the ways ideologies define and distinguish kinds of violence, the concept of 
violence would not be essentially contested.  Historic tradition in the philosophical literature 
demonstrates an ongoing competition between rival political philosophies concerned with kinds 
of violence.  Their claims and definitions are in competition.  If competition were to cease, this is 
no indication of an agreement, but is instead only a temporary time period in which novel 
definitions and distinctions are not produced.   
 The concept of violence satisfies conditions (6) and (7).  There is an ongoing contest 
between political ideologies that describe and define why and how the concept of violence 
applies to particular exemplars.  The disagreement between the WHO’s definition and 
Bufacchi’s definitions is only one amongst many.  They might not explicitly acknowledge one 
another’s definitions, but the fact that they define violence in ways that conflict with other 
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definitions demonstrates that they acknowledge that violence must be defined.  That is, if there 
were an agreed upon definition for violence, then it would be superfluous that either of them 
make an effort to define violence.  If there were an agreed upon definition of violence, then it 
could be assumed.   
Furthermore, the other five conditions required for the concept of violence to be an 
essentially contested one are fulfilled.  That is, the concept of violence is appraisive, insofar as it 
is applied in relation to some achievement that is itself assessed as violence, no matter whether 
the achievement is a use of means, or an achieved goal.  Means used toward goals, and goals 
themselves can be appraised as violent.  Likewise, in accordance with the second condition, the 
achievement explained by the use of a concept of violence is itself “internally complex” because 
the assumptions, descriptions, evaluations, and argumentation produced on the basis of political, 
ideological assumptions contribute to the whole of the evaluation of an achievement as an 
instance of violence.  For example, political ideological assumptions, such as those concerning 
how human freedom, laws, a state, police and a military relate to one another altogether 
contribute to the evaluation of a use of violence, and to the evaluation of that which the violence 
achieves.  If we are to understand why and how a political ideology justifies a use of violence, 
then these internal complexities have to be fully considered.   
The third condition pertains to violence insofar as that which is achieved, and declared to 
be violence, is not only “internally complex,” but is also variously describable.  This means that 
what is referred to as violence is dependent upon whether achievements, in the forms of means 
and goals, fit within the political ideological assumptions of a theorist who is concerned with 
defining what violence is.  Multiple political ideologies, for example, each concerned with 
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freedom, justice, the rule of law, and the role of violence can describe these in various ways that 
rival one another. 
 Additionally, since there are a variety of ways that theorists can construct their political, 
ideological perspectives, and there is a variety of ways that they can evaluate the means and 
goals that they define as violent, there is no way to predict which future use of means and gain of 
goals will count as violent, and this satisfies the fourth condition.  A use of violence today may 
be considered good, right, and legal, but in the future, this same use of violence may later be 
valued as evil, wrong, and illegal.  The concept of violence, in this sense, is “open.”  One cannot 
always indubitably know now that a use of violence is what one defines it as, and one cannot 
declare that a use of violence will achieve what is expected in the way that one expects. 
Nevertheless, because the concept of violence is essentially contested, it is possible to 
depict violence as capable of achieving, and as having successfully achieved a goal, even if the 
means used are not considered to be violent by everyone.  Political ideologies aggressively and 
defensively use the concept of violence, each in their own way, in opposition with one another, 
and this satisfies the fifth condition.  Therefore, violence qualifies as an essentially contested, 
given the seven requirements produced by Gallie. 
 
2.11 MacIntyre on Essentially Contested Social Concepts:  The Continuously Developing 
Debate Concerning the Concept of Violence 
 
 Alasdair MacIntyre, in his article, The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts, 
points out that some concepts, particularly within the social sciences, are essentially contested in 
ways that do not occur in the natural sciences.52  In the natural sciences, “decisive and effective 
answers which are inseparable from the formulation of certain key generalizations” are 
                                                          
52 Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts,” Ethics 84(1973):  1. 
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produced, if even temporarily, in ways that the social sciences do not produce key 
generalizations.53  MacIntyre refers to Friedrich Waismann's notion of “the open texture of 
concepts,” which, MacIntyre argues, “depends upon a contrast between the application of criteria 
(i) in what have been up to now normal circumstances, (ii) as a result of experience in standard 
conditions...and their application in abnormal or radically new situations.”54  MacIntyre 
considers this distinction to be similar to one made by Hilary Putnam, who “shows that to 
convey the normal use of a word involves certain sets of what [Putnam] calls “core facts.””55  
Overall, MacIntyre's reason for referring to Putnam and Waismann is that together they 
demonstrate that even though “there is not a finite and determinate set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions which determine the application of a concept...or a word...[we] in normal 
circumstances and in standard conditions...behave as if there were such a finite and determinate 
set.”56  He means that we use some concepts, even though we lack a full-fledged understanding 
of the conditions that qualify uses of the concepts, because it would otherwise be impractical to 
use those concepts.  Such concepts are “indefinitely debatable” because they are essentially 
contested.  To argue that these concepts, such as violence, are not “indefinitely debatable” is to 
prove that they are “indefinitely debatable” and essentially contested.  The paradigm case core 
conception of violence serves as the definition with which people typically and commonly refer 
to particular actions and events as violent ones.  Many can point to the same action or event and 
                                                          
53 A triangle is a three-sided figure, for example, and nothing more is necessary for understanding what counts as a 
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54 Ibid. 1-2.  See also Friedrich Waismann, D. M. McKinnon, and W. C. Kneal, “Symposium:  Verifiability,” 
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55 MacIntyre refers to Hilary Putnam, “Is Semantics Possible?” Metaphilosophy 1(1970):  187-201. 
56 MacIntyre 2. 
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say that it is “violent,” but this is the initial moment from which emerges the question, “why and 
how is it violent?” and there begins the disagreements. 
 MacIntyre adds that essentially contested concepts are “indefinitely debatable” because, 
unlike concepts used within the natural sciences, in the social sciences “beliefs are partially 
constitutive of at least some central social institutions and practices, and such beliefs always 
involve some version of a concept of the institution or practice in question.”57  These beliefs are 
ideological insofar as they correspond to and “are partially constitutive of at least some social 
institutions and practices...[and] affect their relationships to those institutions and practices, 
and...consequently affect the character of such institutions and practices,” particularly in the case 
of political parties.58  This means that, within a political party, for example, certain beliefs and 
behaviors constitute the “character” of the party, but there can be disagreement concerning what 
these beliefs and behaviors are, and there can be disagreement concerning what exactly is the 
topic of disagreement.59  These disagreements occur not only verbally, but also in practice.  
Political parties may agree that something is violent, but disagree on the kind of violence it 
happens to be.  So, though we can refer to political groups by name, their uses of terms such as 
‘violence’ that relate to their shared beliefs, but that they disagree upon, leads to their actions not 
being in agreement.  People act in relation to those things they define in relation to their beliefs.  
If there is agreement that an action is violent, but disagreement concerning the kind of violence it 
happens to be, then how people act in relation to this action differs.  Even though a political party 
may seem to have one motive, and shared belief, this belief is articulated and enacted in various 
ways.  So, whether something is violent, and what kind of violence it happens to be, depends 
upon the beliefs, ideological and political, of the person, institution, or state that applies the word 
                                                          
57 Ibid. 3. 
58 Ibid. 3. 
59 Ibid. 4. 
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'violence' to some event or action.  Even if two or more agree on some things, they will disagree 
on other things, and there is no guarantee that when they utter the word 'violence' in relation to 
the same thing that they agree on anything other than that the word 'violence' applies in the sense 
of the paradigm case core conception of violence. 
 MacIntyre also argues that disagreement arises because the actions and ideas that pertain 
to the social sciences are ones that may be identified, but their identity is not something that can 
be indicated in reference to some “law-governed” example.60  Actions and ideas are identifiable 
because there is a “continuity of institutionalized argument, debate, and conflict,” but this 
identification is not possible because of some agreed upon way in which these actions and ideas 
are identified.61  That is, there is no one, law-like way, for example, in which 9/11 can qualify as 
having involved a kind of violence, even though most people might say that 9/11 involved 
paradigmatic violence.  For these reasons, every instance of someone's declaration or definition 
of what a concept is amounts to an instance that makes it clear that there is disagreement 
concerning the concept.  A person who declares, “violence is X,” or that “X is violence” does not 
define violence and settle the debate, but instead, contributes to a continuous debate concerning 
the concept of violence.   
 Disagreement, in this way, sustains the existence of the relevance of the contested 
concept.  Disagreement does not continue in the same particular way forever, but transforms into 
new kinds of disagreements in relation to discontinuous breaks that are introduced when 
individuals produce novel arguments and ways of thinking of some social concepts.  The 
meaning of such concepts is not settled, and if it seems as if the concept's meaning has been 
settled, then this is only a period of time during which there is a lack of a production of 
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discontinuous breaks and novel arguments.  Disagreement will arise again, though, even if it 
seems as though the matter concerning some concept, such as violence, is settled. 
 Furthermore, MacIntyre argues that “innovations help to define new sets of alternatives 
which create new occasions for decision and for conflict over decisions,” and none of these 
innovations could have been predicted according to some agreed upon concept.62  It follows that 
“normative debate is ineliminable from the question of how the concept...is to be applied.  [So, it 
is] essentially contestable.”63  The point to take from MacIntyre is not that theorists are getting 
better at conceptualizing violence, but that they are merely engage in an ongoing debate 
concerning the concept of violence, innovating ways in which violence is defined.  It should be 
noted that the same is the case for other terms as well.  Freedom, democracy, rights, legitimacy, 
and justice, for example, are concepts for which there is agreement at one level, in relation to 
particular exemplars, but beyond the common agreement, there is disagreement concerning what 
should be evaluated as freedom, democracy, rights, legitimacy and justice, and there is 
disagreement how these should be evaluated.  Any attempt to “operationalize” such concepts 
(including violence) so that it is “amenable to scientific procedure” would be trivial, ad hoc, and 
only serves to contribute to an ongoing debate, not to ending it, since any one way of declaring 
that a social concept should be used would be an operationalization of the concept only for the 
sake of operationalizing it.64   
For example, one might declare that a concept should be used restrictively, but this would 
be a restriction that is made simply for there being a restricted use of the concept, and to 
maintain that only this one use of the concept qualifies as a use of the concept is trivial and ad 
hoc.  Any restriction that is ad hoc in this way is unwarranted because it trivializes the concept.  
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So, strict definitions for social and political concepts are not desirable.65  From this perspective, 
it follows that the definitions produced by the World Health Organization, and Bufacchi are ad 
hoc, and trivial.   
 
2.12 Willem de Haan on Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept 
 Professor of criminology Willem de Haan agrees that violence is an essentially contested 
concept.  In his Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept, de Haan argues that 
criminologists should move beyond “one of the most common ways of defining violence [which 
is] to argue that violence is the use of force that has been prohibited by law” because 
For a criminologist it is more fruitful, both theoretically and 
methodologically, to consider definitions of violence to be 
essentially contested, to accept that, depending on the specific 
contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, valid arguments 
are feasible for either inclusive or restrictive definitions of 
violence, and that a proper definition of ‘violence’ should not a 
priori be seen as a starting point for empirical research but as a 
temporary outcome, which may or may not prove to be useful in 
future research. Exploring a diversity of definitions is fruitful 
because by means of adjusting concepts scientific progress can 
[be] made [sic].66   
 
De Haan’s aim is to convince criminologists to avoid approaching violence from the restrictive 
view of the law.  Legally defined kinds of criminal violence are insufficient for addressing what 
counts as violence.   
Though de Haan does not explicitly state this, there is a political motivation for 
criminologists to approach the concept of violence more inclusively.  The legitimacy of law’s 
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definition of criminal violence can be questioned, and this is not a politically neutral point for de 
Haan to make.  He writes,  
Occupational groups like the police…have a vested interest in 
ensuring that ‘violence’ is an issue for which they can claim 
professional competence and which they can use to preserve the 
image of their jobs as dramatic and dangerous…[They] evinced 
interest in defining actions so that they fall either inside or outside 
‘violence.’”67 
 
The police want to appear to be authorities on violence, but because the police consider things to 
be violence, which others might not consider violence, the police reveal the need to avoid 
defining violence only in relation to uses of force that are prohibited by law.  De Haan points out, 
as an example, that while the police claim violence to have occurred when an elderly person 
slaps a nurse, nursing home workers refuse to call this action violent.  If criminologists only 
account for criminal violence as defined by law, and only when the police claim it to have 
occurred, then this is a non-neutral, political restriction within the state’s political, ideological 
assumptions, concerning its justification for its legal order, namely the assumption that the 
imposition and enforcement of laws is not itself productive of kinds of violence.   
De Haan’s concern reflects a political, ideological one because people who commonly 
agree on a definition of violence, or on distinctions between kinds of violence may overlook 
other kinds of violence, or claim some kinds of actions to be violent, while other groups would 
not.  In relation to other groups, these disagreements concerning what violence is and the 
distinctions between kinds of violence are essential.  This suggests that there is no neutral 
definition of violence, nor are there neutral distinctions between kinds of violence.  Not even the 
commonsense views of violence are politically neutral in that they only define those kinds of 
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actions and events that people commonly agree count as violent ones:  the philosophical theories 
discussed here are critiques of the commonsense view.  In the following section, I utilize Thomas 
Nagel, and Verena Erlenbusch's arguments concerning the concept of “terrorism” because 
terroristic violence is itself an exemplary case of a kind of violence that is non-neutrally, 
politically defined.   
 
2.13 Thomas Nagel on the Concept of Terrorism 
 Soon after September 11, 2001, Thomas Nagel wrote the article, “What is Wrong with 
Terrorism?”68  Here, he asks, “what makes terrorist killings any more worthy of condemnation 
than other forms of murder?”  He rejects appraising the concept of terrorism, and condemning 
terrorists in relation to the goals they seek.  Instead, Nagel focuses on the means used because, 
generally speaking, it is not the goals of terrorists that are condemned, but the particular way in 
which they utilize means.  The goals of terrorists are not always condemned, and do not help 
toward defining terrorism because they are goals that are sometimes the same goals that non-
terrorists also pursue, such as freedom or justice.  So, when terrorism is condemned it is not the 
goals themselves that are condemned, but the means used.   
 Terroristic means, though, have to be of a particular kind so that they are distinguishable 
from other non-terroristic uses of means that may prima facie appear to be the same.  Nagel 
commits to the distinction that portrays terrorists as those who intentionally kill noncombatants.  
Non-terrorists do not intentionally kill noncombatants.  This distinction enables Nagel to sustain 
the view that “collateral damage” (the killing of noncombatants) is justifiable when states use 
violence, particularly when doing so is “unavoidable – and morally permissible.”  Terrorism is 
                                                          
68 Thomas Nagel, “What is Wrong with Terrorism?,”  Project Syndicate, November 19, 2002, accessed October 3, 
2014, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-is-wrong-with-terrorism-  
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condemned, in other words, because it directly aims to kill noncombatants, and does not 
accidentally produce collateral damage.  This raises the issue concerning why it is considered 
morally permissible for noncombatants to be killed as “collateral damage,” but not morally 
permissible for the use of terroristic means to kill noncombatants.  This is particularly 
problematic, if there are no noncombatants, given that indirectly, citizens can contribute to the 
development and strengthening of combatants, which might mean that they are also combatants, 
at least in an indirect sense.  Lastly, it is also problematic because Nagel denies that a terrorist 
could accidentally, unintentionally produce collateral damage. 
 In order to explain why it is wrong for terrorists to kill noncombatants, and acceptable for 
states to kill noncombatants in the sense of “collateral damage,” Nagel refers to the exemplary 
case of the bombing of Hiroshima.  The intentional killing of noncombatants, in this case, is 
contested as a case of terrorism.  The United States, some might argue, did not intend to kill 
noncombatants, despite that President Harry S. Truman knew that noncombatants would be 
harmed as a result of bombing Hiroshima.69  In this case, the killing of noncombatants is not 
accidental.  The use of the atomic bomb, in this case, is not considered terrorism because the US 
did not directly intend to kill these noncombatants.  That they were harmed, or killed, was not the 
intended result, but an unfortunate consequence.  Thus, their victimization is defined as 
                                                          
69 Three days after Hiroshima was bombed, on August 6, 1945, and on the day that Nagasaki was bombed, on 
August 9, 1945, President Truman gave a speech from the White House at 10:00pm, in which he states that “The 
world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished 
in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to 
come. If Japan does not surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries and, unfortunately, 
thousands of civilian lives will be lost. I urge Japanese civilians to leave industrial cities immediately, and save 
themselves from destruction.”  Obviously, President Truman was thoroughly aware that the atomic bomb would 
destroy the lives of civilian noncombatants, since he publicly admits that the military aimed to avoid civilian 
casualties.  See “Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference,” Harry S. Truman Library & 
Museum, accessed July 29, 2016, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/?pid=104  It is on this assumption that 
since Hiroshima was a military base, which Truman targeted first, less civilians would be there, that leads Nagel to 
reference this event rather than Nagasaki.  It appears to be a case of Truman’s intention to avoid killing and injuring 
noncombatants. 
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“collateral damage.”  The US is not morally condemnable, some could say, because the 
victimization of noncombatants was not what the US meant to do.   
 The paradigm case core conception of violence and the WHO’s definitions are relevant 
here, since the US political leadership claimed its intentions.  Almost everyone will agree that 
the use of an atomic bomb to attack, harm, kill, and destroy people and property is an instance of 
violence.  However, not everyone will agree that this action-event counts as one that produces 
collateral damage, particularly since the US knew that noncombatants would be harmed and 
destroyed, as well as killed, by the use of the atomic bomb.   
 Nonetheless, Nagel then adds that the difference between intentional and non-intentional 
uses of violence against noncombatants rests upon an assumption that each individual deserves 
“minimal basic respect,” in the sense that, unless an individual is “a danger to others,” each 
individual may not be killed “just because it would be useful to do so.”  Any violation of this 
“minimal basic respect” is wrong.  So, the question concerning the use of the atomic bomb 
centers on whether the US thought it to be useful to use violence against harmless 
noncombatants.  If the US knew that the harmless noncombative residents of Hiroshima were not 
a “danger to others,” then did the US violate Nagel's “minimal basic respect” requirement?  If so, 
then the bombing was an act of terrorism, and wrong. 
 The issue is that, during warfare, noncombatants are injured and killed, but this is not 
necessarily considered terrorism because a state never declares its intention to kill them, and can 
deny it intended to do so.  The state can always declare that it never intended to harm 
noncombatants, and if it does so, then these deaths are “collateral damage.”  In the case of 
terrorism, though, the killing of noncombatants is the explicit, intended aim.  So, the issue 
concerns whether there is an intention to use violence against noncombatants.  The significance 
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of the role played by intentions makes it possible for Nagel to define the term “terrorist” such 
that a terrorist is one who intentionally aims to use violence against noncombatants. 
 Nagel's definition of the concept of terrorism sets out three conditions:  First, an act of 
terrorism is one that is intentionally directed toward innocent, noncombatants.  Second, terrorism 
does not aim to minimize civilian casualties.  And, third, terrorism does not demonstrate a 
minimal basic respect for (human) life.70  So, Nagel's characterization of the conditions for 
violence counting as terrorism portrays the bombing of Hiroshima, which the US leadership 
knew would harm noncombatants, as not being an instance of terrorism, and the events of 9/11 as 
an instance of terrorism.  When the US bombed Hiroshima, it did not intend to kill 
noncombatants, but instead aimed to minimize civilian casualties, which indicates its minimal 
basic respect for human life, despite that the US knew that it would kill noncombatants, that 
civilian casualties would be produced, and that the use of the atom bomb completely destroys, or 
at least significantly disfigures and poisons life.   
At this point, it appears that Nagel's distinction concerning what counts as terrorism is 
controversial.  The paradigm case core conception of violence would define the dropping of an 
atomic bomb on humans as a violent act or event.  Whether or not it is justified is not something 
that the paradigm conception of violence can argue.  Instead, beyond the commonsense view of 
violence, whether this action-event counts as terroristic is disputable, given that the US knew that 
noncombatants would be killed or harmed.  To define these killings and harms as collateral 
                                                          
70 “Human” is placed in parentheses here because Nagel's description of the moral condition, “minimal basic 
respect for life,” is intended to only apply to humans here.  In relation to wilderness, contemporary human society 
could, on Nagel's terms, be depicted as terrorists, should one wish to point out the intentional destruction of the 
environment, and the purposeful production of animals for the sake of their later destruction, which violates the 
condition of “minimal basic respect for life.”  I don't think that Nagel intends to extend this “minimal basic respect 
for life” to non-human life.  Furthermore, Nagel is implicitly utilizing the Doctrine of Double Effect.  The intention 
to respect life and to avoid harming noncombatants is defined.  This makes it possible for states to define the deaths 
and harms of noncombatants as “collateral damage.”  Violence intentionally used as a means to harm and kill 
noncombatants is terroristic. 
 64 
damage is to connect these to the concept of an unintended consequence, which itself is 
contestable.   
 In the following, Verena Erlenbusch's argument concerning the ability of a state to define 
who counts as a terrorist is discussed because this contests Nagel's definition for terroristic 
violence.  Not only does Erlenbusch argue that terrorism is an essentially contested concept, but 
she also indicates how the ability to wield greater violence enables an entity, such as a state, to 
act as an authority on what counts as kinds of violence.  This indicates that terrorism is an 
essentially contested concept because violence is an essentially contested concept.  As a result, 
neither Nagel nor Erlenbusch define what violence is, though they discuss terroristic violence at 
length, and agree that actions and events like 9/11 are paradigmatic instances of violence. 
 
2.14 Verena Erlenbusch on the Concept of Terrorism 
 In her Notes on Violence: Walter Benjamin's Relevance for the Study of Terrorism, 
Erlenbusch argues that “if the theorist uncritically adopts the state's account of terrorism, [then 
the theorist] occludes an important dimension of the phenomenon that allows for a rethinking of 
the state's claim to a monopoly on legitimate violence,” which is that a state can declare any 
threat to its own “legitimate” use of violence, or to its legal order, to be an act of terrorism.71  
Erlenbusch means that states have the ability to define uses of violence against them as terrorism, 
                                                          
71 Verena Erlenbusch, “Notes on Violence:  Benjamin's Relevance for the Study of Terrorism,” Journal of Global 
Ethics, 6(2010):  167.  State leaders declaring their own uses of violence as not counting as terror has not always 
been the case.  For example, Maximilien Robespierre, the leader of the Committee of Public Safety that governed 
France, urged uses of terror as a virtue of democracy and freedom.  In his speech, On the Moral and Political 
Principles of Domestic Policy, given on February 5, 1794, Robespierre states, “If the spring of popular government 
in time of peace is virtue, the springs of popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue, 
without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, 
severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of 
the general principle of democracy applied to our country's most urgent needs...Subdue by terror the enemies of 
liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic. The government of the revolution is liberty's despotism 
against tyranny.”  See Maximilien Robespierre, “Robespierre February 1794:  Justification of the Use of Terror,” 
accessed July 29, 2016, https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/robespierre/1794/terror.htm  
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despite that a state's own use of violence can be a similar use of violence to that which the state 
declares to be terrorism.  For example, a building can be blown up and people harmed and killed, 
but if it is a state that performs this action, rather than non-state actors, then it is legitimate 
violence, from the perspective of the state.  If it were the non-state actors who produced this 
violence, then states could define it as terroristic violence.  The use of drones by the United 
States in other countries, for example, which sometimes kill noncombatants, rather than the 
intended targets, is not considered to be terroristic by the US, though if others were to use drones 
on US territory in this way, odds are that the US would define this as an act of terroristic 
violence.  The actions themselves are defined as violence by the paradigm case core conception 
of violence, but how they are evaluated as kinds of violence depends on the entity that 
distinguishes between kinds of violence.  The state’s distinctions mean that a state would never 
define its own uses of violence as terroristic, but only as legitimate.  However, rather than posit 
intentions as a criterion, as Nagel does, Erlenbusch’s point is that a state that has a monopoly on 
legitimate violence and this monopoly makes it possible for a state to distinguish between kinds 
of violence, defending its own uses as legitimate ones. 
 Erlenbusch refers to Walter Benjamin's 1921 essay “Critique of Violence” in order to 
ground her conception of terrorism and its relationship to a state's monopoly on legitimate 
violence.72  Her aim is “to examine the discursive portrayal of terrorism by governments and 
mainstream media as an illustration of Benjamin's analysis of state power.”73  She utilizes 
Gallie's phrase, “essentially contested concept,” but does not mention Gallie's argument, nor the 
conditions that qualify a concept as an essentially contested one.  Erlenbusch also utilizes Max 
Weber’s definition of a modern state as that which has a monopoly on legitimate violence within 
                                                          
72 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Reflections:  Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (New York:  Shocken, 1986), 277-300.   
73 Erlenbusch, 167. 
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a territory, though she does not mention this.74  Nonetheless, we can ask about on what basis 
Erlenbusch claims that terrorism is an essentially contested concept in relation to a state’s 
monopoly on legitimate violence.   
 
2.15 Terrorism as an Essentially Contested Concept 
 In order to test whether terrorism counts as an essentially contested concept, we have to 
ask whether Erlenbusch qualifies “terrorism” as a concept that is “an appraisive term [that] 
signif[ies] an achievement that is internally complex, variously describable and “open”...[and is] 
used both “aggressively” and “defensively,” as Gallie puts it.75  Erlenbusch indicates that, “the 
state has to impose a certain understanding of terrorism against other contesting interpretations... 
[and] has to successfully portray a particular form of violence as terrorism,” but she also warns 
that to simply adopt the perspective of the state on what constitutes terrorism is to be 
“uncritical.”76  This assertion can be directed against Nagel.   
 Nagel argues that the state's production of “collateral damage,” which is the unintentional 
killing of noncombatants, is not an instance of terrorism.  To agree with Nagel, from 
Erlenbusch's point of view, is to uncritically side with the state.  In order to understand the 
concept of terrorism, and how it is essentially contested, how terrorists and states utilize violent 
means must be addressed, but we should also take into account how the use of particular means 
is itself usurped by a state such that the state authorizes itself as the only authority capable of 
making the distinction between what counts as terrorism, and what does not.  Terrorism is 
warfare not conducted by, or recognized as, a legitimate state entity. Terrorists intend to kill 
                                                          
74 Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in Weber:  Political Writings, ed. by Peter Lassman and 
Ronald Speirs (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310-11. 
75 Gallie, 180-1. 
76 Erlenbusch, 167. 
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noncombatants, while states do not.  However, states are able to claim that they do not kill 
noncombatants because they possess a monopoly on legitimate violence. 
Here, we see relationships between the essentially contested concept of terrorism, and the 
essentially contested concept of violence emerge:  states enter into the continuously developing 
debate concerning what counts as terroristic violence by claiming that only their own definition 
of terrorism is the correct one.  A state rejects the claim that its own use of violence is terroristic, 
and rejects the claim that the violence that the state defines as terroristic is not terroristic.  So, 
this is a foundation for a fundamental disagreement, particularly when states use violence when 
they know that noncombatants will be harmed or killed. 
 Both Nagel and Erlenbusch are concerned with the same events that occurred on 9/11.  
This exemplar serves as the foundation for a disagreement.  How they explain these events as 
acts of terrorism differs.  That they agree upon this exemplar indicates that their disagreement 
concerning the concept of terrorism is not due to a radical confusion.  Erlenbusch states that, “the 
years following the events we call 9/11 have cemented a public understanding of terrorism as 
political violence against states that is exercised by groups or individuals who do not belong to 
recognized states and thus lacks [sic] legitimacy.”77  The issue, in her view, is that “the concept 
[of terrorism] has undergone a process of fragmentation that resulted in the potential 
applicability of terrorism to all sorts of actions that are perceived as threats to the so-called 
“Western” way of life.”78  Since a state can define threats, and can define threats as terrorism, the 
result is an “obscurity that underpins and troubles any effort that seeks to establish a once-and-
for-all definition of terrorism.”  There is a fundamental disagreement concerning the concept of 
terroristic violence.  Because states define, decide, and apply the concept of terrorism, a static, 
                                                          
77 Ibid. 173. 
78 Ibid. 174. 
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agreed upon definition of violence is impossible.  What one state or collective of people define 
as an act of terrorism, another state or collective of people can define as an act of war, or as 
revolutionary violence, for example. 
 The consequence of this, according to Erlenbusch, is that “states tend to outlaw as 
criminal those acts that are interpreted as terrorist...[and] rely on emergency decrees that allow 
for the restriction of civil liberties and preemptive action.”  Once terrorism or a potential for 
terrorism is defined, civil liberties are curtailed for the sake of gaining an upper hand on the 
state-defined means of potential terrorism.  For example, if organizations defined as terroristic 
utilize Internet platforms and telephones, then states may curtail privacy-rights for the sake of 
tracking the communication that takes place within these terrorist organizations.  The result of 
states defining what counts as terrorism is twofold:  (1) terroristic violence is rendered illegal and 
illegitimate, in relation to the state's use of violence, and (2) states thereby endorse their own 
“excessive and extraordinary measures to be taken against those designated terrorists; measures 
that would normally lack both legality and legitimacy.”  Though implicitly, Erlenbusch 
significantly disagrees with a view like that of Nagel in that she takes into account that states 
authorize themselves as the authorities that distinguish between terroristic violence and non-
terroristic violence.  Nagel's distinction between terroristic violence that intentionally harms 
noncombatants, and state violence that produces collateral damage is a view produced from the 
state's perspective, and it is this kind of view that Erlenbusch's distinction criticizes as an 
uncritical view of how violent actions are defined as terrorism by states. 
 Erlenbusch's point can be put in these terms:  It is only because the state has a monopoly 
on legitimate violence that a state can declare the harms it produces upon noncombatants to be 
collateral damage.  If non-state actors had this monopoly on legitimate violence, they too could 
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define their own uses of violence as legitimate and productive of collateral damage.  Yet, as a 
result of their not possessing this monopoly, non-state actors can always be defined as terrorists 
by a state.  This does not occur due to a state's animosity toward the non-state actors themselves, 
she argues, but because the non-state actors produce an exception to the state's authority, 
threatening that authority and the state’s existence.  A state utilizes this threat to its authority and 
existence as the reason for defining these threats as terroristic, and as a justification for its own 
uses of violence against the non-state actors.  Even if a state's use of violence is greater, and 
more destructive than the terrorist's use of violence, this is for the sake of sustaining the state's 
authority and existence against the threat produced by terrorists, and therefore, from the state's 
perspective, the state’s violence is legitimate.   
Also, Erlenbusch argues that intentions only play a role because states are able to openly 
define their intentions.  Nagel’s restriction to intentional uses of violent means supports a state’s 
definition of its own uses of violence against noncombatants as collateral damage, and ignores 
the state’s ability to openly define its own uses of violence.  Anyone who produces violence 
against a state, which might be defined as terroristic violence, is already demonized by the state, 
and is not necessarily afforded an opportunity to openly declare intentions.79  So, states have the 
ability to distinguish between what is terroristic violence, and its own uses of violence because of 
the greater monopoly on legitimate violence that secures the states’ authority to make these 
distinctions.  Erlenbusch can restrict a definition of terroristic violence to Nagel’s definition and, 
at the same time, show that Nagel’s definition ignores the significance of a state’s monopoly on 
legitimate violence.  Both of their claims can be aggressively defended against one another, even 
                                                          
79 This point is complicated by the fact that some organizations, such as ISIS/ISIL, do openly declare their 
intentions and take ownership of uses of violence directed against innocent noncombatants.  In these cases, when 
these organizations define themselves as using terroristic violence, it is difficult to disagree with them, though this 
does not eliminate the fact that these organizations are unable to define their uses of violence as legitimate in 
relation to the monopoly on legitimate violence possessed by a state.  
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if they agree and use the word “terrorism” in reference to the same kinds of actions and events 
defined by the paradigm case core conception of violence.  So, because terroristic violence 
evaluates kinds of violence, terroristic violence is an essentially contested concept.  
Disagreement with the claim that terroristic violence is an essentially contested concept only 
demonstrates that it is an essentially contested concept.  
 
2.16 Conclusion 
 This chapter outlined various definitions for violence produced by Bufacchi and the 
World Health Organization.  The World Health Organization’s definition is akin to a 
commonsense view concerned with paradigmatic examples of violence, and Bufacchi’s 
distinction between kinds of violence extends beyond these paradigmatic examples.  It was also 
shown that, though there is an etymological relationship between the concept of violence and the 
concept of “to violate,” this relationship does not define violence.  Instead, at bottom, there are 
paradigmatic examples of violence that are immediately understood to be wrong.  Distinctions 
between kinds of violence, including the view that violence is wrong, are evaluations of kinds of 
violence that extend beyond the paradigm cases view.  These evaluations, such as the distinction 
between terroristic and legitimate violence, positively and negatively value kinds of violence.  
These evaluations appraise actions and events as complex achievements that count as kinds of 
violence, but these actions and events are variously describable, as shown by the outline of Nagel 
and Erlenbusch’s definitions and discussions concerning terroristic violence in relation to the 
state.  These actions and events are also “open” in that they can be defined, described, and 
evaluated in novel ways in the future.  Furthermore, how and why actions and events, such as 
9/11, count as kinds of violence is debatable, and both Nagel and Erlenbusch’s views can be 
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aggressively and defensively used against one another.  In other words, beyond the paradigm 
case core conception of violence, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially 
contestable in the way that Gallie requires a concept to count as an essentially contested one.   
The positive and negative evaluations of kinds of violence each arise from an assumed 
political ideology.  Political ideologies oppose one another, as seen between Nagel’s view that 
supports a state’s claim that it produces collateral damage when the state’s violence harms or 
kills noncombatants, and Erlenbusch’s critique of a state’s ability to make this claim only 
because it possesses a monopoly on legitimate violence.  Nagel’s supportive view reflects his 
political ideology, and Erlenbusch’s critical view reflects hers.  They fundamentally disagree 
with one another.  Their definitions of and distinctions between kinds of violence are not 
politically neutral.  So, beyond the paradigmatic examples of violence, distinctions between 
kinds of violence are essentially contested, and non-neutrally political. 
In the following chapter, various political ideologies are outlined from the perspectives of 
specific, influential philosophers concerned with the existence of modern states.  Their 
distinctions between kinds of violence are shown to disagree with one another, demonstrating the 
continuously developing debate, and the non-neutrally political character of their distinctions.  
These disagreements reveal that the concept of violence is not only an essentially contested one, 
but that these disagreements are non-neutrally political, which means that definitions for 
violence and for kinds of violence are essentially, non-neutrally political.  Agreement with any of 
them likely reflects one’s own political, ideological beliefs, and if one believes in the correctness 
of a definition or distinction between kinds of violence, then one authorizes that definition and 
distinction as legitimate.  The result is that what counts as legitimate is itself, therefore, 
contestable.  Because kinds of violence distinguished beyond the paradigm case core conception 
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of violence are essentially contested, we cannot know for certain that uses of violence are what 
we believe them to be because others can disagree with us. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  DISAGREEMENT CONCERNING POLITICAL VIOLENCE:  A 
LEGITIMACY ISSUE 
 
Nicholas Machiavelli, to Lorenzo de' Medici:  Iustum enim est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia 
arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est.80 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 As we have seen, there is a fundamental disagreement concerning what counts as 
violence, what counts as kinds of violence, what kinds of violence are legitimate and to what 
violence is essentially connected.  The previous chapter argues that, beyond the paradigm core 
case conception of violence, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contested.  In 
this chapter, it will be argued that this disagreement is essentially non-neutrally political and that 
defined kinds of violence are essentially non-neutrally political.  Much of this has to do with the 
fact that philosophers, historians, and scholars are concerned with the existence of the modern 
state, and its relationship to violence, power, the political, freedom, justice, legitimacy, law, and 
other things.  Each individual person concerned with these kinds of things in their relation to the 
modern state, produces moral equivalence claims, connecting these things in relationships to one 
another in evaluative ways that fundamentally disagree with how others connect them.  Each of 
their views conflict with the views of others in ways that are politically ideological, and 
therefore, are non-neutrally political.  The result, it is argued, is that violence is an essentially 
contested concept for which no definition in the standard philosophical literature is politically 
neutral.  Choosing one definition or distinction between kinds of violence reflects one’s belief in 
                                                          
80 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (New York:  Penguin Books, 2005), 110.  “Because a necessary war is a just 
war and where there is hope only in arms, those arms are holy.”  Machiavelli quotes Titus Livius (Livy). 
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a political ideology, even if one chooses one of the commonsense views.  This is because 
choosing how to define and value kinds of violence means believing in the legitimacy of that 
definition or distinction between kinds of violence.   
Hanna Arendt, for example, in her On Violence, argues that violence is not essential to a 
state's political power because “power always stands in need of numbers, whereas violence up to 
a point can manage without them because it relies on implements.”81  She disagrees with 
traditional political philosophy’s definition of violence, particularly in the form of war, as 
essential to state political power, and intends to demonstrate the superior legitimacy of 
nonviolent political power.  By treating violence as essentially connected to uses of implements, 
Arendt aims to demonstrate that violence is not essential to state political power, since state 
political power can be construed as not necessarily requiring uses of implements.  She argues, 
“power is indeed of the essence of all government, but violence is not.  Violence is by nature 
instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance and justification through the 
end it pursues.  And what needs justification by something else cannot be the essence of 
anything.”82   
 In response to the view that violence is not essential to state political power, it will here 
be argued that whether violence is essential to state political power cannot be settled because 
there is a disagreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence.  That is, there is a tradition 
of disagreement concerning those things to which violence is essentially connected.  
Furthermore, in response to the traditional liberal assumption that a state's uses of violence are 
legitimate, it will be argued that what counts as legitimate uses of violence is also a matter of 
disagreement, given that how a theorist defines kinds of “good” and “bad” uses of violence 
                                                          
81 Hanna Arendt, On Violence (New York:  Harcourt, Inc., 1970), 42. 
82 Ibid. 51. 
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mobilizes collectives of peoples who believe in a merely theoretical distinction between kinds of 
violence.  The liberal state’s definition of its own uses of violence as defensive is not politically 
non-neutral because the liberal state’s definitions contribute to this continuously developing 
debate.  Belief in the legitimacy of a liberal state’s use of violence, on the ground that the liberal 
state claims its own uses of violence to be justified in relation to things like freedom and justice, 
does not eliminate the disagreement, but instead politically, and non-neutrally reproduces it.   
   
3.2 Violence and the Political:  Essentially Connected? 
 In a way that differs from Gallie’s approach to showing that some concepts are 
essentially contested, in the “Preface” to his work, Disagreement:  Politics and Philosophy, 
Jacques Rancière describes how disagreements occur, even when two or more people use the 
same word in reference to the same thing:  
We should take disagreement to mean a determined kind of speech 
situation:  one in which one of the interlocutors at once 
understands and does not understand what the other is saying.  
Disagreement...is the conflict between one who says white [for 
example] and another who also says white but does not understand 
the same thing by it or does not understand that the other is saying 
the same thing in the name of whiteness.83   
 
We can substitute the concept “violence” for “white” in the previous sentence.  Two persons can 
both apply the word 'violence' to something, and understand that they both utter the same word in 
relation to that thing, but can fail to understand what one another means to say because each has 
his own reasons for speaking the word 'violence' in relation to that thing.  Paradigmatic actions 
and events are commonly referred to as violent ones, but the kind of violence people consider 
them to be is a ground for disagreement.  Each person agrees that the action or event is violent, 
                                                          
83 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement:  Politics and Philosophy, trans. by Julie Rose (Minneapolis:  University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), x. 
 76 
enabling them both to apply the word 'violence,' but their appraisals of the action or event as a 
kind of violence disagree. 
 Arendt, for example, disconnects violence from the “essence” of state political power so 
that violence is essentially the instrumental use of implements or instruments as means to goals, 
regardless of the various ends that are thought to justify their use.  She does this in order to 
elevate the legitimacy of the power of people acting in concert without uses of violence.  She 
thus separates “power” from the instruments of violence:  “the extreme form of power is All 
against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All.  And this latter is never possible 
without instruments.”84  One individual can dominate the “All” only through uses of instruments 
of violence.  It is questionable whether “the All” is a politically meaningful concept.  It implies 
that no one rejects or deviates from this “power.”  The power of a “people” is not of “All,” if it 
defeats some minority or opposition group’s way of life.  It is a form of domination, which could 
itself be interpreted as violence.   
Likewise, whether violence is essentially a use of instruments as means is disputable, 
particularly because theorists, such as Walter Benjamin and Slavoj Žižek describe kinds of 
violence, which are not in any way uses of implements and instruments, as is discussed toward 
the end of this chapter.  Still, Arendt’s claim that violence is essentially the instrumental use of 
implements as means does not settle the question concerning what violence is, particularly 
because what counts as an instrument of violence is itself disputable. 
The concept of violence can commonly be applied to the same action or event, but people 
can disagree upon why it applies.  Authors connect the concept of violence to other things, 
legitimating some uses rather than others, in relation to those things.  An analysis of an author's 
claims concerning what violence is connected to, and what not, demonstrates what an author 
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believes to be legitimate.  Arendt’s emphasis on the superiority of the extreme case of a group 
acting entirely in concert is that which she believes to be superior, and so she defines it as such.  
Likewise, the disagreement between Arendt's definition of violence as a use of implements or 
instruments by “one,” and Machiavelli's (re-)assertion (of Livy's claim), quoted above, which 
translates as, “because a necessary war is a just war and where there is hope only in arms, those 
arms are holy” reveals that Machiavelli means to show to Lorenzo de Medici what counts as a 
superior kind of violence.  The connections defined by Livy entail that, if war is a kind of 
violence, and it is necessary, then the violence is necessary, and also “just.”  However, this tells 
us nothing of when violence becomes necessary, and ignores other possible disagreements 
concerning the concept of “justice.”  Justice itself can count as an essentially contested concept, 
given various ways the term can and has been defined throughout history.   
The addition that the holiness of war lies in the “hope...in arms” reflects a belief in the 
ability of the “necessary” arms of warfare, i.e. violence, to successfully defeat some threat 
against which violence is the only option.  The superiority indicated of a necessary, just war is 
elevated above other kinds of wars by this “hope,” which is a kind of belief in legitimacy, insofar 
as the “legitimacy” of violence lies in the belief that the violence is what people believe it to be, 
namely that which is believed to be capable of achieving the goals of those who believe in it.  
Livy’s quote indicates that this hope is connected to the holiness of necessitated uses of violent 
means of warfare.  Machiavelli would never suggest to Lorenzo de Medici, his intended audience 
of The Prince, that a prince can rely on the “power of his people acting in concert,” since it is 
this itself that constitutes a rebellious threat, and the possible overthrow or demise of the prince’s 
limited power.  The power defined by Arendt, because it is the people acting in concert, limits 
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the power of the prince, and is, perhaps, the reason why Machiavelli implies that Lorenzo should 
believe in the holiness of necessary, just wars, i.e. uses of violence.85 
 Of course, Machiavelli is thinking in terms of principalities, and not modern states or a 
republic in his book, The Prince, and Arendt is thinking in terms of modern, liberal democratic 
republics, but the point on which they disagree holds.  There is no agreement concerning their 
definitions of violence in its relation to power.  Their disagreement arises because, for Arendt, 
the power of the All is legitimately superior to the violence of an individual’s uses of violent 
instruments, while for Machiavelli, the limited power of the prince is secured by his placing all 
hope in necessitated uses of violent means of war, and certainly not in the people.86  Their 
disagreement lies in that, while Arendt places power in the theoretical possibility of a people's 
united actions, which makes state power redundant, Machiavelli places power in the rule of the 
prince, which is secured through uses of violence and cruelty.  Legitimacy plays the primary 
distinguishing factor in their disagreement.  We do not gain a definition of violence, beyond the 
paradigm case core conception of violence, but an indication of what they each believe to be 
legitimate and superior in relation to illegitimate and inferior things.  Were they to directly 
engage with one another, Machiavelli and Arendt could both say that an action is violent, but 
because they disagree on other things in connection to violence, they disagree on why and how 
the action is violent. 
 Additionally, Rancière also explains that disagreements are “not misconstruction[s],” 
since this would imply that an interlocutor “does not know what [s/he is]...saying. Or what the 
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other is saying.”  A disagreement does not imply that someone is ignorant, deluded, or 
misunderstood, and does not result from a lack of knowledge.  Disagreements do not arise 
because someone is not “getting things correct.”  Instead, disagreements arise “wherever 
contention over what speaking means constitutes the very rationality of the speech situation.”87  
In terms of the concept of violence, two people can disagree because they disagree about “what 
speaking [the word 'violence'] means” such that what each says only makes sense on the basis of 
there being a fundamental, inveterate disagreement.  None of the interlocutors are confused or 
misunderstood because there is a set of paradigmatic cases of violence that grounds the 
disagreement.  Were they able to speak to one another, both Machiavelli and Arendt could agree 
that uses of weapons for the sake of causing harms and destruction are instances of violence, but 
their disagreement would be (and is) how these instances of violence are connected to power. 
 In contrast to Machiavelli and anyone else who defines violence as connected to 
something that has to do with a state, Arendt argues that violence can no longer be essential to 
politics, particularly because, with the introduction of nuclear weapons, if violence were 
essentially connected to politics, then the result would be “universal suicide.”88  Her definition of 
violence reflects her concern with advanced technological weaponry.  She urges for the 
separation of violence from politics because she fears a devastating outcome, which she 
evaluates negatively, and this leads her to evaluate positively a kind of political power that lies in 
the people, and not in the uses of violent means.  Her argument is that, essentially, violence is not 
essential to a state because state political power is essential to the concerted actions of a group of 
people, and she believes in the superiority of “the All” over the violence of one.   
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 Arendt also adds another distinction between rational uses of violence as a last resort for 
the sake of self-preservation, and irrational uses of violence, which are not instances of rational 
uses of self-defensive violence.89  However, this is still a definition concerning violence used as 
a last resort.  Violence used as a last resort is defined as an act of self-defense.  The issue here 
concerns what counts as self-defense.  If a use of violence is rational because it is self-defensive, 
but at some point it is no longer rational because it is no longer self-defensive, then 
disagreements are possible, particularly concerning the point at which a rational, self-defensive 
use of violence becomes irrational because it is no longer self-defensive.  Everyone could agree 
that an action is violent, but whether it is self-defensive depends upon how that violent action is 
evaluated, and it is not necessary that everyone will agree that it is self-defensive.  For 
Machiavelli, waiting to use violence as a last resort and only in self-defense would possibly lead 
to the failure of a prince to secure his limited power. 
 
3.3 Rancière on the Logic of Disagreement 
 Now that some disagreements concerning violence have been discussed, we can look 
more closely at Rancière's formulation of a logic of disagreement.  The general logical structure 
of disagreements can be formulated, as Rancière notes, in the following way:  “disagreement is 
where X cannot see the common object Y is presenting because X cannot comprehend that the 
sounds uttered by Y form words and chains of words similar to X's own.”90  Rancière describes 
this as an “extreme” kind of disagreement because there are incommensurable assumptions held 
on the part of the interlocutors.  They fail to communicate with one another, despite that they 
utilize similar words in relation to the same things.  What appears as an agreement may be an 
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agreement to disagree, but such an agreement is merely an avoidance of a more fundamental 
disagreement.  As shown via the disagreement between Arendt and Machiavelli concerning the 
connection between violence and power, we can say that they use the same words, but because 
they disagree in relation to other things, they do not agree on this connection.  These 
disagreements are essentially political, as is argued in the next section. 
 
3.4 The Political as an Essentially Contested Concept 
 In contrast to Arendt, Carl Schmitt, in his The Concept of the Political, defines “the 
political” as the condition for the state.91  But, the political itself is distinct in that it is defined 
according to criteria specific to the political, and not in relation to other things, such as “the 
moral, aesthetic, and economic.”92  The criteria for this “specific political distinction” is the 
“friend and enemy” distinction.  The distinction between friends and enemies is the condition for 
the existence of the political, which is itself the condition for the existence of a state such that the 
enemy is “existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with 
him are possible.”93  Schmitt defines the other as enemy, and only conceives of the political as 
an antagonistic relationship between friends and enemies.  Assuming Schmitt's definition of the 
political, violence is a political concept, but this is only one way of defining the political.  The 
other need not be defined as enemy, and the collective interest of a group need not be unified by 
a common enemy.  The political, as the collective interests of a group, or as an agreed upon 
“good” that a group pursues need not be defined in any one way.  For this reason, the political 
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itself is an essentially contested concept, as is violence, and other related concepts, such as 
freedom, justice, power, and legitimacy, which cannot all be addressed here. 
 
3.5 The Political, Ideological Disagreement between Hobbes and Kant on the Legitimacy of 
the Liberal State 
 
 Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant’s agreement that the state secures individuals from 
the violence of other individuals presents a useful way toward seeing how there is a 
disagreement concerning what kinds of violence are superior in connection to other things that 
are themselves defined as superior.  Though both assume from the start a hypothetical 
assumption of a naturally violent situation of anarchy, their agreement ends here.  On the one 
hand, Hobbes, in Chapter 13 of his Leviathan, defines the state of nature as a condition in which 
“man is enemy to every man...[such that there is] continual fear and danger of violent death, and 
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”94   However, in accordance with the 
“fundamental law of nature...to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it,” an 
individual will “be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defence of 
himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so 
much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.”95  In the state of 
nature, each individual has a “right to all things,” but in the interest of peace, in the form of 
protection from the threats that other individuals pose, each individual agrees to submit to a 
sovereign, and forfeits this “right to all things.”96   
 Kant, on the other hand, in his Foundations for the Metaphysical of Morals, writes that 
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Before a public lawful condition is established individual human 
beings, peoples and states can never be secure against violence 
from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems 
right and good to it and not to be dependent upon another's opinion 
about this. So, unless it wants to renounce any concepts of right, 
the first thing it has to resolve upon is the principle that it must 
leave the state of nature, in which each follows its own judgment, 
unite itself with all others (with which it cannot avoid interacting), 
subject itself to a public lawful external coercion, and so enter into 
a condition in which what is to be recognized as belonging to it is 
determined by law and is allotted to it by adequate power (not its 
own but an external power); that is, it ought above all else to enter 
a civil condition.97 
 
In relation to the violent insecurity of the state of nature that exists before a “public lawful 
condition” is achieved, once this “civil condition” is achieved, a united group of people, as 
individuals, choose to subject themselves to the law's power to coerce.  This civil condition is 
The original contract [which] is only the idea of this act [the 
formation of a state via a social contract], in terms of which alone 
we can think of the legitimacy of a state. In accordance with the 
original contract, everyone (omnes et singuli) within a people gives 
up his external freedom in order to take it up again immediately as 
a member of a commonwealth, that is, of a people considered as a 
state (universi).98 
 
So, Kant conceives of the formation of a state in political liberal terms, like Hobbes.  A kind of 
freedom is secured through the existence of the state, and the state is that which is legitimate 
because people believe in the state's ability to protect them from the violence of the state of 
nature.  They both assume that the state of nature is violent, and that exiting from the state of 
nature is a means to defeating this violence.  The common liberal assumption is that a social 
contract, civil condition, or state, is that which secures an individual against this violence, and is, 
therefore, legitimate.   
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 However, beyond this agreement, Hobbes and Kant disagree, as Howard Williams argues 
in his Kant's Critique of Hobbes:  Sovereignty and Cosmopolitanism.  In particular, Hobbes's 
liberalism tends toward “an absolutist form” such that the state is “unitary, [but] non-
representative and anti-republican,” while Kant’s republicanism rejects Hobbes's absolutist 
liberalism as “insufficiently liberal and progressive.”99  For the sake of what he defines as 
liberal, Kant explicitly rejects Hobbes's work as insufficient.  For example, in Kant's article, On 
the Common Saying:  That May be Correct in Theory, but It is of No Use in Practice, Kant 
presents “his own republican approach to political obligation...in stark contrast with Hobbes's 
absolutism.”100  Kant begins with the assumption that there is a need for a civil constitution, i.e. 
social contract, but for goals and reasons that oppose those of Hobbes.   
For example, Williams points out that “for Hobbes moral and political truth are one and 
the same,” producing and applying political justice universally within the boundaries of each 
state, while Kant is concerned with universally produced and applied political justice not only 
within each state, but also between states, internationally.101  Kant utilizes Hobbes's 
universalization of moral and legal norms within a state as a catalyst toward universalizing moral 
and legal norms between states.  Thus, Kant “enters Hobbes's absolutist world [in order 
to]...make his own republican ideas logically follow from [his] reading of Hobbes,” Williams 
argues.102  The disagreement is that, though both legitimate the existence of a civil state on the 
basis of the state's securing its members from violence, Kant aims for security between states, 
and not only within a state.  This means that their definitions for a liberal state disagree with one 
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another because they relate the existence of the liberal state to the violence of the state of nature 
in different ways. 
 This disagreement arises because Kant takes issue with Hobbes's view expressed in 
Chapter 13 of the Leviathan, where Hobbes states that,  
In the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel:  
first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.  The first 
maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third 
for reputation.  The first uses violence to make themselves masters 
of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to 
defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different 
opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their 
persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, 
their profession, or their name.103 
 
Opposed to this, Kant, as Williams argues, aims to “supersede” Hobbes's claims by 
distinguishing two aspects of the human individual:  “The human individual is part of two 
realms:  one where we regard ourselves from the standpoint of reason, where we can be guided 
by moral laws; and, secondly, one where we regard ourselves from the standpoint of sense-
experience, where we are moved by instinct, inclination, and desire.”104  The disagreement 
between Hobbes and Kant lies in that Hobbes only addresses the second, “animal” aspect of the 
human individual, and not the first because a human’s desires, inclinations, and instincts leads 
that human to submit to a sovereign in exchange for freedom from violence.  However, they also 
disagree in that, though they agree that there is some kind of social contract, for Hobbes the 
social contract is a means to “happiness or felicity of the individual subjects,” while for Kant, the 
social contract establishes a “civic constitution,” which is “an end in itself.”105  Happiness is not 
the goal, in Kant's view.   
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Furthermore, for Hobbes, the social contract achieves “self-preservation and self-
protection,” which requires limits placed on freedom, which is transferred to the sovereign 
body.106  Kant agrees that freedom must be limited, except that the freedom of an individual is 
not limited and transferred to the sovereign body for the sake of protection in exchange for 
obedience, but is instead transferred to “the impersonal power of the law” itself.  This raises the 
issue of the legitimacy of coercion as an effective violent means to sustaining the legitimacy of 
public power, particularly when that coercion is exercised by a public authority.   
 Kant defines coercion as “any limitation of freedom through another's choice.”107  In 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, the freedom of individuals living in the state of nature is absolute in the 
sense that there is an “absence of external impediments,” but under a social contract, this 
freedom is transferred to the sovereign state.108  Individuals, in Hobbes view, agree to limit their 
freedom in exchange for protection, but once they enter the social contract, they continue to be 
coerced, insofar as they are “tie[d] by fear of punishment to the performance of their 
covenants.”109  So, as Williams points out, Kant disagrees with Hobbes's rationale concerning 
why an individual would enter into a relationship with a covenant, particularly because the 
reasons Hobbes gives for a person's entering a social contract are “expediency and prudence,” 
while for Kant, an individual enters due to “the supreme or transcendent requirements of 
reason.”110  In Kant's view, freedom is restricted, and this restriction is coercion, but insofar it is 
the law that restricts freedom, and a rational individual sees this restriction as a rational thing to 
choose, this coercion is legitimate.  For Hobbes, though, an individual escapes the state of nature 
due to the “danger of violent death,” while for Kant, an individual escapes the state of nature and 
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in order to enter into a civic constitution because it is rational to enter into legal relationships 
produced by “the law-making capacities of pure reason.”111  This means that, for Hobbes, 
entering a social contract is a means to an end, but for Kant, entering into a civic constitution is 
an end in itself because it is rational to enter into rational (legal) relationships with other rational 
beings.  The reasonableness of morality is the motive for individuals acknowledging the need for 
political obligations and coercion, for Kant, while Hobbes conceives of legal obligations as only 
possible if there is a power that enforces law.112  For Hobbes, the force of law is the ability of 
power to coerce individuals to act as obligated to act, and this coercion works as a threat of 
violent punishment or as the threat of exiling an individual to the violence of the state of nature; 
for Kant, the force of law is reason itself.  However, this does not mean that Kant dismisses 
violence as something that is never needed. 
 For example, Kant argues in the “Doctrine of Right,” the first part of his Metaphysics of 
Morals, that laws produce freedom by hindering obstacles to freedom.113  In this way, actions in 
accordance with law do not themselves violate freedom, but are freedom, in the juridical and 
moral sense.  Kant states, “If...my action or my condition generally can coexist with the freedom 
of everyone in accordance with a universal law, whoever hinders me in it does me wrong; for 
this hindrance (resistance) cannot coexist with freedom in accordance with a universal law.”114  
In other words, as long as a person's freedom does not infringe upon, or restrict another's 
freedom, then those free actions are right, lawful actions.   
 It would seem that violence is wrong, since it is a kind of obstacle to freedom, but Kant 
defines at least one instance in which violence is acceptable.  In particular, if a person violently 
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restrains or hinders the freedom of another for the sake of defending oneself, then this is 
justifiable, violent coercion, even if the person who uses violence is not suffering violence.115  
Kant states, “the deed of saving one's life by violence is not to be judged inculpable...but only 
unpunishable.”  Kant does not define violence, but gives commonsensical examples, such as a 
person's pushing someone out of the way in order to save herself.  Such an action is 
blameworthy, but a person cannot be punished for saving her own life through a use of a violent 
push.  In this sense, violence is only punishable when it does not occur for the sake of preserving 
one's own life, i.e. in self-defense.   
However, as with Arendt’s view that violence is only rational when it is self-defensive, 
we can ask what counts as self-defense and when violence ceases being self-defense, and 
various, opposed explanations could be given.  To claim that an act of violence, in a 
commonsense view’s definition of the term, is self-defensive, is to extend the paradigm case core 
conception of violence.  A violent action is evaluated as self-defensive, and such an evaluation is 
not necessarily universally agreed upon without dispute.  This indicates that, if the coercive 
enforcement of law rights wrongs, and self-defense is a justified use of violence, then insofar as 
the law and freedom are themselves violently defended, violence is sometimes justifiable, in 
Kant's view.  The legitimacy of law, of violent coercions, and of self-defensive violence lies in 
that these are rational, universalizable, and uphold the freedom of individuals.  Coercion, the 
interference with freedom, is legitimate, as a kind of violence, so long as it occurs for the sake of 
freedom, despite the fact that it restricts freedom.   
The point is that the liberal state is conceived of as that which legitimates its own uses of 
violence, but theorists of the liberal state disagree with one another concerning the legitimacy of 
a state's use of violence, in terms of what that violence is connected to.  The disagreement here is 
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that while Kant believes reason leads individuals into rational, universalizable relationships 
because it is rational to avoid violence within and between states (though violence as self-
defense is legitimate because it is rational for freedom to defend itself), Hobbes believes in the 
sovereign's ability to secure the individual from violent threats such that happiness is attained 
only within a state.  Both consider obedience to be that which is achieved in exchange for the 
belief in the ability of a liberal state to achieve security from violence, and this constitutes their 
agreed upon legitimation of the modern state's uses of violence, though they disagree upon the 
reasons why this legitimacy exists.  Their political ideologies disagree, so their distinctions 
between how the violence of the state of nature is avoided disagree, and the legitimacy of the 
states they describe is disputable.  For both, security is achieved through the exchanges between 
protection and obedience, but in Hobbes's view, the violence of a liberal state that secures 
freedom is prudent, and in Kant's view, it is rational self-defense.  In what follows, Treitschke’s 
focus on the liberal state’s destined power and greatness is discussed next because this 
demonstrates that there is not only this one way that disagreement arises in relation to violence 
and the liberal state.  Hobbes, Kant, and Treitschke are each concerned with the existence of a 
liberal state, but how the liberal state relates to violence is a ground for their fundamental 
disagreement even though they all implicitly agree upon paradigmatic cases of violence. 
 
3.6 Treitschke on Military Violence as the Condition for the Power and Greatness of the 
State 
 
 In agreement with Hobbes and Kant that the liberal state secures and protects obedient 
citizens through uses of coercion and violence, Heinrich von Treitschke, in his Politik lectures, 
argues that “the state would no longer be what it has been and is, did it not visibly girt about with 
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armed might.”116  For Treitschke, if a state is “incapable of drawing the sword when it sees fit,” 
then the sustainability of that state's existence is uncertain.117  The use of “armed might” and “the 
sword” amount to uses of military violence.  His claim is that it is necessary for a state to use this 
kind of violence:  “without war no state could be,” he says.118  So, the use of armed violence is a 
condition for the existence of a state.   
 The existence of a state requires military and legal violence, in Treitschke's view, to the 
extent that any “blind worshiper of an eternal peace falls into the error of isolating the state, or 
dreams of one which is universal, which [is]…at variance with reason.”  This rejection of the 
possibility of “eternal peace” disagrees with Kant's view.  Kant, in his Perpetual Peace, outlines 
six preliminary articles that are meant to lessen the likelihood of the conditions for the possibility 
of war, the third of which is that “standing armies shall in time be totally abolished.”119  
However, Kant adds that armies may be used for the sake of peace, until peace is achieved, but 
these armies must be used only for the sake of achieving peace, and not for the sake of punishing 
enemies.120  In Kant's view, reason itself, “the supreme moral legislating authority,” condemns 
war as a means to making law, and dictates peace as a duty.121  So, Treitschke disagrees in that 
he considers a belief in the possibility of peace to be “at variance with reason” in such a way that 
there is nothing commensurable between his and Kant's view concerning uses of military 
violence and the possibility of peace.  Treitschke considers war to be necessary for a state's 
existence and peace to be a utopian dream, while Kant considers war to be needed only until 
peace is established, assuming that it actually could be.   
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 Treitschke also argues that the state is power and greatness, which are both achieved and 
upheld by the state's use of kinds of violence, in the forms of legal compulsion and military 
force.  On state power, he writes,  
Since the state is power, it can obviously draw all human action 
within its scope, so long as that action arises from the will which 
regulates the outer lives of men, and belongs to their visible 
common existence. Historical experience...teaches that the state 
can overshadow practically the whole of a people's life. It will 
dominate it to the precise extent in which it is in a position to do 
so.122 
 
The state's power lies in its ability to dominate the lives of citizens through legal compulsion, 
which is the will of the state that regulates the “outer lives” of citizens.  In this sense, a state's 
ability to dominate over the lives of its citizens is unlimited in its “attempt to dominate the outer 
life of its members as far as it is able to do so.”123  Treitschke considers this power, i.e. ability to 
dominate, as a derivative of “its first duty,” which is “the double one of maintaining power 
without, and law within, its primary obligations must be the care of its Army and its 
Jurisprudence, in order to protect and to restrain the community of its citizens.”124  The care of 
the army and maintenance of its law are conditions for a state's remaining a state, and require 
violence.  The state only directly interferes with individual citizens, though, “in the domain of 
criminal law,” to the extent that “the principles of common law are...absolutely binding,” and 
“public servants have no option in the extent to which they exercise their functions,” which 
means that they have no choice other than to fulfill their duty as defined by the laws of the state, 
particularly when it comes to violently punishing criminals.125   
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 Treitschke then argues that war is “the next essential function of the state,” since “the 
protection of their members by armed force remains [a state's] primary and essential task,” and 
this means that “war...will endure to the end of history, as long as there is a multiplicity of 
states.”126  However, given “the economic ravages of war,” civilized nations seek wars that are 
“rarer and shorter,” but this is no indication that “wars can ever cease.”  “They neither can nor 
should,” he adds.127  The point is that, as with other theorists discussed thus far, Treitschke 
defines kinds of violence as essential to the existence of a state.  Without violence, a state cannot 
achieve its destined power. 
 On the greatness of a state, Treitschke writes that,  
The greatness of the state [as that which] lies precisely in its power 
of uniting the present and the future; and consequently no 
individual has the right to regard the state as the servant of his own 
aims but is bound by moral duty and physical necessity to 
subordinate himself to it, while the state lies under the obligation to 
concern itself with the life of its citizens by extending to them its 
help and protection.128   
 
Present military violence is not only a condition for, but essential to achieving the existence of a 
state now and into the future, and insofar as this occurs, the greatness of a state is achieved 
through the unity of all of its uses of violence.  Treitschke disagrees that any peace could be 
achieved for the reason that the state only exists on the grounds of its uses of violence for the 
sake of protecting its people and maintaining their existence from one generation to the next.  
Treitschke's point is that wars fought in the past and in the present bring about “national honour,” 
which each generation inherits from former ones such that, within a state the sacrifice of 
individuals for the State is considered “positively sacred.”129  All of this increases the 
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“greatness” of the state.  Uses of violence for the sake of the state, and the protection of its 
people, is positively evaluated because it achieves “greatness.”   
Treitschke adds that,  
Most undoubtedly war is the one remedy for an ailing nation. 
Social selfishness and party hatreds must be dumb before the call 
of the state when its existence is at stake.  Forgetting himself, the 
individual must only remember that he is a part of the whole, and 
realize the unimportance of his own life compared with the 
common weal.130 
 
Through war, individuals sacrifice themselves, heroes emerge, and “the chaff is winnowed from 
the wheat,” as “puny” citizens are “annihilated.”131  The “whole” of a state exists not only in the 
present, but as the unity of past, present, and future.  Citizens must realize the superiority of the 
state’s entire existence.  Weak citizens must willingly be sacrificed for the sake of the greatness 
of the state.  So, in Treitschke's view, the state's uses of military violence, and willingness to 
engage in war, through which “puny” citizens are sacrificed and heroes arise, is that which 
achieves the state's power, and greatness, which the people of the state believe in, because they 
have faith in the state's ability to protect their legally bound existence, in exchange for their 
obedience.   
 This true belief in the state's power, secured through uses of violence, is that which 
legitimates the state's uses of violence.  If there were no such belief in the state's power, its 
ability to protect its citizens in exchange for submissive obedience, and to sustain its existence 
into the future, then the state's uses of violence would be illegitimate.  Insofar as the people are 
protected, the state's uses of violence are legitimate because the people correctly believe such 
uses of violence to be that which secures their protection.  Without the state's uses of violence, 
                                                          
130 Ibid. 66. 
131 Ibid. 67. 
 94 
the people would lack security from internal and external threats, and the state’s existence would 
lack power and greatness.   
 Considering the arguments outlined above produced by the others addressed thus far, it is 
evident that legitimacy is at the heart of the disagreements that result from opposed political 
ideologies, particularly because various theorists disagree on how, when, and why violence is to 
be believed in.  Treitschke, Kant, Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Arendt each describe violence as 
connected to some kinds of thing(s).  For Treitschke, violence is essential to the power, 
greatness, and existence of the state; for Kant, there is the violence of the state of nature, of self-
defense of the freedom of an individual secured by universal laws, and of coercion; for Hobbes, 
there is the violence of the state of nature and of the violent punishments utilized for the sake of 
enforcing a social contract that secures individuals from the violent state of nature; for 
Machiavelli, there is the rebellious violence that threatens a prince’s rule, and the necessitated, 
justified, and holy violence required for the security of the prince's limited power; for Arendt, 
violence is essentially uses of instruments as means to goals, which means that state political 
power is not essentially violent.  These kinds of violence, for the person who defines them, are 
defined as legitimate or not to the extent that the violence is connected to the thing defined.  
Without the paradigm case core conception of violence as the intentional use of physical means 
for the sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction, these disagreements 
would not make sense.  Only with the paradigmatic examples of the violence of the state of 
nature, the violence of self-defense, and the violent uses of implements, can these disagreements 
arise because these paradigmatic examples, captured by commonsense views of violence, serve 
as a fulcrum upon which distinctions between kinds of violence, positively or negatively 
evaluated, can be defined.  Despite these definitions of violence as connected and not connected 
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to other things, no agreed upon distinction between kinds of violence is produced.  Instead, 
various kinds of violence are defined in relation to diversely defined things.   
 However, a commitment to one distinction or definition rather than another does not 
mean that there is any one way to distinguish between kinds of violence, other than the definition 
of the paradigm case core conception of violence.  In the following, Max Weber’s 
characterization of legitimacy as a kind of belief is discussed in order to develop the point that 
definitions of the concept of violence and distinctions between kinds of violence constitutes a 
legitimacy issue. 
 
3.7 Weber on the State and its Connection to Violence 
 Max Weber argues in his The Profession and Vocation of Politics that legitimacy is 
merely a belief, and nothing more.  Weber defines a modern state in terms of the means “specific 
to it,” such that “a state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the 
monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory.”132  In other words, the state 
is that which possesses a monopoly on uses of violent means that count, for the relevant group of 
followers, as “legitimate” uses of violence:  “the state is a relationship of rule (Herrschaft) by 
human beings over human beings, and one that rests on the legitimate use of violence.  For the 
state to remain in existence, those who are ruled must submit to the authority claimed by 
whoever rules at any given time.”133  The ruled must obey, however, they choose their obedience 
on the basis of their belief in the state's possessing a monopoly on legitimate violence.  So, like 
Arendt, Weber exclusively defines violence only as a means, and not in relation to goals, which 
contrasts with the other authors discussed.  But unlike Arendt, Weber does not separate state 
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political power from violence.  Weber writes, “the decisive means of politics is the use of 
violence,” and politics is the “striv[ing] for a share of power or for influence on the distribution 
of power.”134  “Politics operates with a quite specific means, namely power, backed up by the 
use of violence.”135  Altogether, Weber defines politics as that which uses violence, as the 
struggle for power, and power as that which is backed up by uses of violence.  Politics, power, 
and violence are defined in these relationships, and not in relation to goals, though violent means 
are a condition for politics and power.   
 On legitimacy, Weber distinguishes between three sources:  the authority of tradition and 
custom, the authority of charisma, and the authority of legality.136  In each case, citizens are 
obedient because they believe in tradition and custom, or in the charismatically presented goals 
promised by a leader, or in the legal-normative realm established by the rule of law.  These three 
kinds of legitimacy constitute three kinds of rule.  Given these three kinds of legitimacy, 
legitimacy itself is contestable.  For example, someone who believes in the authority of charisma 
disagrees with someone who rejects the authority of charisma in favor of the authority of 
tradition and custom.  However, all three center on the role of belief.  Legitimacy, in general, is 
the belief in a political leader’s use of violent means as legitimate.   
So, there is a fundamental disagreement concerning extended definitions of violence, and 
how these extended definitions extend to disputed things.  Next, it will be demonstrated that this 
disagreement is reappears in connection with anti-state political ideologies.  For example, a 
legitimate use of violence by the state in the name of freedom is an “oppressive” or “bad” use of 
violence from the perspective of revolutionaries who legitimate their own uses of violence 
against the state in the name of freedom.  Given this disagreement, liberal state theorists and anti-
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state revolutionaries are, for one another, “enemies of freedom.”  For each, there should be “no 
freedom for the enemy of freedom.”  However, their definitions of freedom disagree in the first 
place, which means that though they utter the same word, ‘freedom,’ there is only a fundamental 
disagreement, particularly in relation to whose freedom counts as violence and whose violence 
counts as a means to freedom. 
 
3.8 Bakunin and Sorel on the Violence of the State 
 
 Mikhail Bakunin and Georges Sorel agree that states are violent, but as revolutionaries 
who desire the complete destruction of modern states, and not merely their reform, they consider 
a state's uses of violence to be illegitimate in relation to revolutionary violence.  For example, in 
contrast to the liberal conception of the state's legitimate uses of its own violence for the sake of 
defeating uses of violence the state considers to be a threat, anarchist Bakunin inverts the view 
that “all that is instrumental in conserving, exalting, and consolidating the power of the State is 
good...and vice versa, whatever militates against the interests of the State is bad, even if it be in 
other respects the most holy and humanely just thing.”137  In other words, from the perspective of 
the state, its own uses of violence serve its interests, particularly its ability to secure the 
protection of its people of whom it demands sacrifices.  But, this is merely the state's perspective, 
and its own justification for its own uses of violence.  From the perspective of an anarchist, such 
as Bakunin, the state's uses of violence are bad, and illegitimate, particularly because the state's 
uses of violence violate natural freedom.  This is a direct inversion of liberal political ideology 
concerned with what a state does and why it exists.  Bakunin argues on the assumption that 
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natural freedom exists external to the state, and defines the state as that which destroys natural 
freedom. 
 For example, in contrast to a claim that a state makes freedom possible, Bakunin argues 
that the natural liberty (freedom) of individuals is immediately threatened by the existence of a 
state.  He defines the liberty of an individual human being such that “so long as men remain 
isolated in their absolute individuality, enjoying all their natural liberty, recognizing no limits to 
this liberty but those imposed by fact and not by right, they follow only one law – the law of 
natural egoism.”138  This definition of liberty as existing “naturally,” and independent from any 
state enables Bakunin to criticize the typical “theoretical premise of the State,” which claims that 
this natural liberty of individuals leads individuals to “insult, maltreat, rob, murder, and devour 
one another,” which means that natural liberty “produces not good but evil, man being bad by 
nature.”139  In this sense, Bakunin’s view disagrees with Kant and Hobbes, who consider the 
state of nature to be terrible.  Kant and Hobbes portray the state as that which, via a freely 
entered social contract, leads people to be good.  However, Bakunin rejects this view, asserting 
that, “the state...is not the product of liberty, but, on the contrary, the product of the voluntary 
negation and sacrifice of liberty.”  Furthermore, this “voluntary negation and sacrifice of liberty” 
results in individuals becoming “slaves of the State.”  So, Bakunin infers that, since “from the 
point of view of the State the good arises not from liberty, but, on the contrary, from the 
negation of liberty,” this negation of liberty constitutes the immorality of the state.140  The state 
is immoral because its existence is a negation and sacrifice of liberty.  On the assumption that 
                                                          
138 Ibid. 143. 
139 Ibid. 143. 
140 Ibid. 143. 
 99 
“morality presupposes freedom,” since a state negates and sacrifices freedom, it destroys the 
possibility for morality, and is itself immoral.141   
Bakunin's disagreement with the liberal conception of the state is precise.  The 
immorality of the state is its negation of liberty, which is a kind of violence, and provokes the 
violence of individuals against the state.  He argues, 
Even when the State enjoins something good, it undoes and spoils 
it precisely because the latter comes in the form of a command, 
and because every command provokes and arouses the legitimate 
revolt of freedom; and also because, from the point of view of true 
morality, of human and not divine morality, the good which is 
done by command from above ceases to be good and thereby 
becomes evil.  Liberty, morality, and the humane dignity of man 
consist precisely in that man does good not because he is ordered 
to do so, but because he conceives it, wants it, and loves it.142 
  
This is an inversion of the commands of a state such that, what is good from the perspective of 
the state, is evil from the perspective of an individual human because the individual human is 
capable of understanding what is good and evil independent from the state's commands.  This 
inversion disorients the legitimacy claims concerning a state's uses of violence, defining the state 
as illegitimate, and the revolutionary violence that state commands and state violence provoke as 
legitimate in its defined relation to natural liberty.  Like others, Bakunin does not explicitly 
define violence, but instead distinguishes kinds of violence that are then valued in relation to 
other things.   
 The anarcho-syndicalist Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, agrees with 
Bakunin that the state's existence does violence to freedom, but disagrees insofar as Sorel 
focuses on the violence of calculated, rationalistic laws of capitalism oppressively forced upon 
an individual's internal freedom of creative consciousness.  Sorel utilizes Henri Bergson's 
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dualistic presentation of human existence, discussed in Bergson's Time and Free Will, in order to 
emphasize internal and external selves constitutive of an individual human's existence.143  Sorel's 
point is that a person can freely reflect internally, for the sake of making a free decision to create 
a new individuality, which is an inward, emotional decision that becomes an outward enacted 
movement.144  The emotional, inner decision moves into the world through action.  
 In terms of an enacted movement, he writes, “to say that we are acting, implies that we 
are creating an imaginary world placed ahead of the present world and composed of movements 
which depend entirely on us.  In this way our freedom becomes perfectly intelligible.”  That 
which is imagined as a possible future is that which is acted toward, and this constitutes the 
“movement” Sorel refers to.  State-imposed laws and capitalistic relationships constitutive of 
relations of production violently oppress and destroy this internal, emotional, creative freedom, 
forcing a person's actions to conform to these laws and capitalistic relations despite a person's 
decision.  The decision to enact a revolutionary movement is decisive, therefore, in that it is a 
condition for the revolutionary movement such that, without this internal, emotional, free and 
creative decision, no such movement would be enacted.   
 Additionally, according to Sorel, the decision to act is motivated by indescribable myths 
of a proletarian general strike, which “are not descriptions of things, but expressions of a 
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determination to act.”145  The myth of a proletarian general strike is indescribable because the 
emotions that lead a person to imagine it are irrational, and cannot be formulated, or defined by 
reason.  For this reason, the revolutionary strike that destroys the capitalistic state cannot be 
predicted or known by reason with any certainty.  So, the myth of a proletarian general strike is 
irrational, insofar as it is not subject to rationalistic calculations, but arises from an emotional 
decision to act toward the total destruction of the state. 
 Violence is an issue, for Sorel, because violence is required for the total destruction of a 
state's violence.  The “myth of the “general strike”...implies an absolute revolution,” he writes.146  
His aim is to explain “the function of the violence of the working classes in contemporary 
Socialism.”147  However, in consideration of how violence functions, Sorel is not concerned with 
the immediate effects of violence, but with “its distant consequences,” particularly in the class 
relationship between workers and employers.148  The destruction and harm that immediately 
results from uses of violence is irrelevant in relation to the imagined future.  These “distant 
consequences” are that which is imagined in the ineffable myth of a proletarian general strike.  
“The general strike must be taken as a whole and undivided, and the passage from capitalism to 
Socialism conceived as a catastrophe, the development of which baffles description.”149  Any 
prediction or calculation of how the state would be overthrown is impossible.  At best, it is a 
complete destruction of the state and its violence.  However, violence plays an important, 
particular role in the present, insofar as “working class violence” produces fear:  “doubtless fear 
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is an excellent weapon,” Sorel says, but it must be used with reservation so that it does not 
“provoke obstinate resistance” against the revolutionary movement.150   
 Sorel also equates “working class violence” to “proletarian violence” and “strike 
violence,” all three of which are conditions for “keep[ing] the revolutionary spirit alive.”151  As 
such, this violence is a “clear and brutal expression of the class war.”152  If these kinds of 
violence did not occur, then the “revolutionary spirit” would, presumably, cease to exist.  
However, it is because these kinds of violence occur that Sorel considers it to be a fact that a 
class war exists.   
Proletarian violence also reveals the inevitability of class war due to the exploitative and 
oppressive relationships between workers and employers under capitalistic relations of 
production.  Without proletarian violence, redemption from capitalistic relationships cannot be 
achieved, and capitalistic relationships ensure that proletarian violence occurs.  Additionally, 
proletarian-working class violence is connected to “the experience of this great epoch [which] 
shows quite clearly that in this warlike excitement which accompanies this will-to-deliverance 
the courageous man finds a satisfaction which is sufficient to keep up his ardour.”153  As long as 
this epoch exists, the conditions for proletarian violence exist in the form of a revolutionary 
movement that aims to emancipate itself from the capitalistic relationships of oppression 
sustained by modern states.   
 Sorel also characterizes proletarian violence such that,  
proletarian violence, carried on as a pure and simple manifestation 
of the sentiment of the class war, appears...as a very fine and very 
heroic thing; it is at the service of the immemorial interests of 
civilization; it is not perhaps the most appropriate method of 
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obtaining immediate material advantages, but it may save the 
world from barbarism.154   
 
Since Sorel describes proletarian violence as that which “saves the world from barbarism,” he 
elevates it to a superior position, as a legitimate kind of violence.  He frames proletarian violence 
as that which should be believed in.  The most superior use of violence is that violence deployed 
by the worker class because it transforms and destroys the state.  He equates proletarian violence 
to an army of worker-warriors intent on destroying the state, and not on merely reforming it.  So, 
in this sense, Sorel is opposed to liberal state theorists who legitimate state violence.   
Sorel also explicitly defines violence in relation to other things, and in kinds.  He writes, 
“the term violence should be employed only for acts of revolt; we should say...that the object of 
force is to impose a certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to 
the destruction of that order.”155  Here, Sorel indicates the distinction between the force of 
capitalistic relations of production and state laws imposed upon workers, and the superior 
violence that is the inevitable ability of the workers to destroy that force.  The force of capitalism 
and laws destroys the inner, free and creative consciousness of workers, whose own violence can 
defeat this force.  There is, in this sense a hierarchy of kinds of violence, defined by Sorel, on the 
basis of which kind defeats another kind.  Sorel aims to usurp the concept of violence as superior 
to the concept of force, embellishing his own political ideology with the superiority of violence. 
In this sense, there is what Sorel defines as “a regime of violence:” 
(a) On the lowest level, we find a scattered kind of violence, which 
resembles the struggle for life, which acts through economic 
conditions, and which carries out a slow but sure expropriation; 
violence of this character works especially with the aid of fiscal 
arrangements; (b) Next comes the concentrated and organized 
force of the state, which acts directly on labor, ‘to regulate wages,’ 
i.e. force them within the limits suitable to surplus value making, 
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to lengthen the working day, and to maintain the laborer himself in 
the normal degree of dependence; this is an essential element of 
the so-called primitive accumulation; (c) We have, finally, 
violence properly so called, which occupies so great a place in 
history of primitive accumulation, and which constitutes the 
principle subject of history.156   
 
These three kinds of violence are hierarchically defined.  From the lowest kind of violence that is 
unorganized, “scattered,” and a “struggle for life,” to the “force of the state” that organizes labor, 
to “violence properly so called” that is “the principle subject of history,” Sorel defines kinds of 
violence.  The superior kind of violence is the “subject of history,” i.e. proletarian violence, 
insofar as “it represents the highest moral ideal ever conceived by man...[and is the] birth of a 
virtue...which has the power to save civilization,” transforming history.157  This embellishment 
of proletarian violence extends far beyond the paradigm case core conception of violence.  In 
fact, Sorel writes that, “it is to violence that Socialism owes those high ethical values by means 
of which it brings salvation to the modern world.”158  So, though in agreement with Bakunin that 
the state must be destroyed, and that its existence and uses of force and violence are illegitimate, 
Sorel disagrees with Bakunin in that it is not only the state's immoral destruction of natural 
liberty that provokes the need for its destruction, but also capitalism's oppressive forces imposed 
upon workers as rational calculations of bare life, which exploit, but also guarantee proletarian 
violence as a response to state capitalism.  Proletarian violence, in short, is defined by Sorel as 
the means to salvation from the barbaric imposition of state laws and capitalistic relations of 
production.   
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3.9 Violence and a Logic of Domination 
 At this point, we've seen the logic at work, formulated by Rancière, namely that there are 
disagreements that arise, not because there is a failure of interlocutors to agree on anything, but 
because they agree only to the extent that the word 'violence' is commonly used in relation to 
what counts as actions and events defined by the paradigm case core conception of violence.  
Distinctions between kinds of violence are evaluations of kinds of violence, and extend the 
definition of violence to include or exclude acts as wrong.  There is violence itself, and then 
there are kinds of violence positively and negatively evaluated in relationships of superiority and 
inferiority. 
Except for Arendt, state theorists and anti-statists agree that a state's existence is 
connected to violence, but disagree on why there is this connection, on what a state’s violence 
achieves, and on how it is valued.  However, the liberal state theorists who agree on some things 
disagree on other things, and anti-statists who agree on some things disagree on other things.  It 
is not that these theorists would be unable to acknowledge that one another speaks of or writes 
the term, 'violence,' but that they disagree with what one another means when each uses the word 
‘violence’ in relation to these other things.  The term ‘violence,’ in these cases only makes sense 
in terms of that person’s political ideology.  Without the paradigm case core conception of 
violence, this disagreement would constitute a radical confusion, but with paradigmatic 
examples, this disagreement continuously develops in novel ways.  Each of the discussed authors 
distinguish between kinds of violence according to a logic of domination. 
 Karen Warren, in her The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism, formulates a 
“logic of domination” such that “for any X and Y, if X is morally superior to Y, then X is 
 106 
morally justified in subordinating Y.”159  Though Warren's concern is to demonstrate that the 
oppression and subordination of women and of the environment logically imply one another 
because a patriarchal oppressive framework commonly utilizes this logic against them both, this 
“logic of domination” is also useful for analyzing definitions of violence that characterize 
violence as connected to other things.  Kinds of violence are defined in relationships of 
superiority and inferiority, and the superior is then believed to be justified in its subordination of 
the inferior, based on a person’s politically ideological definitions.  The above discussion 
demonstrates that political ideological distinctions between kinds of violence are defined as 
superior and inferior in relation to other things.  Then, the defined superior kinds of violence are 
defined as something to be believe in because they are superior, and justified toward destroying 
the inferior kinds.  Arendt's definitions, though they sever the connection between violence and 
state political power, still work within this logic of domination.  She defines violent uses of 
instruments as inferior to the nonviolent power of people acting in concert, thereby justifying this 
power’s subordination of the violence that can be produced by one.   
Now, in the following, the issue for Arendt's definition of the power of people acting in 
concert as essentially not requiring violence is addressed, namely because, according to Slavoj 
Žižek, nonviolent actions like this can count as a kind of violence.  Like others, Žižek defines 
violence as connected to the state's existence by defining kinds of violence, and one kind of 
violence he defines is the nonviolence that defeats the violence that is systemic, structural, and 
linguistic.  This systemic, structural, and linguistic violence is not only consistent with the 
agreement of the All, but is typically a condition of collective agreement itself. 
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3.10 Žižek on the Legitimacy of Nonviolence 
 Žižek's definition of nonviolence as a kind of violence hangs on his interpretation of the 
kinds of violence defined by Walter Benjamin.  In Benjamin's Critique of Violence, three kinds 
of violence are defined in their relationships to one another such that a value-hierarchy is 
produced, establishing the superiority of divine violence, which by definition is superior to the 
merely human “All,” over law-making and law-preserving violence.  Benjamin assumes that “all 
violence as a means is either law-making or law-preserving.”160  That is, when violence is a 
means, it is law-making or law-preserving.  If violence is not a means, then it is neither law-
making nor law-preserving.  He also distinguishes between how natural law, and positive law 
regard violence.   
 Against positive law's distinctions between legitimate, legal violence, and illegitimate, 
illegal violence, Benjamin characterizes a kind of “divine violence,” which is defined as “law-
destroying” because it expiates by destroying the instrumentalist, means-ends positive laws 
produced and sustained by law-making and law-preserving violence.161  Divine violence is not a 
means because it is neither law-making nor law-preserving.  Divine violence arises from a 
position external to the means-ends, instrumentalist, legal relationships sustained by law-making 
and law-preserving violence.  Because it destroys law, divine violence eliminates state power, 
and because state violence can only establish legal power, it does not attain justice.  Instead, 
divine violence, which destroys law “is the principle of all divine end making,” and attains 
justice, Benjamin says.162  From the perspective of a state, its power is attained through its 
legitimate uses of violence against illegal violence, but the legitimacy of this violence is that 
                                                          
160 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Reflections:  Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (New York:  Shocken, 1986), 287. 
161 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 297-300. 
162 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 295. 
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which is defeated by the justice of divine violence.163  Benjamin depicts divine violence as 
something capable of transcending and destroying the violence of a state and its laws.  So, 
though Benjamin agrees that violence is a condition for a state’s existence, Benjamin's 
disagreement concerns the superiority of legitimacy.   
 Legitimacy only exists in so far as there is the belief in the superior ability of a kind of 
violence to defeat other kinds of violence.  Benjamin, though, defines the superiority of the 
justice of divine violence above the legitimacy of a state's law-creating and law-preserving 
violence.  Divine justice, in this sense, overrides, dominates, and transcends legitimacy.  Divine 
violence is justice, which the inferior, legitimate violence of law does not attain, since violence 
that makes or preserves law is not divine violence.  If legitimacy is a kind of belief, as has been 
argued here, then divine violence is that which no one can believe in because they cannot believe 
in it as a means to anything, since divine violence is not a means, but simply happens. 
 Slavoj Žižek also distinguishes between kinds of violence in such a way that his 
distinctions agree with others discussed above, namely in the sense that violence is a condition 
for the existence of a state.  In his book, Violence:  Six Sideways Reflections, Žižek distinguishes 
between subjective violence, and objective violence, which splits into systemic, and symbolic 
violence.164  He also produces an interpretation of Benjamin's conception of divine violence, but 
one that disagrees with Benjamin, particularly in the sense of the violence of nonviolence.  If 
nonviolence is a kind of violence, then we have come a long way from the paradigm core case 
conception of violence.   
                                                          
163 Jacques Derrida, in his lecture on Benjamin's Critique of Violence, makes it clear that the relationship between 
law and justice is such that justice is not law, is not achieved by law, and cannot be defined by law because whatever 
law defines as just is measured by law, therefore, it is simply a rationally calculated extension of law.  Ultimately, 
any attempt to define 'justice' leads to an aporia, in Derrida's view.  Jacques Derrida, “Force de Loi:  le “Fondement 
Mystique de l'Autorité”” (“Force of Law:  The “Mystical Foundation of Authority””), Cardoza Law Review, trans. 
Mary Quanintance 11(1990):  919-1045. 
164 Slavoj Žižek, Violence:  Six Sideways Reflections (New York:  Picador, 2008).  
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 On objective and subjective violence, Žižek argues that objective violence (the symbolic 
and systemic) is the condition for the possibility of subjective violence.165  He defines subjective 
violence as “directly visible,” and “performed by a clearly identifiable agent.”166  Subjective 
violence includes all those actions and events that we would typically refer to as instances of 
violence, particularly because they are visible.  
 In contrast to subjective violence, objective violence is “invisible,” and is that which 
sustains the “normal” as a “zero-level standard against which we perceive something as 
subjectively violent.”  That is, subjective violence is that which is “experienced... against the 
background of a non-violent zero level” and disturbs the “normal,” or what is considered to be a 
“peaceful” situation.167  This “normal” is produced and reproduced by the repetitive actions of 
individuals, which sustain the socio-political and economic framework that constitutes the 
hidden, objective violence.  Objective violence is invisible, and is not typically thought to be a 
kind of violence, but Žižek disagrees, and argues that it is a kind of violence.  That is, this 
presumed “nonviolent” “normal” of everyday life involves a kind of objective violence, from 
which subjective violence erupts as an “abnormal” disruption.  The “normal” sustains a kind of 
violence, though its appearance as “normal” veils its violence, which results in violence directed 
against this “normal” appearing as “abnormal.”  In this sense, objective violence is the 
transcendental condition for the possibility of the abnormality of the abnormal, subjective 
violence.  
                                                          
165 Ibid. 1. 
166 Žižek’s conception of subjective violence is akin to the paradigm case core conception of violence, since 
subjective violence is that which people typically refer to as violent. 
167 Ibid. 2. 
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Žižek distinguishes two kinds of objective violence:  the symbolic and systemic.  The 
symbolic side of objective violence is violence “embodied in language and its forms.”168  That is, 
language is a kind of violence.  Things said create, and sustain a symbolic realm of meaning, 
“essenc[ing]” a “universe of meaning” that imposes a division upon the world in so far as what is 
said of things divides things into what they are and what they are not, what they should be and 
what they should not be, in terms of superiority and inferiority.169  The things people say, and the 
ways that people speak of things produces what seems to be a non-violent linguistic realm 
constitutive of a non-violent normalcy, but this is only because this violence is invisible.   
The systemic side of objective violence is the “often catastrophic consequences of the 
smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.”170  Political and economic orders 
appear to be productive of “a comfortable life,” but such orders involve “subtle forms of 
coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation, including the threat of 
violence.”171  Not everyone enjoys the “comfortable life” produced by a political or economic 
order.  This is particularly the case in capitalist societies, where class conflicts are symptomatic.  
So, systemically and symbolically, an objective framework of invisible violence is structurally 
sustained through everyday practices and linguistic expressions of individuals, which reproduce 
this framework that is typically overlooked because it is accepted as “normal.”  It is from and 
due to this objective violence that subjective violence emerges as “abnormal” violence. 
 So, in agreement with those discussed above, Žižek depicts violence as a condition for 
the state and relies on the paradigm case core conception of violence, but this is the limit of his 
agreement.  Žižek is not exclusively focused on military violence against other states, nor is he 
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exclusively concerned with coercive or legal violence against criminals.  Instead, the very 
structures constitutive of a state's existence are kinds of violence.  Since objective violence is 
invisible, there is the potential that anything counts as a kind of violence because anything could 
be the condition for the possibility of someone's being subjectively violent in a way that disrupts 
a “normal” state of affairs. 
 Žižek interprets Benjaminian divine violence as a refusal that interrupts objective 
violence, and the subjective violence it brings about, by means of a violent refusal to act.  
Indeed, Benjamin describes revolutionary violence as that which serves as one possible example 
of divine violence, but divine violence could occur in other forms, such as an earthquake or 
volcanic explosion that destroys the laws of a state by literally destroying the state.172  
Revolutionary violence can count as divine violence, in Benjamin’s terms, but only if it is not a 
means to some goal, and instead is suddenly a kind of eruption.  Žižek, though, simply runs with 
revolutionary violence as that which counts as divine violence, and conceives of the ideal 
revolutionary violent action as one in which the agent intentionally does nothing for the sake of 
passionately refusing one's participation in the systemic, linguistic, and symbolic structures that 
constitute and uphold the existence of invisible, objective violence.  Refusal defeats objective 
violence, and appears as something “abnormal” against the “normal” of the symbolic and 
systemic components of objective violence, but the refusal that is one's doing nothing when 
otherwise expected to act is a kind of violent nonviolence.     
 Žižek writes that the “domain of pure divine violence…is the domain of sovereignty.”173  
Divine violence is not pathological, not a crime, not a sacrifice, not aesthetic, not ethical, and not 
religious, in his view.  Instead, divine violence is like the “bio-political disposal of Homini sacer:  
                                                          
172 Benjamin, 282, 300. 
173 Žižek, 198. 
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in both cases, killing is neither a crime nor a sacrifice,” and it makes no distinctions between 
good and evil.  Divine violence does not simply occur for the sake of producing a spectacle, and 
is not subordinate to law, but transcends these as that which commands simply because divine 
violence commands by freeing individuals from the guilt imposed upon them by law.  In this 
sense, divine violence is, at the same time, a refusal to submit, and a refusal to accept sacrifices.   
 However, Žižek adds that “those annihilated by divine violence are fully and completely 
guilty:  they are not sacrificed, since they are not worthy of being sacrificed to and accepted by 
God – they are annihilated without being made a sacrifice.”  They are guilty of merely living a 
natural life – “divine violence purifies the guilty not of guilt but of law, because law is limited to 
the living.”  Divine violence simply commands and its commands are sovereign in the sense that 
they are free from any possible subordination of divine violence to anything at all.  Divine 
violence is not any other kind of violence.  It is not a means; it is violence that has no goal.  
Divine violence is completely sovereign, independent, free, beyond good and evil, and expects 
nothing in return.  It is an end in itself that has no further end.  Divine violence is freedom and 
frees the living from the guilt of living.  Divine violence brings to an end, but for no purpose. 
 So, divine violence is sovereign, but not in the sense of state sovereignty, since divine 
violence does not produce a foundation for law.  Instead, according to Žižek, divine violence 
should be conceived in the sense of the old Latin motto:  “vox populi, vox dei…as the heroic 
assumption of the solitude of sovereign decision.  It is a decision (to kill, to risk or lose one’s 
own life) made in absolute solitude, with no cover in the big Other.”174  Divine violence cannot 
be used as a means because it is not a means.  It is instead unconditional freedom from the 
imposition of any universal norm that strikes ““blindly,” demanding and enacting immediate 
justice/vengeance...strik[ing] out of nowhere, a means without end.”  It is, so to speak, “a leap of 
                                                          
174 Ibid. 202.  “Vox populi, vox dei” translates as “The voice of the people is the voice of God.” 
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faith,” irrational, but as such, it works toward expiating individuals from their guilt under law to 
their freedom from law. 
 Žižek also defines divine violence in relationships to a variety of things, particularly to 
what various significant figures have claimed throughout history.  For example, divine violence, 
in relation to the words of Robespierre, strikes as “lightning,” immediately, passionately, and 
with love.  And, in relation to the words of Che Guevara, divine violence strikes with hatred, but 
because it loves.175  And, in relation to the words of Kierkegaard, on the Christian demand to 
“love one’s enemy,” it is “the demand to hate the beloved out of love and in love.”  So, given 
these various characterizations of divine violence, it is beyond the domain of law and legal 
power, and it arises from the domain of love, which law and legal power cannot control or force 
into submission.   
 However, divine violence is also a revolutionary refusal to act.  This love that strikes with 
hatred is nothing in relation to law and legal power because there is nothing about a loving 
refusal to act that law and legal power can respond to without resorting to a kind of violence 
connected to law and legal power.  However, as a non-violent, non-action, doing nothing refuses 
law and legal power, and actively destroys law because the violence of law is not allowed to 
dominate.  In this way, the most effective action, “the first gesture to provoke a change in [a] 
system is to withdraw activity, to do nothing.”176  Žižek concludes, stating that “sometimes 
doing nothing is the most violent thing to do.”177  So, Žižek defines kinds of violence, and 
defines nonviolence, and doing nothing as kinds of violence, evaluating these in relation to one 
another, and assuming that subjective violence ought not to occur.  Whether anyone agrees with 
him is a matter of belief in the legitimacy of the distinctions he defines from the position of his 
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political ideology.  Given other ways to define and evaluate kinds of violence, Žižek’s 
definitions for divine violence, and objective violence, both symbolic and systemic, reveal kinds 
of violence that extend the paradigm cases of violence, which are grounds for political 
disagreement.  
 
3.11 Conclusion 
 Recall Walter Bryce Gallie’s brief description of essentially contested concepts.  An 
essentially contested concept is “an appraisive term [that] signif[ies] an achievement that is 
internally complex, variously describable and “open”...[and is] used both “aggressively” and 
“defensively.””178  Rancière logic of disagreement was added to Gallie’s definition:  
“disagreement is where X cannot see the common object Y is presenting because X cannot 
comprehend that the sounds uttered by Y form words and chains of words similar to X's own.”179  
Now that the political ideologies pertaining to violence and the existence of kinds of states has 
been discussed, it should be obvious that each person outlined above evaluates kinds of violence 
defining kinds of violence in connection to other things that are themselves evaluated positively 
and negatively in accordance with a logic of domination that serves to justify superior kinds of 
violence dominating inferior kinds of violence.  Machiavelli, Arendt, Hobbes, Kant, Treitschke, 
Schmitt, Weber, Bakunin, Sorel, Benjamin, and Žižek each utilize a commonsense view of 
violence, explicitly or implicitly, in such a way that the definition of what is commonly 
considered to be a violent act or event is appraised in relation to other things, such as power, 
greatness, the state itself, the political, law, justice, capitalism, freedom, the divine, and other 
things.  In the end, there are distinctions between kinds of violence that disagree with one 
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another.  One person’s distinctions between kinds of violence and those things they are 
connected to can be inverted by another person so that what the first person defines as superior is 
defined by the second person as inferior, even in relation to the same things, such as freedom.  
Nonviolence, which commonsensically speaking, does not count as violence, is definable as a 
kind of violence.   
Altogether then, there are numerous definitions of kinds of violence.  The definitions I 
have discussed here, which are representative, but not exhaustive of the philosophical literature, 
and include all the major examples, follow the same pattern.  One person’s evaluation 
fundamentally disagrees with another.  Each person’s evaluation of kinds of violence reflect that 
person’s political ideologies.  Political ideologies disagree with each other.  Except for the 
paradigm cases of violence, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contestable.  
Any attempt to stop this debate by defining kinds of violence is to reproduce the debate.  To 
attempt to stop the debate by only affirming a commonsense view of violence is also to 
reproduce the debate.  There are only opposed political ideologies.  Finally, for these reasons, 
these distinctions between kinds of violence are non-neutrally political and fundamentally 
disagree with one another, except for the paradigm acts that most people define as wrong, and as 
violence.  Belief in any one way of defining violence or in one way of distinguishing kinds of 
violence is merely a belief.   
In the following chapter, I will consider what might on the surface appear to be an 
alternative approach:  starting not from the concept of violence, but from the concept of 
nonviolence.  But, given Žižek’s claim that nonviolence can count as a kind of violence, it 
appears that even this starting point is contestable:  nonviolence can count as a kind of violence.  
If there is a logic of domination at work in the distinctions between kinds of violence, then this 
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argument can be generalized:  if nonviolence is evaluated as superior to other kinds of violence 
and justified in its attempt to defeat them, then nonviolence must count as a kind of violence.   
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CHAPTER FOUR:  ON THE VIOLENCE OF NONVIOLENCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 As indicated in the previous chapters, there is a paradigm case core conception of 
violence, and various extensions of this conception.  The core cases involve the intentional use of 
physical means for the sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction.  
Commonsense views are grounded on these core cases.  This implies that a commonsense view 
of nonviolence defines an action as nonviolent when it does not involve an intent to use physical 
means for the sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction.  A paradigmatic 
example of violence is a person’s intentional slamming of another person’s head between two 
bricks for the sake of causing harm and destruction.  Similarly, there are paradigmatic examples 
that most people would agree count as involving no violence, such as when a forest hiker who 
intentionally leaves no trash behind, and aims to avoid disturbing wildlife and plants, for the sake 
of not disturbing nature to the greatest extent possible.  It would be unusual for someone to think 
that a tidy, conscientious hiker like this one walking through the forest is being violent.   
However, as shown in previous chapters, there are many extended concepts of violence, 
based on claimed equivalence to paradigmatic violence, that define violence on the basis of the 
wrongness of paradigmatic actions and events.  Likewise, as will be shown in this chapter, 
extended definitions for kinds of nonviolence can also be produced.  Distinctions between kinds 
of nonviolence evaluate those kinds of nonviolence, unlike a commonsense view of nonviolence 
that only describes paradigmatic nonviolent actions and events.  Also argued in previous 
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chapters, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contestable, and there is a 
fundamental disagreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence.  Definitions for kinds of 
violence are typically non-neutrally political.  Kinds of violence are defined, for example, by 
Heinrich von Treitschke, Mikhail Bakunin, Walter Benjamin, and others, as conditions for the 
goals of the state, its power, greatness, its immorality, and the preservation of its law.180  The 
same occurs with distinctions between and definitions of kinds of nonviolence, beyond a 
commonsense definition of nonviolence.  That is, given that kinds of nonviolence can be defined 
in connection to other things, and opposed political ideologies do not necessarily agree, we 
should expect a political disagreement concerning what nonviolence is beyond the paradigm 
cases of nonviolence.   
Nonviolent actors who aim for their actions to be legitimate means used in relation to the 
state, laws, justice, dignity, equality, freedom, or other things aim to produce a transformation 
through a defeat or an undermining of something “normal” or status quo within a society, and 
these nonviolent means may perhaps be defined as working in the way that violence is thought to 
work as a legitimate means, often used toward very similar goals.  If these nonviolent means can 
be defined as kinds of violence, then nonviolence counts as a kind of violence.  Since 
nonviolence is simply that which is not violence, but is also construed as something that can be 
used as a means to a goal, it is worth asking, if nonviolence is defined in a way that is not clearly 
                                                          
180 This is discussed in the previous chapter.  The goals of the state's power and greatness are discussed by Heinrich 
von Treitschke in his Politics, trans. Arthur James Balfour (New York:  The MacMillan Company, 1916); the 
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distinct from how violence is defined, and if it is impossible to guarantee that one's own actions 
are nonviolent in relation to other things, then is nonviolence another kind of violence?  Since we 
are not referencing actions that just happen to be nonviolent, but ones that are defined as useful 
means to ends, we are concerned with nonviolence used as a means and the effects it produces in 
relation to other things that may themselves count as kinds of violence.  This distinguishes 
nonviolent action from the paradigmatic case of the forest hiker mentioned earlier. 
 We should ask whether it is possible for nonviolence really to be not violent when used 
as a means particularly because there is a variety of diverse and opposed views that might not 
agree upon the goals toward which the so-called nonviolent means should be used.  
Disagreement concerning goals may indicate that the means used toward them can be valued in 
opposed ways, particularly as violent or nonviolent means.  A kind of purely nonviolent political 
action is likely impossible, given perspectives, scales of relationships between actors, institutions 
and states, and the contingency of the future that may turn what were nonviolent actions into 
some kind of violence.  But, if pure nonviolence is impossible, particularly because there is 
disagreement concerning whether it works as a means to goals, such as justice, freedom, and 
equality, and whether it works toward such goals as a nonviolent means, then nonviolence is 
another kind of violence that aims to eliminate other kinds of violence in the same way that kinds 
of violence are thought to work as a means toward defeating other kinds of violence.   
 In the following, it is shown how some believe that nonviolence cannot exist without 
some kind of violence that makes the nonviolence possible.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty and René 
Girard both define, each according to his own political ideology, a kind of violence that is a 
condition for human existence.  However, their definitions of this violence disagree.     
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4.2 Merleau-Ponty and Violence as a Basic Fact of Human Existence 
 In his Humanism and Terror:  An Essay on the Communist Problem, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that “we do not have a choice between purity [i.e. nonviolence] and violence but between 
different kinds of violence…[and adds that] inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence is our 
lot...Violence is the common origin of all regimes.  Life, discussion, and political choice occur 
only against a background of violence.  [So] what matters...is not violence but its sense or its 
future.”181  In other words, Merleau-Ponty defines violence as a condition for human existence, 
in the sense of “regimes.”  No regime exists without violence; no regime is nonviolent.  In 
particular, he means to distinguish between the violence of liberalism and communism because 
both political ideologies claim to be equivalent to freedom.  Their claims that their own uses of 
violence are equivalent to freedom only make sense against the background situation from which 
Merleau-Ponty writes.  Given the Cold War, the French were in a position of having to choose to 
take sides with the Soviet Union or the United States.   
Even though both communism and liberalism value freedom, how violence is utilized as 
a means toward freedom differentiates liberalism from communism.  Merleau-Ponty writes, 
Violence is the basic fact on which we have to build freedom.  We 
are not accusing liberalism of being a system of violence; we 
reproach it with not seeing its own face in violence, with veiling 
the pact upon which it rests while rejecting as barbarous that other 
source of freedom – revolutionary freedom – which is the origin of 
all social pacts.  With the assumptions of impersonal Reason and 
rational Man, and by regarding itself as a natural rather than an 
historical fact, liberalism assumes universality as a datum whereas 
the problem is its realization through the dialectic of concrete 
intersubjectivity.182 
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The main point is that, according to Merleau-Ponty, without violence, liberalism’s freedom is 
impossible.  “Violence is the basic fact.”  Liberalism hides its violent foundation, and claims that 
it only violently protects the freedom that liberalism produces, when it really only defends an 
idea of freedom.  Liberalism's assumptions of “impersonal Reason and rational Man” are merely 
“universality as a datum,” a claim, and liberalism fails to produce actual freedom in concrete, 
intersubjective relationships between actually existing humans.   
Merleau-Ponty assumes that this actually existing intersubjective freedom is possible, and 
agrees with Trotsky, Bukharin, and Stalin, who "are all opposed to the liberal ethics because it 
presupposes a given humanity, whereas they aim at making humanity.”183  The point is that 
liberalism hides its violence, merely defending its idea of humanity, while it simultaneously 
violently upholds bourgeois capitalistic conceptions of freedom, and not actually existing 
freedom between humans.  In this sense, “Bourgeois justice adopts the past as its precedent; 
revolutionary justice adopts the future.  [Revolutionary justice] judges in the name of the Truth 
that the Revolution is about to make [historically] true.”184  So, the key difference is that, on the 
one hand, liberalism conceives of its existence as something “well and truly made.”  Liberalism 
utilizes violence for the sake of defending its existence, imposing itself upon individuals who 
cannot refuse liberalism for the sake of freedom, while communism uses violence for the sake of 
a future of humanism and actual, free, human relationships, particularly because liberalism has 
not succeeded at achieving freedom.   
The difference between communistic, revolutionary justice and the bourgeois justice of 
liberalism lies in the temporal direction each emphasizes, the future and the past, respectively.  
Both justify their own violence in relation to freedom, aiming to preserve the past or to create a 
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future, and since they are political ideologies actually enacted in the post-World War II world, 
each person is already on one side or the other, at least indirectly allied with the violence of the 
state that protects them.  Both liberalism and communism utilize violent means toward a 
nonviolent goal of freedom, but whether this freedom exists now, or a different kind is possible 
in the future, is a matter of disagreement, and therefore, whether the violent means each uses are 
justified is a matter of disagreement.   
Nonviolence might be assumed as a choice against this dichotomy, but cannot work 
against violence because the violence of the violent will dominate the nonviolent, in any kind of 
political system because “violence is the basic fact,” according to Merleau-Ponty.  In such a 
world, no one who seeks freedom can be nonviolent because it is violence that is defined as 
equivalent to that which produces freedom, not nonviolence.  One is always already involved in 
some kind of violence.  Freedom cannot be achieved nonviolently, and the violent defense of an 
idea of freedom, no matter how impartial and rational it may be, is not any more justifiable than 
the violent defense of actually existing freedom.  There is only the disagreement between these 
two political ideologies concerning whether freedom exists, and its relationship to justified kinds 
of violence.  Nonviolence would either allow liberalism to dominate with its violence, or would 
fail to achieve freedom in “the dialectic of concrete intersubjectivity.”  Merleau-Ponty sums up 
his point, stating that “all we know is different kinds of violence and we ought to prefer 
revolutionary violence because it has a future of humanism.”185   
 So, Merleau-Ponty's distinction between the violence of communism and of liberalism 
should be taken as pointing to the inability of an individual to avoid at least being complicit, 
even in a minimal and indirect way, in relation to a kind of violence.  This puts into question 
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whether nonviolence is possible, and whether it could work toward goals, such as freedom or 
justice, without some kind of violence. 
 
4.3 Political Conflict, Means to Justice, and the Irrelevance of Nonviolence:  Bush and bin 
Laden's Fundamental Disagreement and Justifications for Violence against Violence 
 
 A more recent example than the conflict between liberalism and communism in relation 
to freedom and justice is reflected in the words of two adversaries:  George Walker Bush and 
Osama bin Laden.  Both are concerned with sustaining freedom, defending it against the 
injustices caused by the other.  There is no question of a nonviolent use of means toward their 
goals, since both conceive of the other as someone to be destroyed. 
 For example, in his September 20, 2001 speech, “President Bush Addresses the Nation,” 
US President George Walker Bush denies the justice that the enemies of the United States seek 
and urges violence against them.  In opposition, Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had argued 
in his August 23, 1996 letter, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of 
the Two Holy Places:  Expel the Polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula,” that the West, and 
“America” in particular, are enemies against whom violence should be directed because they 
deny justice.186  Both claim the other denies justice, and both portray the other as an enemy 
against whom violence must be used because there is no other path to take.  They nominally have 
the same goal, but despite this, they justify the use of violent means against one another, and this 
demonstrates their fundamental disagreement.  Their arguments do not allow for any 
reconciliation because they both define the other as equivalent to an enemy against justice, which 
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they both define as that which they themselves, with their “people,” achieve.  What they really 
aim for is the elimination of the threat of the other's violence, and only violence is conceived of 
as capable of defeating that threat. 
 In the following, Bin Laden clearly blames America, accusing it of deception, and of 
being the cause of injustices for the people of Islam:  
The people of Islam have been struck by oppression, hostility and 
injustice...All this happened before the eyes of the world, but the 
clear imperial arrogance of America, under the cover of the 
immoral United Nations, has prevented the dispossessed from 
arming themselves...we work to do away with the injustice that has 
befallen our Umma at the hands of the Judeo-Crusader 
alliance...We pray to God that He might bless us with victory. 
 
Osama bin Laden defines the injustice experienced by “the people of Islam” as being a result of 
the “imperial arrogance of America” that pretends to be moral by appealing to the United 
Nations.  Nonviolence is not even an option for “the dispossessed.”  Bin Laden aims to 
delegitimize America's uses of violent means by defining them as unjust and immoral, and 
thereby legitimizes the violence of “the people of Islam” by defining it as just, and moral.   
 For both Bush and bin Laden, the “other” is defined as an enemy, and as an obstacle to 
each of their own goals in a way similar to how Merleau-Ponty distinguishes liberalism and 
communism in relation to freedom.  Bush states, “They stand against us because we stand in 
their way,” which accords with liberalism standing in the way of communism.  When Bush says, 
“either [Nations] are with us or...are with the terrorists,” this describes America as that which all 
must recognize as the promoter and defender of “freedom” and “justice.”  Anyone who does not 
side with the US, or who remains passive or pacific in this situation, is complicit with the enemy.  
There is no other choice than to engage in some form of punishment of terrorists:  “Terror 
unanswered can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate 
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governments,” Bush says.  The implication is that anyone who sides with someone like bin 
Laden does not believe in the US government Bush leads.  Anyone who is not with Bush, is 
against him, and is implicitly an enemy.  If the aim is to defeat the violence that threatens one's 
own people and way of life, then nonviolence is not the means political leaders choose because 
they suspect the violence of their enemy.  Again, nonviolence as a means is in question because, 
in relation to Islamophobia and ISIS (ISIL) today, nonviolently confronting those who are 
willing to utilize violence seems ineffective because then one's own way of life and people are 
not violently, aggressively defended.  If nonviolence is in principle opposed to violence, 
including defensive violence, and the enemy's violence occurs nonetheless, then to be nonviolent 
would seem to be a case of granting the enemy victory.  
 Furthermore, when Bush declares, “whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring 
justice to our enemies, justice will be done,” he engages in a fundamental disagreement.  The 
American occupation of the Middle East is “justice delivered,” from the liberal state's 
perspective, and an “invasion of evil,” from bin Laden’s theological one.  Bin Laden calls for 
“jihad against the enemies of God, your enemies the Israelis and Americans,” adding later that 
“you know that your coming-together and co-operation [sic] in order to liberate the holy places 
of Islam is the right step towards unification of the world of the Umma under the banner of God's 
unity.”  Unlike Bush’s liberal ideological conception of political justice, bin Laden’s 
eschatological ideology concerns a kind of divine justice.   
There is no question for these leaders that if there is an enemy who impedes upon their 
own ability to achieve justice, then in practice it is violence that is the means to defeating the 
enemy, and not nonviolence.  Both agree that violence is justified against enemies, but they 
politically disagree on who counts as enemy.  Their definitions utilize the same terms, such as 
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justice, but these terms are defined in opposed ways that fundamentally, politically disagree.  So, 
whether nonviolence can succeed against enemies is in question, particularly when those 
enemies wield violence.  Not to use violence against an enemy’s violence is defined as allowing 
the enemy’s violence to succeed.  That is, nonviolence cannot be justified against an enemy’s 
violence because, by definition, this would grant victory to the enemy’s violence. 
 Merleau-Ponty's claim is relevant here:  “He who condemns all violence puts himself 
outside the domain to which justice and injustice belong.”187  The point that he makes, and that is 
reflected by the opposed definitions produced by George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden, is that 
anyone who works toward some political goal is already on the side of some kind of violence 
that the goal itself justifies, even if one is not oneself engaged in violent actions that pertain to 
the paradigm cases.  To condemn violence, and to commit to nonviolence is to give up on 
pursuing goals of justice and freedom, particularly in a world in which one has enemies.   
If one is protected so that one can enjoy living in relation to a defined kind of justice and 
freedom, then one is living a life that sides with a kind of violence, even if one is intentionally 
nonviolent.  Even if nonviolent means are intentionally utilized, as Merleau-Ponty argues, the 
ability to be intentionally nonviolent is protected by other kinds of violence.  Also, it is possible 
that one’s intention to be nonviolent now may later become a kind of violence in the future, since 
the future is contingent and we cannot know now what our nonviolence will mean in the future.  
One’s intention to be nonviolent can be violent because, as indicated above and below, some 
kinds of violence are defined as invisible, systemic, and symbolic.  If one avoids engaging in 
paradigmatic acts of violence, this is no guarantee that one is not violent in some other way.  The 
political disagreements concerning what counts as violence mean that one’s nonviolence can 
count as violence.   
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In his reflections on liberalism and communism, Merleau-Ponty argues that “once 
humanism attempts to fulfill itself with any consistency it becomes transformed into its opposite, 
namely, into violence.”188  The pursuit for the goal of humanism will inevitably result in some 
kind of violence, such as that of a humanism's oppressive imposition against those who threaten 
the goal of that “humanism.”  So, nonviolence cannot work as a means to these goals because 
some kind of violence can always be implicated by a pursuit of this kind. 
 
4.4 Girard on Mimetic Rivalry and the Modern Legal System as a Scapegoating 
Mechanism 
 
 Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of liberalism's masking its own violence with conceptions of 
justice and freedom that are meant to serve as justifications for liberalism's violence as instances 
of defensive violence is reflected in Girard's anthropological work on violence, though Girard 
does not discuss Merleau-Ponty’s arguments.  In Girard's view, the modern state, including the 
liberal state, veils its own uses of violence by pretending as though its use of violence were for 
the sake of achieving nonviolent harmony within a community, when anthropologically, 
evidence indicates that states merely engage in violence, violently protecting themselves, and 
scapegoating “victims,” i.e. “criminals,” who threaten that nonviolent harmony that states only 
claim to achieve, but do not actually achieve.  In other words, without violence, nonviolence is 
not possible.  The violence of modern states is merely a secularized version of an ancient, 
primitive logic of sacrificial violence. 
 In his Violence and the Sacred, through anthropological analyses of primitive and ancient 
cultural practices and texts, Girard argues that in both primitive and modern cultures, only kinds 
of violence defeat violence, and temporarily establish nonviolent social harmony, and that this is 
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an inherently religious aspect of human existence.  The relationship between ancient, primitive 
forms of violence that is thought to be capable of defeating violence and the juridical violence of 
modern states lies in their need for groups of people to believe in these kinds of violence as 
legitimate and effective toward defeating violence.  On religion, Girard writes 
Religion invariably strives to subdue violence, to keep it from 
running wild. Paradoxically, the religious and moral authorities in 
a community attempt to instill nonviolence, as an active force into 
daily life and as a mediating force into ritual life, through the 
application of violence. Sacrificial rites serve to connect the moral 
and religious aspects of daily life, but only by means of a lengthy 
and hazardous detour. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the 
efficacy of the rites depends on their being performed in the spirit 
of pietas, which marks all aspects of religious life...Primitive 
religion tames, trains, arms, and directs violent impulses as a 
defensive force against those forms of violence that society regards 
as inadmissible. It postulates a strange mixture of violence and 
nonviolence. The same can perhaps be said of our own judicial 
system of control.189 
 
Girard indicates how the cultural role of traditional, ritually performed violent sacrifices works in 
a way that includes nonviolence, but only in relation to violence, “mixed” with it.  The purely 
nonviolent is not a means to cultural harmony, since a kind of violence is needed for defeating 
the violence that “society regards as inadmissible.”  For this reason, it is paradoxical that religion 
and moral authorities try to instill nonviolence, since it does so through uses of kinds of violence.  
Inadmissible violence is that which threatens the existence of a society.  Religion adopts 
nonviolent sacrificial rites as means to keeping violent impulses outside of a community, but 
nonviolent sacrificial rites only work to the extent that they mimic an original, violent sacrifice. 
 Additionally, modern culture reflects religion in that it uses violence as a means to 
defeating violence.  In modern cultures, the guilty party is directly punished “because [the 
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judicial system] possesses a monopoly on the means of revenge.”190  Due to this monopoly, 
revenge against the law is less likely.  Though the judicial system directly punishes the guilty, no 
one is willing to exact revenge on the judicial system.  The judicial system's “control” of 
violence via its greater ability to be violent is assumed to keep violence in check.  Modern 
society's belief in judicial systems lessens fears of vengeful violence that arise from people 
pursuing revenge against those who had pursued revenge against them.191  Like the violent 
sacrifices utilized in primitive cultures for various goals, such as gaining a deity's favor or for the 
atonement of sins, the legal system of punishment depends on its uses of violence, without which 
it would no longer work.  Religion tends to mask its dependency on violence, while judicial 
systems do not, since they have a practical monopoly on the means of revenge. 
 The role of religious, violent sacrifices, in Girard's anthropological analysis, is that they 
serve to defeat the desire for vengeance against others that leads to reciprocating, vengeful 
violence.  Without violent sacrifices, the nonviolent harmony of a community would not be 
possible.  Without the almost universal agreement that the violent sacrifices are wrong, in the 
sense of the paradigmatic cases of violence, there would be no nonviolently unified 
communities.  It may appear that the modern judicial system does not engage in pursuits for 
violent vengeance, but this is merely an appearance, since, in the end, as “the most efficient of all 
curative procedures,” the judicial system pursues violent vengeance against criminals and 
outlaws.192  Nonviolent harmony in juridically policed communities that do not allow their 
members to seek vengeance against other members is secured through the direct use of violence.  
Nonviolence is only attained via means that are themselves violent, in the sense defined by the 
paradigmatic cases.   
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 In order to see why only violence is a means to nonviolence, note that Girard argues that 
the anthropological cause of violence is mimetic, triangular desire, which produces rivalry.193  
He explicitly disagrees with a “traditional view” of mimetic desire, which claims that violent 
conflict results from two or more humans competing for an “object [which] comes first, followed 
by human desires that converge independently on this object,” followed by their violent 
confrontation when they attempt to possess the object.194  It is not the case, according to Girard, 
that conflict results from two or more competing desires for an object.  That is, “it is [not]...the 
intrinsic value of the object that inspires...[violent] struggle; rather, it is...violence itself that 
bestows value on the objects.”195  The object itself is only a “pretext” for violent conflict in the 
sense that, without the object, one would not see another individual manifest that the object is 
desirable through that other individual’s being a violent obstacle to that object.   
 In this sense, mimetic, triangular rivalry involves three factors:  a subject, an object, and a 
rival, who “desires the same object as the subject.”196  Two different subjects compete against 
one another in pursuit of being the one who exhibits the desirability of being the one who 
demonstrates the desirability of possessing the object.  That is, because “the rival alerts the 
subject to the desirability of the object...the rival...serves as a model for the subject...in regard to 
desires.”197  This rival-model shows a “disciple” that an object is desirable, which means that we 
desire objects only because others demonstrate to us what is desirable.198  For example, it is not 
that a person first desires owning natural resources and then the person competes with a rival for 
those natural resources, but that the other person who owns the natural resources demonstrates 
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that it is desirable to be the one who owns these.  One is shown what one lacks, in particular, the 
desirability of being the one who possesses the object.199  The disciple does not want to be the 
one who has the object, but to be the one who manifests the desirability of being the one who 
possesses the object.  
 Girard explains that this mimetic, triangular rivalry produces a “double bind,” which is “a 
contradictory double imperative...[that] is so common that it might be said to form the basis of 
all human relationships.”200  The contradictory imperatives are “Imitate me!” and “Don't imitate 
me!”201  A model demonstrates the desirability of being able to be an obstacle to expressing the 
desirability of having an object.  As an obstacle to being the model, this model is a kind of 
violence that “commands” others to become the model.  The model-obstacle commands “Imitate 
me!”  However, when the disciple imitates the model-obstacle, they are violent threats in relation 
to one another.  At this point, there is a double bind, the irreconcilable commands that the 
disciple should and should not be the model.  This mimetic rivalry occurs such that the disciple-
rival aims to imitate being a violent obstacle “by means of a mimetic counterviolence” that aims 
to overcome the model's being the violent model-obstacle.202  When the disciple succeeds, their 
roles are inverted.  The disciple becomes the model-obstacle, and the model-obstacle becomes 
the disciple.  Thereafter, this particular inversion repeats reciprocally, oscillating back and forth 
as they each aim to outdo one another's being the violent model-obstacle.   
 The worst of possibilities that may result from this mimetic rivalry occurs when there is a 
steady growth of violence that “oscillates between the combatants, without either managing to 
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lay final claim” to being the model-obstacle.203  This growth of violence continues to escalate 
toward greater and greater kinds of violence in a mimetic, reciprocating process that occurs 
because “each person prepares himself for the probable aggression of his neighbors and 
interprets his neighbor's preparations as confirmation of the latter's aggressiveness.”204  The 
difficulty of attaining nonviolence internationally is relevant here.  In terms of the security 
dilemma, this mimetic growth threatens at a global level, given that the increased security of one 
state can lead to other states increasing their own security.  The other appears as a threat, and this 
leads to the building up of defenses, which results in one's increased defenses appearing as a 
threat to the other, which results in the other building up defenses and appearing as a threat, and 
so on.  This continues to spiral as a vengeful reciprocation of aims to mimic the violence of the 
other recurs.   
 Anthropologically speaking, though, Girard describes how cultures have rescued 
themselves from this threat of the reciprocating, vengeful violence that arises from mimetic 
rivalry.  This is the scapegoating mechanism.  His assumption is that, due to mimetic rivalry and 
the double bind, people “make a duty of vengeance.”205  The model-obstacle's violence serves as 
a reason and justification for violent revenge against it.  At a certain point, an epiphany is 
reached, at which everyone involved in the oscillation of violence must altogether redirect their 
reciprocating, vengeful violence away from one another and toward some single thing so that 
their desire for vengeance can be extinguished.  At this point “only an act of collective expulsion 
can bring this oscillation to a halt and cast violence outside the community.”206  This requires the 
collectively produced sacrifice of a surrogate-scapegoat victim.   
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 When a mimetic rivalry has become violent to the intense degree Girard describes, 
differences quickly shift back and forth between individuals intent on overcoming one another's 
violence.  Then the situation simplifies, as participants increase their being violent and thereby 
lose their differences in relation to one another because each is engaged in violence.207  As 
manifestations of violence, they all become the same, and at this point a sacrificial crisis 
exists.208  One can imagine a community in which everyone is engaged in violence to the point 
that, what would otherwise distinguish each person from every other, is erased.  The differences 
required for cultural harmony are erased.  At the point when a sacrificial crisis is reached, the 
“epiphany” occurs, and “violence...generate[s] unanimity, either in its favor or against it.”209  
Either all continue to spontaneously reciprocate vengeful violence until they destroy themselves, 
or they collectively and spontaneously turn their violence onto a surrogate victim who serves as a 
scapegoat.210  Anthropologically speaking, Girard shows that “violence is both the disease and 
the cure.”211  Nonviolent means are not the means to nonviolent consequences.  Nonviolence is 
not defined as the cure to violence.  Only violence can defeat violence, and though in modern 
states violent sacrifices of surrogate-scapegoats do not explicitly occur, this scapegoating 
mechanism that unifies a community against violence by way of a kind of sacrificial violence is 
retained in the juridical structure.   
 Girard defines the ancient, primitive situation in this way:   
Everything suggests a crowd whose intentions were initially 
pacific; a disorganized mob that for unknown reasons...came to a 
high pitch of mass hysteria.  The crowd finally hurl[s] itself on one 
individual; even though he had no particular qualifications for this 
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role, he served to polarize all the fears, anxieties, and hostilities of 
the crowd.  His violent death provided the necessary outlet for the 
mass anguish, and restored peace.212 
 
Given Girard's arguments, every society has this kind of violence at its origin, and its nonviolent 
existence as a society rests on uses of violence.  To claim that nonviolence is possible without 
violence, or to claim that there is a society that does not have violence at its origin is to disagree 
with Girard’s anthropological theory concerning the role violence plays in societies and with his 
analysis of the meaning of the kinds of action he interprets as responses to original violence, 
such as sacrifice.. 
 Girard's point is that violence brings people together, either in terms of their unification 
or in terms of their self-destruction.  Religion “hides” the violence it uses for the sake of 
maintaining nonviolent social harmony, but Girard suggests that the religious hiddenness of the 
role of the scapegoating mechanism is revealed by the judicial system.  Girard argues that,  
As the focal point of the system shifts away from religion and the 
preventive approach is translated into judicial retribution, the aura 
of misunderstanding that has always formed a protective veil 
around the institution of sacrifice shifts as well, and becomes 
associated in turn with the machinery of the law...As soon as the 
judicial system gains supremacy, its machinery disappears from 
sight. Like sacrifice, it conceals—even as it also reveals— its 
resemblance to vengeance, differing only in that it is not self-
perpetuating and its decisions discourage reprisals. In the case of 
sacrifice, the designated victim does not become the object of 
vengeance because he is a replacement, is not the "right" victim. In 
the judicial system the violence does indeed fall on the "right" 
victim; but it falls with such force, such resounding authority, that 
no retort is possible.213   
 
Law is defined as a means to the preservation of nonviolence, but it can only do so by using 
violence, which law itself justifies, for the sake of defeating the desire for vengeance that leads to 
acts of violence.  Without violent acts directed against the “right” victim, violence cannot be 
                                                          
212 Ibid. 131. 
213 Ibid. 22. 
 135 
defeated.  The “machinery of law” eliminates the religious veil, making the function of its 
violence explicitly obvious, though it would shroud its uses of violence as that which achieves 
nonviolence.  But, the judicial system cannot escape the fact that, when legal norms are violated, 
violent actions are the means used to punish criminals directly.  Judicially, the violent actions 
justified by a modern state appears to be legal and secular, but they retain this religious character 
in that the violent actions justified by the state bind a community together in nonviolent 
harmony.  In short, Girard's point is that “vengeance, sacrifice, and legal punishment...are 
essentially the same [because] they tend to adopt the same types of violent response in times of 
crisis.”214  So, again, but anthropologically (and juridically) speaking, nonviolence can only be 
gained as a goal through some kinds of uses of violent means, and not nonviolent ones. 
 
4.5 Can Nonviolence be Achieved in Practice? 
 Merleau-Ponty's criticism of liberalism demonstrates that no one can seriously claim to 
be nonviolently seeking freedom.  Someone is imposed upon when means are used toward 
sustaining or creating freedom, and such impositions can be experienced as violence.  Whether 
such impositions actually are violent is a matter of political disagreement.  Girard shows that 
only by way of kinds of violence, sacrificial and judicial, can peaceful, nonviolent harmonies be 
achieved.   
 A person who argues in favor of nonviolence needs to show that nonviolent means are 
capable of achieving nonviolent goals (in the social-political and economic sense), and that those 
nonviolent means actually are nonviolent.  In the following, we turn to arguments concerned 
with nonviolent resistance, nonviolent direct action, nonviolent civil disobedience, pacifism, 
forgiveness, and prayer.  It will be shown that these arguments, produced by Todd May, John 
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Rawls, Slavoj Žižek, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Gil Bailie, and Hannah Arendt, disagree with 
one another politically.  The kinds of nonviolence they define either demonstrate that 
nonviolence counts as a kind of violence, or show that whether nonviolence is attained in 
practice is a matter of political disagreement. 
 
4.6 The Violence of Nonviolence:  Resistance, Disobedience, and Refusal 
4.6.1 Todd May, Neoliberal Violence, and Nonviolent Resistance 
 With a focus on the USA and Europe, instead of the entire global population, Todd May 
argues that, since the Great Depression, there has been “a decline of the welfare state...and a turn 
to...neoliberalism,” i.e. “Chicago School economics,” which argues for less government 
intervention, and contrasts the Keynesian economics that influenced Franklin Roosevelt's 
creation of social welfare programs that intervene and invest in the public by providing public 
welfare in various ways.215  With Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher's elections, 
neoliberalism arrived in full force.   
 May cites David Harvey's definition of neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”216  Neoliberalism privatizes, deregulates, 
and eliminates public services, but intervenes in national and sometimes international markets, 
via the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  The main goal of neoliberalism is to 
“liberat[e] individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills,” but in Harvey's view, neoliberalism 
shifts wealth back to economic elites.  This shift in the distribution of wealth, and lack of 
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investment in the public means that “where once it was considered an important social duty to 
assist one's fellow citizens, now they are left more nearly to their own devices,” May says.217  As 
a result, more people are forced into situations where they are afraid and alone to the extent that 
neoliberalism “erodes social solidarity; it contributes to an increasing individualization.”218  The 
government's use of money is distrusted, so neoliberalism privatizes and deregulates, and private 
companies do what they want without government interference.  It follows, in May's view, that 
“neoliberalism leads to more neoliberalism in a cycle of isolated individualism creating more 
isolated individualism.”219  May's intention is to argue that nonviolent political action (i.e. 
nonviolent resistance) can confront neoliberalism because such actions bring about “cooperation, 
trust, and solidarity.”220   
 May characterizes neoliberalism as a kind of violence that extends beyond the 
commonsense view and paradigmatic examples.  Its violence is “generally more structural than 
physical or psychological,” which means that uses of violence against particular persons whose 
actions reproduce neoliberalism is uses of violence against victims of that same structural 
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violence.221  Also, using violence against those individuals whose actions defend neoliberalism, 
including the police and military, is likely to result in the police and military using their greater 
ability to wield violence to stop the violence directed against neoliberalism.222  So, May looks at 
nonviolence as the only way groups of individuals acting in solidarity can work against the 
structural violence of neoliberalism.  He argues that neoliberalism does not need to be 
“overthrow[n],” but “undermine[d], by way of a “refusal of obedience...based upon a 
recognition of the dignity and a presupposition of the equality of everyone.”223   
 It is because May does not think that violence can succeed against neoliberalism's 
structural violence, and the violence of those who support neoliberalism, that he endorses 
nonviolence as the means to undermining it.  This nonviolent undermining of neoliberalism's 
violence is, as a means, a “refusal of obedience.”  A refusal like this, in May's view, does not 
overthrow, but undermines, in that if neoliberalism openly uses violence against those who 
nonviolently refuse to be obedient, then the project of neoliberalism, as a moral, social, and 
political project is shown to be an immoral, anti-social, political ideology that violently enforces 
individualism, privatization, and economic inequalities, which have the potential to weaken and 
damage the ideology of neoliberalism itself.   
The assumption is that nonviolent refusal to obey undermines by forcing a change.  That 
against which the intentional use of nonviolence is directed is either provoked to use violence 
against the nonviolent, and thereby reveals the violence of the thing the nonviolence is directed 
toward, or the sought change is brought about.  This, in May's view, is not an overthrow, since an 
overthrow could count as violence, but an undermining.  To undermine is to start from the 
foundations, from the ground up, with actions that are assumed to be nonviolent in the sense of 
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paradigmatic acts of nonviolence that are intentionally performed without any action counting as 
a paradigmatic act of violence.   
 May's assumption is that an overthrow implies a kind of domination and destruction, 
which can be more easily accused of violence.  To be nonviolent, according to May, is to 
undermine because a nonviolent action assumes the dignity and equality of all, thereby 
producing a situation of respectfulness, which neoliberalism would openly violate, if it were to 
use violence against a nonviolent resistance or movement.  So, in this sense, a nonviolent 
political action provokes that against which it is directed into transforming into something else, 
such as when the nonviolent political actions of Gandhi undermined British Imperialism and of 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. undermined the oppressive forces that upheld segregation. 
 In contrast to May's definition of the refusal to be obedient as nonviolent, Sartre defines a 
refusal as a kind of violence because it destroys the expectation that one will be obedient.  In his 
Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre writes that “violence is not just the refusal of making use of 
something, it is the destruction of the possibility of such use for everyone, the refusal of all 
lawfulness.”224  This is because, as opposed to obedient actions that conform to law, and are 
therefore nonviolent from the perspective of law, refusal to be obedient breaks lawfulness in 
general, and is therefore a kind of violence.  Sartre states that “every refusal is likely to be taken 
for a form of violence.”225  So, the refusal of obedience characterized by May as nonviolent 
political action can mean that in relation to other things, such as lawfulness, the refusal is a kind 
of violence.  There is a political, ideological disagreement concerning whether a refusal of 
disobedience counts as nonviolence or as violence.  In order to see how this nonviolent political 
action can count as violence, May's definition of nonviolence is addressed next because the issue 
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concerns whether nonviolent actions can be effective in any way without there being a possibility 
of their being interpreted as a kind of violence.   
 May defines “nonviolence as political, economic, or social activity that challenges or 
resists a current political, economic, or social arrangement while respecting the dignity of its 
participants, adversaries and others.”226  He adds that “nonviolence must reject not only 
violence but also threats of violence” because such threats “don't actually respect the dignity of 
others” and because such threats intend to interrupt a human life.227  The nonviolent means used, 
in the sense that May intends, are human bodies.  He states,  
In nonviolence, one does not express one's equality with a gun but 
rather with one's own body.  It is oneself, not one's weapon, which 
is the vehicle of resistance...Moreover, in nonviolence it is by 
standing up rather than knocking down another that expresses 
refusal...That is a form of emancipation that comes not from what 
is granted by one's adversary but developed through one's own 
activity.228   
 
Whether a body counts as a weapon is debatable, depending on what is done with the body.  A 
person’s body could itself be a threat to someone’s dignity, particularly if it “expresses refusal.”  
If someone is intentionally nonviolent for the sake of enacting paradigmatic, nonviolent actions, 
acting nonviolently as if it were a maxim, standing up and refusing through nonviolent action, 
then it is possible that someone may disagree, and interpret an action like this as a kind of 
violence.  If this conception of acting nonviolently on principle entailed an action completely 
devoid of violence, then because it is a matter of interpretation and political, ideological 
assumptions that lead a person to think an action is in accordance with a principle of 
nonviolence, there can be others who do not necessarily define the actions as nonviolent ones.  A 
person’s standing up, in the sense of emancipatory refusal, could be that which is interpreted as a 
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threat, which binds individuals together in opposition to it.  One's own idea of nonviolence, no 
matter how strongly one intends to actualize it in concrete, paradigmatic actions, does not 
guarantee the action will be defined as nonviolent by most people.   
No matter how morally wrong it might be for someone to be a white supremacist who 
aims to uphold the institution of segregation, the so-called nonviolent direct actions of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. could be experienced by such a person as violence.  Nonviolent political actors 
put their bodies in the way of things going on as normal, interrupting that normal and bringing 
about an abnormal situation that establishes a new normal that some individuals may refuse to 
accept as normal.  They might sit on a bus, or at a lunch counter, for example.  This new normal 
can itself be experienced as a kind of violence by those who wish to preserve the past.  The 
nonviolent refusal of the old normal, as Sartre might put it, is violence against the lawfulness of 
the old normal.  Once refused, the nonviolence violently destroys the possibility of that old 
normal continuing to be normal. 
 However, May is careful to define nonviolent political actions as nonviolent actions, 
emphasizing that it is not merely the intention that matters, but the action itself.  That is, if an 
action is to count as a nonviolent political action, then it really must be nonviolent as an action, 
in relation to what counts as a nonviolent action.  Walking down a sidewalk is a paradigmatic 
example of a nonviolent action.  The action itself is defined as a nonviolent action by most 
people.  It is not that one must intend to embody nonviolence in principle, but that an action is 
nonviolent if it accords with the way that nonviolence is defined by most people.  However, 
whether an action is nonviolent depends upon the things that a person connects the action to.  If 
the action is connected to the disruption of some defined normal way of things, then one can 
disagree, and define a nonviolent action as a violent one.  This would be to extend nonviolence 
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beyond the paradigmatic cases, requiring that actions also not disrupt something defined as 
normal.  Whether an action is nonviolent is a matter of disagreement, despite agreements that 
there are paradigmatic examples of nonviolent actions. 
May defines nonviolent actions that undermine as those that are equivalent to expressions 
of respect for the dignity of others.  He writes that, “to act with dignity in nonviolent 
action...involves treating someone with the proper respect...tying together the dignity of the 
nonviolent actor with that of his or her adversary.”229  May frames nonviolent political action as 
something that uses the treatment of others with respect as a means to “tying together the dignity 
of the nonviolent actor with that of his or her adversary.”   
Dignity is tied together when everyone involved, including one’s adversary, is recognized 
as commonly sharing, 
The ability to engage in projects and relationships that unfold over 
time; to be aware of one's death in a way that affects how one sees 
the arc of one's life; to have biological needs like food, shelter, and 
sleep; to have basic psychological needs like care and a sense of 
attachment to one's surroundings.230 
 
A body’s nonviolent action that respects the dignity of the other is defined as equivalent to the 
respect for the other’s living life toward death, with basic biological and psychological needs.  If 
one does not act with respect for the life and needs of one’s adversary so that this adversary will 
reciprocate with respect for the dignity of the nonviolent political actors, then one’s action is not 
equivalent to a nonviolent political action that undermines, as defined by May.  Respect for the 
dignity of others, the presupposition that all equally have basic needs and a life to lead, is defined 
as central to how nonviolence is thought to work as a means of refusal that undermines and 
emancipates.  But, should an individual respect the dignity of an adversary who is physically 
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attacking that individual?  If the adversary is not giving up, and continues to attack, despite the 
individual’s enacted nonviolent refusal, does one simply stand there and continue to receive 
those attacks?  If one only stands there, is one allowing violence to be used as a means against 
oneself for the sake of some higher goal?  Can a person use self-defensive violence? 
 May answers “no”:  
Nonviolent action requires that one not physically attack others, 
even in self-defense...[because] any form of violent self-defense 
involves a significant diminishing of respect for the dignity of the 
one attacked...[and] To have to defend oneself violently is to be put 
in a situation where one can only retain one's own physical 
integrity by disrespecting the other.231   
 
The respect for the dignity and equality of each individual is central to social solidarity, and 
serves as a normative assumption that is enacted by nonviolent political action.  This respect, as 
May defines it, is the highest value that is to be committed to no matter what happens during a 
political action.  During such an action, if one is to express this respect, one cannot even utilize 
self-defensive violence, since that would eliminate the physical integrity of the political action’s 
actually expressing refusal in a nonviolent way.  May’s assumption is that the violence of the 
other, which might otherwise justify self-defense, should be refused so that it is not reciprocally 
returned against that other.  This undermines the other by respecting that other even when the 
other directs violence against oneself.  That is, the assumption is that by refusing violence and 
being nonviolent against violence, nonviolence can defeat violence because an action’s 
expression of nonviolence is defined as equivalent to the expression of respect for dignity. 
However, whether a nonviolent political action is equivalent to this expression of respect 
is disputable.  An adversary’s violent action may be a reaction to a kind of action that the so-
called nonviolent political action put into use.  If a so-called nonviolent political action interrupts 
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the flow of traffic on a highway, for example, then the ability of people to lead their lives is cut 
off, if even momentarily, in such a way that some of those people might claim to have suffered 
some kind of violence.  Perhaps, for example, someone cannot make it to their job, and loses it as 
a result; or, perhaps someone is need in medical assistance, but cannot make it to a hospital 
because of the nonviolent political action.  A person performing a nonviolent political action has 
no control over what nonparticipants think of that action, for example, whether they take it as an 
act of solidarity.  Ideally, the nonviolent political action makes way for emergency vehicles, but 
if any mistake is made, or some individual does some miniscule thing, such as stepping off a 
sidewalk into a road, that he ought not to have done because the police had told the participants 
to “Stay on that sidewalk!  Get off the road!  I’m only going to tell you once!,” then the police 
and state can claim that the nonviolent political action provoked the police to react because laws 
were violated, which then led to the participants arguing with police, all of which can escalate 
into police violence against that nonviolent political action.  At that point, it is not clear whether 
the political action is nonviolent because there are only images of arrests, arguments, physical 
struggles, bodies aggressively confronting one another, etc.  In short, a nonviolent political 
action can appear as violence, given opposed political, ideological assumptions, as do the 
“mistakes” that can occur during a nonviolent political action. 
Also, following the assumption that a body’s action can count as a refusal, it can count as 
violence because it depends on the person acting and the person acted against, who are bound 
together, involved in a particular situation, interpreting actions as they see them.  A person may 
be engaging in a sit-in, lying on the ground, doing nothing, but because the police have told this 
person that “the street must be cleared now,” whether the person’s action is nonviolent is 
disputable, given disagreements on what counts as violence.  From the perspective of the police, 
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refusal to perform actions commanded by the police is not necessarily a legitimate, nonviolent 
action.  Each person’s actions will be interpreted in their relationships to other things.  A 
nonviolent political action can thus at the same time be a kind of violence, possibly as a 
provocation, as a violation of law or of some “normal,” or perhaps due to some actor’s 
aggressiveness, or because the actions of some actors failed to express respect for dignity.   
 An issue for May’s theory of nonviolent resistance is that it is difficult to guarantee that 
the actions of the participants in a campaign or social-political movement will not be interpreted 
as violent.  That is, there are disagreements concerning whether nonviolent political action really 
are nonviolent.  One analysis might look at the total gestalt of the political action and then decide 
whether it is nonviolent, ignoring the particular actions of individuals, and instead focusing on 
the overall “action,” and what it, as a totality, did as a means to some end.  Another analysis 
might begin from each individual’s actions, weighing the degree to which they are violent or 
nonviolent, and then adding these up to see whether the violence or nonviolence outweighed the 
other.  Surely, there are other ways some kind of violence pertaining to a political action could 
be defined and measured, such as in terms of police arrests, property destruction, and negative 
economic impacts.  But the point is that ensuring that a political action is nonviolent is difficult, 
if not impossible, because, beyond the paradigmatic examples, there are disagreements 
concerning what counts as violence and as nonviolence in the first place.   
May’s argument follows a logic of exception.  X is a nonviolent political action, except 
when Y.  Y is defined as actions that are not the embodiment of nonviolent refusal of obedience 
that express respect for dignity as a means to the goal of gaining the adversary’s reciprocated 
respect.  In May’s view, if a person engaged in a political action does not embody the expression 
of respect for the dignity of the adversary, then the person’s political action is not nonviolent.  
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One is required to embody and enact this respect for dignity.  By definition, according to May, 
one cannot be nonviolent one’s body expresses this respect.  But there is no way to guarantee 
that the acts will be taken as this kind of expression.     
Note that, since one must act in the way May defines in order for one’s action to count as 
a nonviolent political action, one cannot choose to act nonviolently in any way other than how 
May defines a nonviolent political action.  This itself can be interpreted as an oppressive 
imposition of a normative expectation that we must act a particular way.  If so, it could be 
interpreted as a kind of violence.  No one is allowed to be a nonviolent political actor, unless one 
does it the way May defines.   
We should again note that refusal can count as a kind of violence from other perspectives.  
Likewise with respect.  For example, Merleau-Ponty condemns respecting those who disrespect 
you.  He states, 
We only know of situated consciousnesses which blend themselves 
with the situation they take and are unable to complain at being 
identified with it or at the neglect of the incorruptible innocence of 
conscience...[A]s soon as we begin to live, we lose the alibi of 
good intentions; we are what we do to others, we yield the right to 
be respected as noble souls.  To respect one who does not respect 
others is ultimately to despise them; to abstain from violence 
toward the violent is to become their accomplice.232 
 
The respect for an adversary's equality and dignity in relation to oneself that a nonviolent 
political action is supposed to express might be a good intention, and enacted, but this nonviolent 
respect still does something against those targeted people and institutions the nonviolent political 
actions are directed against.  They did not choose for any kind of political action to occur in 
relation to them.  They are forced.  If a person does not disrespect an adversary who disrespects 
her in some minimal way, then she is not authentically engaging in the relationship of disrespect 
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that exists, and will come to despise that adversary.  Once the adversary is despised though, that 
is all that has happened.  The adversary’s disrespect and violence will remain.  So, Merleau-
Ponty does not argue that one should respect those who disrespect others because this does not 
work.  If kinds of violence are happening and people are disrespecting others, then respecting an 
adversary merely allows the kinds of violence and disrespect to continue, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
view.  This political ideological perspective directly disputes May’s requirement that adversaries 
be respected, even when they use violence against us.   
Similarly, Sartre argues that respect is violence.  In his Being and Nothingness, he argues 
that “respect for the Other's freedom is an empty word; even if we could assume the project of 
respecting this freedom, each attitude which we adopted with respect to the Other would be a 
violation of that freedom which we claimed to respect.”233  Freedom is violently violated, in 
Sartre's sense, because it is always treated as a thing whenever one is respectful toward it.  There 
cannot be “laissez-faire” tolerance and respect for another person’s freedom because in relation 
to one another, each individual limits the freedom of every other.234  Each individual in relation 
to every other is forced into a world of an Other where that Other’s respect and tolerance limit 
what each individual may do.  Respect and tolerance restrict what is acceptable, and this violates 
freedom as a kind of violence.  In terms of Sartrean existentialism there is no escape from the 
fact that the freedom of consciousness sees others as they are in the world, as things, and to 
expect an Other to express respect and tolerate others is to impose an objectified existence as a 
thing onto the freedom of that person’s consciousness, violently violating it.  Respect as an 
imposition of an expectation is merely another means of domination over another, and can count 
as a kind of violence.   
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However, May is focused on the equality of everyone, and not freedom, in the sense that 
“to act on the presupposition of equality is to act as though one were already an equal rather 
than asking to be treated as an equal.”235  Sartre means something very precise in his existential 
notion of the freedom of consciousness that transcends the existence of that person as a thing, but 
for our purposes it suffices to capture his main point, which is that assuming a project of any 
kind and then respecting others in relation to that project is an imposition of that project and a 
violent violation of anyone who is not likewise persuaded by that project.  Any universalization 
of such norms, even if they are defined as being nonviolent, might be experienced by some 
people as a violent objectification of their existence as an equal.  Though May defines respect in 
relation to equality, rather than freedom, it is irrelevant because the expectation that an adversary 
acknowledge respect for equality can be experienced by that adversary as a kind of violence. 
 
4.6.2 Active and Passive Equality:  Challenging the Police Order   
May defines two kinds of equality, passive and active, in his The Political Thought of 
Jacques Rancière.236  May writes,  
Passive equality [is] the creation, preservation, or protection of 
equality by governmental institutions.  The animating idea behind 
passive equality is that some form of equality is to be ensured by 
an institution for the sake of those whose equality is at stake.  It is 
to be given, or at least protected, rather than taken or enacted by 
the subjects of equality.237 
 
Passive equality is the passive reception of distributed justice or distributed equality, particularly 
in the sense of equal consideration.238  This means that people do not “create, ensure, or protect 
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their equality,” but are merely recipients of equality.  May writes, “inasmuch as we conceive our 
political space in terms of rights…, we conceive ourselves as passive.  And inasmuch as we 
conceive that space in terms of equal rights, we conceive our equality as passive.”239  The 
passiveness of passive equality lies in that rights and equality are assumed as having been 
achieved and sustained through the distribution of these, which citizens passively receive as 
recipients.  May agrees with Rancière’s description of this passive equality as being a matter of 
“policing,” and not of politics.240   
“Policing” is the result of passive equality, and the distribution of equality and rights.  
This is “the idea of the police as involving a social ordering that is enforced not merely by 
military-style intervention – armed men in uniforms – but more significantly by the idea of a 
proper social order.”241  This kind of policing “seeks…to put everything in its place, through 
allotment and through justification.  The allotment is the distribution posited by the order.  The 
justification…is the appeal to equality that founds the particular distribution.”242  This passive 
view of equality overlooks the significance of the active, creative struggles for equality and 
rights that were first required before any passive distribution could occur.  May means to focus 
not on this passive reception of rights, “secured” through policing, but on the active “political 
moment of struggle itself” that challenges this.243 
In contrast to passive equality, active equality is “political participation,” which May 
defines as that which everyone can engage in.244  In brief, “equality is not received.  It is 
made…because to receive equality is already to be less than equal to the one who bestows it.”245  
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Democratic politics is political participation, enacted as a challenge, a “dissensus” in Rancière’s 
terms, in relation to the police order.246  The foundation for political participation is equality in 
the sense that each individual speaks from a position.  Politics happens, in May’s view, when 
“the traditional mechanism of what are usually called “politics” are put into question.”  And, it 
happens as “an action by the people, the demos, that intervenes upon [a] situation” from which 
they have been excluded.”247  In this sense, “a democratic politics is the appearance of that which 
has been excluded…manifests a people…[and] creates a political subject.”248  In short, “in the 
name of equality..., a demos arises that dissents from the position or positions its members have 
been allotted…disrupt[ing] the completeness of a police order through an activity that is in itself 
an expression of its own equality with those whose own position or actions seek to deny that 
equality.”249  Political expertise is not necessary for this enacted challenge to the “equal” identity 
individuals passively receive within a police order because everyone is equally intelligent, in the 
sense that Rancière means, namely that “anyone and everyone…is capable of speaking to one 
another, understanding one another, reasoning with one another.”250  “Being able to consider and 
act upon our world” is all that is required for one’s being an equal.251  Actually speaking words, 
or having a particular level of intelligence and education is not necessary for being equal.  In this 
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sense of equality as being able to act upon and consider our world, this is “a form of active rather 
than passive equality.”252  Active equality is enacted equality and, as such, it is democratic 
politics, which “unif[ies] those who are oppressed and those who act alongside them and on their 
behalf into a single subject” such that a participant is not “a part that has no part” because her 
actions actively communicate equality to her oppressors.253  Altogether, this democratic politics 
of participatory active equality is required for a progressive form of politics because it “concerns 
the ability of each of us, in concert with others, to engage in the project of a reflective 
reconstruction of lives.”254   
May also adds that democratic politics, as a collective action that emerges from the 
presupposition that participants are equal to their adversaries and the police order, must be 
“nonviolent political action.”255  However, nonviolence is not passiveness.  Violent resistance is 
the route typically taken, he argues, because it is “the easy political option” that is the “natural 
temptation” that arises such that, when “one is dominated…one dominates; [and when] one is 
oppressed…one oppresses.”256  Nonviolent resistance, though, “reject[s] the type of thinking 
fostered by a police order [and]…requires the creation of a non-hierarchical space.”257  A 
collective action that is a nonviolent resistance does not react in the form of resentment, but 
creates and is “defined by what [it does] rather than by that [which it] oppose[s].”  In particular, a 
nonviolent, political, collective action presupposes equality, while “violent struggle requires one 
to choose between one’s own worthiness and that of one’s adversary.”258  Violence harms, which 
means that if violence is used, then who counts as deserving of harm, as less than equal, has been 
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decided upon.259  Violence will not work, in May’s view, against a police order, since it 
reestablishes a police order of inequality.  For this reason, nonviolence is “the most likely path” 
to “a point of consensus,” which is “an agreement on the equality of everyone in the [police] 
order itself.”260   
 
4.6.3 The Violence of Self-Preservation or the Violent Recreation of Inequality? 
 However, May adds that violence can be utilized by a democratic political action.  He 
writes,  
There seems to be no bar to placing side by side the claims that 
one’s adversary is one’s equal and that, because of the adversary’s 
refusal to recognize one’s own equality, one must injure or kill her.  
The analogy here would be one of self-defense.  To defend oneself 
against another does not require a denial of that other’s equality.  It 
requires instead an embrace of one’s own.  Self-protection is…the 
necessity of preserving oneself.  So it is with a violent democratic 
struggle.  The emergence of violence in such a struggle arises on 
the basis of a persistence in one’s own equality, of the effort to 
maintain the expression of the presupposition of equality in the 
face of steadfast refusal to allow that expression…[A]lthough the 
effect of violence may be a denial of the other, it is not because of 
the attempt to deny the other but to preserve one’s own democratic 
expression that violence can be resorted to without violating the 
ethical strictures of a democratic politics…[T]he appeal to violence 
in the context of democratic struggle lies on a razor’s edge.  The 
line between self-preservation and the denial of the equality of the 
other is a thin one…[I]t is easy to ratify the destruction of the other 
out of anger or the denial one has suffered rather than for the 
preservation of one’s democratic expression.  The deeper the 
history of denial of equality, the stronger that temptation is…By 
placing the emphasis of violent struggle on self-preservation rather 
than destruction of the other, it can help mitigate some of the more 
deleterious aspects of violent struggle. This provides no guarantee 
of safeguards against abuse.261 
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May’s conception of equality, in Nonviolent Resistance (2015) turns toward respect for dignity in 
a way not addressed seven years earlier in this work, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière:  
Creating Equality (2008), as is expressed by this quote.  However, the concern is similar, in that 
the later work conceives of this active equality in relation to nonviolent political resistance on the 
foundation of a presupposed equality concerning the dignity of others, namely that they have 
their own lives and needs, rather than on the equality of the ability to speak intelligently and live 
life in a way that affects the world.  The nonviolence he expects of democratic politics, on the 
basis of presupposed equality and the refusal to dominate others in the way of a new police 
order, can turn to violence in the form of self-defense, or “self-protection” if the adversary 
persistently refuses the equality of the participants who act on the presupposition of equality.  He 
indicates that the point at which this persistence exists is a “razor’s edge,” since there is a 
historical element that may be taken into consideration by those who engage in the political 
action.  The razor edge difference between self-preservation and denial of the other’s equality, 
through a use of violence, depends on historical factors, and the specific situation in which the 
violence is used.  If it is used for self-preservation or denial of the other’s equality depends on 
how it is connected to other things that are not necessarily agreed upon.  Whether the violent 
action is not productive of inequality, or is the self-preservation of equality is not likely to be 
agreed upon.  May’s conception thus depends on a political ideal. 
 May is particularly concerned with actual social-political movements from history, such 
as the Indian Independence Movement and Gandhi's insights into nonviolence as a means of 
protest, and the American Civil Rights Movement and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s contributions 
to the study of nonviolence.  However, in order for someone against whom a nonviolent political 
action is directed to acknowledge that the action is directed against the wrongness of their 
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understanding of equality and freedom, such a person has to forfeit their understanding of 
equality and freedom.  That is, the history of the British government in India, and the judicial, 
police, and cultural systems of the south in the United States was forced to change its course so 
that oppression is explicitly on view for everyone to see as oppression and as wrong, thereby 
indicating that the institutions of occupation and segregation are themselves seen as things to be 
defeated.  They are shown as that which breeds the possibility of injustices and violence.  People 
are forced to acknowledge their own violence, which itself might be experienced as a kind of 
violence, no matter how nonviolent the action that forces these people to acknowledge their own 
violence happens to be.   
 However, the individuals who uphold oppressive laws need not to have acknowledged 
that they were in the wrong.  Instead, they were merely forced to succumb to the goals of the 
political action.  This force used to acknowledge that one is wrong, is an interesting one in how it 
works, but can it work as nonviolence?  Being forced to appear wrong in the eyes of the public 
has the potential to mobilize groups of peoples in favor of and against the institutions that uphold 
these wrongs.  If the targeted people and institutions are forced to see themselves as wrong, then 
whether this is a kind of violence or nonviolence is disputable.  These people and institutions are 
imposed upon, which means that even if they are wrong, the actions against them are not 
necessarily nonviolent.  So, it's not clear that the nonviolent respect of nonviolent political 
actions can be nonviolent in the first place, if it is to work against wrongs.  Without coercion or 
provocation, which can themselves be experienced as kinds of violence, it is difficult to see how 
actions could nonviolently produce the kinds of social-political and economic transformations 
that May writes about. 
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 In fact, in Nonviolent Resistance, May admits that it is highly unlikely for any campaign 
to be purely nonviolent.  He argues that “a shove or a threat does not turn a nonviolent campaign 
into a violent one,” but adds that “pure nonviolence is more an ideal than a description of certain 
campaigns.  If we were to characterize only purely nonviolent campaigns as actually nonviolent, 
[May] suspect[s] that no campaign would find itself in that category.””262  So, despite all his 
argumentation and the definitions he produces, he is not really defining nonviolent resistance as 
purely nonviolent.  Whether a shove or threat turns a nonviolent political action into a violent 
one is debatable.   
The issue, then, is that nonviolent means might not actually work as nonviolent means 
toward gaining goals.  From the perspective of those against whom the campaign is directed, the 
“shove or threat” may be exactly that which transforms a nonviolent campaign into a violent one.  
For example, the media's coverage of the recent events in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, 
Maryland focus on the violence of groups of actors, describing those events as “violent,” even 
though many participants were not intentionally being violent.  Whether one defines a political 
action as violent or nonviolent depends on one’s focus, and on what one connects the action to.  
So, what May defines is a kind of nonviolent violence that is, perhaps, less violent than other 
kinds of violence, such as the structural violence sustained by neoliberalism, but can count as a 
kind of violence nonetheless. 
Lastly, May argues that because it is difficult to define violence, he only aims to indicate 
the kind of violence that nonviolent political actions aim to avoid.  In fact, May admits that in 
order for a nonviolent political action to work it has to be a kind of symbolic violence.  On why a 
nonviolent political action counts as symbolic violence, May uses Slavoj Žižek's distinctions 
between subjective, systemic, and symbolic violence, found in Žižek’s Violence:  Six Sideways 
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Reflections.263  May’s concern is not primarily with how nonviolence can count as a kind of 
violence, but with the kind of violence that nonviolent political action aims to avoid.  
Nonetheless, he defines nonviolent political actions as a kind of symbolic violence because, if 
they were not a kind of violence, then it would be difficult to see how they could work. 
 
4.6.4 Nonviolence as Žižekian Symbolic Violence:  The Nonviolent Violence of Jiu-
Jitsu Maneuvers 
 
 In relation to the subjective, systemic and symbolic kinds of violence defined by Slavoj 
Žižek, May argues that the kinds of violence rejected by a nonviolent political action are 
systemic and subjective, but not symbolic violence because he considers it a “stretch” to think of 
nonviolent political actions as not utilizing language.264  If a nonviolent political action is to 
work at all, it has to at least communicate something.  This means that the nonviolence that May 
defines is a kind of action that aims to avoid physical, psychological, systemic, structural, and 
subjective violence, but that still counts as a kind of symbolic violence because otherwise the 
nonviolent political action would not work as a means.  In other words, the nonviolent political 
action defined by May still counts as a kind of violence because the purpose of a nonviolent 
political action is to demonstrate that an injustice exists, and this can only be communicated via 
linguistic, symbolic means, which themselves can be defined as kinds of violence, if they aim to 
undermine the status quo and establish a new “normal.”  In order to see how so-called nonviolent 
                                                          
263 Žižek, Violence:  Six Sideways Reflections, 1-2.  For a more in-depth description of the kinds of violence Žižek 
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actions are measured as subjective violence because they are “abnormal.”  Symbolic violence occurs linguistically, 
as a form of communication, when linguistic expressions represent things as superior and inferior.  Systemic 
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political actions are simultaneously symbolic violence, we turn to May's argument for how 
nonviolent political action works as a means. 
 The way in which a nonviolent political action works is described by May (who follows 
Gene Sharp on this) in terms of a “moral jiu-jitsu,” which effectively “turns the ethical tables on 
an adversary, so that what had once appeared as justified actions or policies turns out to be an 
unjustified assault upon the dignity of those who resist them...[and] results in a convergence on a 
common moral view that includes protestors and adversaries on the same moral plane.”265  May 
distinguishes moral jiu-jitsu from “political jiu-jitsu,” which is capable of nonviolently forcing 
an adversary to involuntarily do something “without violating dignity or presupposing equality,” 
and can occur as a nonviolent “refusal of obedience to and even the active disruption of an unjust 
political, economic, or social order.”266  May aims to retain the nonviolent ability of political 
actions to convince or force an adversary to admit that they are morally wrong, but the adversary 
against whom the nonviolent political action is directed possibly experiences symbolic violence, 
particularly if the nonviolent political actions have escalated to the point of forcing a new normal 
to come into existence.  If this political or moral jiu-jitsu does not occur as a kind of symbolic 
violence, then it is difficult to see how nonviolent political action works at all.  In such a 
situation, the adversary's position is forced to express itself as an abnormal kind of violence by 
the symbolic violence of the so-called nonviolent political action.     
 Merleau-Ponty's following statement reinforces the argument that May's definition of 
nonviolent political action shows that nonviolence could only work as a kind of violence, 
particularly as symbolic violence.  Merleau-Ponty states, 
                                                          
265 Ibid. 163.  See Gene Sharp’s How Nonviolent Struggle Works, (East Boston, MA:  The Albert Einstein 
Institution, 2013). 
266 Ibid. 163. 
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It is a law of human action that the present encroaches upon the 
future, the self upon other people.  This intrusion is not only a fact 
of political life it also happens in private life...In collective history 
the spiritual atoms train after them their historical role and are tied 
to one another by the threads of their actions; what is more, they 
are blended with the totality of actions, whether or not deliberate, 
which they exert upon others and the world so that there exists not 
a plurality of subjects, but an intersubjectivity, and that is why 
there exists a common measure of the evil inflicted upon certain 
people and of the good gotten out of it by others.267 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s point is that, in a world in which we cannot avoid affecting others as we pursue 
our projects, there is always the possibility that those pursuits which are good and nonviolent for 
some people are evil and violent for others.  Whether such an action succeeds at gaining its goal 
depends upon whether it makes those it is directed against acknowledge their “wrongness,” even 
if they do not believe they are wrong, and this can be considered a kind of symbolic violence.   
 
4.7 Rawls, Mouffe, and Merleau-Ponty:  Nonviolent Civil Disobedience and Political 
Liberalism's Pluralism as a Kind of Violence 
 
 May's concern with equality and dignity as basic assumptions inherent to nonviolent 
political action reflect John Rawls's definition of nonviolent civil disobedience.  The challenge 
for Rawls is whether the nonviolent civil disobedience that he defines is even possible.  Rawls 
argues that nonviolent civil disobedience is that which arises when disagreement emerges, 
concerning “the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men.”268  He defines civil 
disobedience as  
A public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law 
usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or 
policies of the government.  By acting in this way one addresses 
the sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares 
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that in one's considered opinion the principles of social cooperation 
among free and equal men are not being respected...269   
 
For an action to count as nonviolent civil disobedience, it must also be “guided and justified 
by...the principles of justice,” and “not...principles of personal morality or...religious 
doctrines...[nor] group or self-interest.”270  The action must be public, and contrary to a 
particular law only because justice and “principles of social cooperation among free and equal 
men are not being respected.”  Any action that is not guided and justified by the principles of 
justice defined by Rawlsian political liberalism cannot count as nonviolent civil disobedience.  
However, if nonviolent civil disobedience must be truly nonviolent, public, and guided by the 
principles of justice, and there is disagreement concerning what it means to be nonviolent 
beyond the paradigm cases, what it means for something to be public, or on what these principles 
of justice are, then it is not likely that an action could ever count as nonviolent civil disobedience 
without political disagreements arising. 
 In his A Theory of Justice, Rawls derives the principles of justice from an assumed, 
fictional, “original position,” in which participants are veiled from knowing anything about who 
and what they each are.271  From this original position, two principles of justice are derived:  “the 
first [i.e., the liberty principle] requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, 
while the second [i.e., the difference principle] holds that social and economic inequalities, for 
example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits 
                                                          
269 Ibid. 320, especially footnote 19.  It is significant to note that Rawls acknowledges other theorist's work on civil 
disobedience, such as those produced by H. A. Bedau, Henry David Thoreau, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and 
Howard Zinn.  He asserts that he “do[es] not at all mean to say only [his definition of nonviolent civil 
disobedience]...is ever justified in a democratic state.” Rawls's concedes that other kinds of dissent can be 
justifiable, but the point holds that his conception of what makes civil disobedience nonviolent in relation to justice 
is disputable.   
270 Ibid. 321. 
271 Ibid. 11. 
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for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.”272  Agreement upon 
these two principles of justice is possible because none of the fictional participants know 
anything about themselves, but instead seek rational and fair principles of justice that can attain 
among equals who are the same.  In short, the original position veils from participants the 
conditions that could lead to envy.  If some have what others would want, then those who do not 
have it is only fair, and those things are not envied, on the assumption of Rawls’ principles.  
Only nonviolent, public actions aimed toward these principles count as civil disobedience.   
 Rawls allows for nonviolent civil disobedience because he acknowledges that reasonable 
attempts to seek overlapping consensus do not always work, not even in a fictional state that is 
almost perfectly just.  In A Theory of Justice, he states,  
By engaging in civil disobedience one intends...to address the 
sense of justice of the majority and to serve fair notice that in one’s 
sincere and considered opinion the conditions of free cooperation 
are being violated.  We are appealing to others to reconsider, to put 
themselves in our position, and to recognize that they cannot 
expect us to acquiesce indefinitely in the terms they impose upon 
us.273 
 
However, like May's definition of nonviolent political actions, Rawlsian nonviolent civil 
disobedience does not seem to be possible other than as a theoretical abstraction from life.  In 
particular, this appeal to others to reconsider and “to put themselves in our position” could be 
experienced by them as the kind of symbolic violence discussed above.  If tables are turned, and 
these others are forced to reconsider that they do not actually understand the principles of justice, 
then there is already a conflict concerning the kind of justice that is to be pursued, and the 
imposition of the principles of justice defined by Rawls could itself be interpreted as violence, at 
least in the Žižekian, symbolic sense.   
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However, Rawls adds that “by resisting injustice within the limits of fidelity to law, [civil 
disobedience] serves to inhibit departures from justice and to correct them when they occur. A 
general disposition to engage in justified civil disobedience introduces stability into a well-
ordered society, or one that is nearly just.”274  So, Rawls assumes a society in which the 
principles of justice are upheld in common by everyone, and that in a just society, only those 
who are in some way denied equality or freedom will utilize civil disobedience nonviolently for 
the sake of upholding the principles of justice as he defines them.  In other words, if someone is 
not engaging in nonviolent civil disobedience for the sake of upholding the principles of justice 
Rawls defines, then that person's actions do not count as nonviolent civil disobedience.  Given 
that a person could conceive of justice differently, Rawlsian political liberalism is that which one 
cannot choose against.  One can only act within the confines of the structures of justice that 
Rawls defines.  In fact, this is directly argued by Chantal Mouffe, and indirectly implied by 
Merleau-Ponty.   
 
4.7.1 On Liberalism’s Rejection of the Freedom to Choose against It 
 Chantal Mouffe argues that there is a presumed neutrality of Rawlsian-styled political 
liberalism, which is precisely the problem with political liberalism.  In her Political Liberalism:  
Neutrality and the Political, Mouffe argues that Rawls ignores the underlying conflict that results 
from the plurality of persons that is upheld by the principles of liberalism in the first place.275  
She states, “a liberal democratic regime, while fostering pluralism, does not put all values at the 
same level.  It could not do so, since its very existence as a political form of government requires 
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a specific ordering of values which precludes a total pluralism.”276  This means that, despite 
Rawls's intention that the participants agree upon neutral, rational principles of justice, the 
decision made in the original position behind the veil of ignorance rejects anyone's knowing who 
and what they are in the world, and rejects anyone's being committed to anything other than 
political liberalism.  Political liberalism's “neutrality” is, therefore, not neutral because there is 
no freedom to choose against it.   
 Likewise, Maurice Merleau-Ponty points out that liberalism contradicts itself.  In his 
Humanism and Terror, he rejects liberalism in favor of communism precisely because 
liberalism's so-called “humanism” hides its violence.  He states, “the dogmatic basis of 
liberalism...[is] the way it only grants certain liberties by taking away the freedom to choose 
against it.”277  Liberalism is contradictory because, “if I wish freedom for another person it is 
inevitable that even this wish will be seen by him as alien law; and so liberalism turns into 
violence.”  For one to make someone free, this freedom is imposed on that person, and the 
person cannot choose against that freedom.  Freedom imposed is the opposite of freedom.  In the 
end, Merleau-Ponty admits that “we are not accusing liberalism of being a system of violence; 
we reproach it with not seeing its own face in violence.”278  He decides in favor of communism's 
violence because, unlike liberalism, communism does not pretend as though it does not utilize 
violence for the sake of gaining freedom.  Despite that liberalism defines itself as the flag-bearer 
of humanism, its humanism becomes terror because it uses violence while hiding that it does so 
at the same time.  This means that the principles of justice that Rawls considers to be constitutive 
of the legitimacy of political liberalism's neutral conditions for a nonviolent society turn out to be 
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a mask that veils its own inclusion of violence against those who are against political liberalism.  
So, the nonviolence of political liberalism's justice turns out to be a kind of imposed violence.   
 This also means that Rawls's expectation that one's nonviolent civil disobedience is not a 
refusal to be obedient to the principles of justice, which are not concretely actualized in any 
regime, eliminates the possibility of one's being nonviolently civilly disobedient.  If anyone 
engages in civil disobedience, then it has to be made clear, presumably by the condition that the 
action is public and communicates the intention to uphold the principles of justice.  For this 
reason, civil disobedience is both obedient to the norms of justice and the laws outlined by a 
constitution that is supposed to uphold those norms, and simultaneously disobedient in relation to 
some of those constitutional laws and norms.  But, since one is not supposed to be disobedient to 
the norms of justice, but only when those norms do not exist in society, one's nonviolent civil 
disobedience could be considered a kind of violence because it is directed against people and 
institutions, not the principles of justice themselves.  So, Rawlsian nonviolent civil disobedience, 
unlike the nonviolent political actions defined by May in terms of symbolic violence and Jiu-
Jitsu, is not merely a kind of violence, but is practically impossible, given opposed ways of 
conceiving of the principles of justice.  In short, if nonviolent civil disobedience must 
exclusively aim toward the two principles of justice defined by Rawls, and there is disagreement 
concerning those principles, then whether civil disobedience is nonviolent is disputable.   
 
4.8 Žižek on the Violence of Doing Nothing 
 Žižek also defines nonviolent actions in such a way that they seem barely possible, given 
symbolic, systemic, and subjective violence.  In his book, Less than Nothing:  Hegel and the 
Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, Žižek describes a person's “standing still” and “doing 
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nothing” as means to doing something, since these can occur as “a sudden interruption of [the] 
movement” constitutive of “a harmonious[ly] functioning...Whole.”279  Intentionally “standing 
still” is one's doing something by “doing nothing.”  The idea is that, “in order to effectively “do 
nothing,” one should not “stand still,” but be active [so that]…one is really active” when one 
purposely “stands still.”  The result, he argues, is that “this immobility causes havoc and 
chaos.”280   
Žižek means that symbolic and systemic violence, as well as the subjective violence that 
results from these, are interrupted when individuals intentionally do not engage in the actions 
that reproduce them.  Doing nothing is a means to this goal.  In order not to be or to contribute to 
objective and subjective violence, one must really be nonviolent, and this requires intentionally 
using “doing nothing” as a means.  Being nonviolent requires not being violent in any way at all, 
and this requires actively doing nothing.  However, unlike May’s definition of a nonviolent 
political action as a kind of symbolic violence, Žižek defines “doing nothing” as not being a kind 
of symbolic violence.  So, there is disagreement on how nonviolently doing nothing is a kind of 
violence. 
 In his book Violence:  Six Sideways Reflections, Žižek expands upon this idea of the 
nonviolence of doing nothing.  He makes three points concerning the “lessons” learned from his 
discussion of violence in this book:   
1. First, to chastise violence outright, to condemn it as “bad,” is an 
ideological operation par excellence, a mystification which 
collaborates in rendering invisible the fundamental forms of social 
violence. 
2. It is difficult to be really violent, to perform an act that violently 
disturbs the basic parameters of social life. 
3. Violence is not a direct property of some acts, but is distributed 
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between acts and their contexts, between activity and inactivity.  
The same act can count as violent or non-violent, depending on its 
context; sometimes a polite smile can be more violent than a brutal 
outburst.281 
 
Here, he clearly states that violence can remain hidden, as his definitions of symbolic and 
systemic violence indicate.  Also, that the same action can count as both nonviolent and as 
violent is not a contradiction, given that whether an action is of one kind or another, depends 
upon a perspective from which it is contextually described and experienced.  What counts as the 
nonviolent functioning of capitalistic structures of employment, for example, is not necessarily 
experienced as nonviolent by those who are the most exploited.  Nonetheless, Žižek intends to 
conceive of a kind of act or event that transforms human relationships.  Doing nothing is such an 
act, but only if it does something.  So, doing nothing is not literally doing nothing, since there is 
something that is actively and purposely done by one's doing nothing for the sake of a 
transformation.  Doing nothing is not acting when one would otherwise be expected or 
commanded to act, which upsets the framework of systemic and symbolic violence.  Since the 
nothing that is done is a refusal to be obedient, it is a kind of violent nonviolence, and one that 
Žižek believes is capable of transforming social-political and economic structures.   
 Žižek also defines today's conflicts such that “mass killings are more and more 
legitimated in religious terms, while pacifism is predominantly atheist.  It is the very belief in a 
higher divine goal which allows us to instrumentalise [sic] individuals, while atheism admits no 
such goal and thus refuses all forms of sacred sacrificing.”282  In this sense, Žižek opposes 
theorists who argue that there is a theological, transcendent element to the justification of 
nonviolent protest, perhaps as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. does.  However, this refusal of sacred 
sacrificing would itself be an atheistic sort of sacrifice of oneself as well, and this indicates that 
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the atheist who refuses sacrifice, retains the role played by sacrifice in that the atheist sacrifices 
sacrifice by refusing it.  So, Žižek veils the fact that the atheist's pacifistic rejection of goals is 
itself a goal.  Other goals are rejected for the sake of the goal of having no goal that 
instrumentalizes individuals toward “divine goals.”  It is in this sense that he secularizes the role 
of sacrifice played in theology.  To see how Žižek disagrees with theologically framed 
justifications for nonviolence, we turn to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
 
4.9 King's Theological Definition of Nonviolent Direct Action in Relation to Justice 
 In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, King defines nonviolent direct action in a way that 
shows that it “seeks to create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a community 
that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.”283  He also writes that 
“there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth...The purpose 
of our direct action program is to create a situation so crisis packed that it will inevitably open 
the door to negotiation.”  The issue is that King frames the ability of a nonviolent direct action to 
produce a change in terms of this “creative tension” and “crisis” that is forced into existence.  If 
“creative tension” and “crisis” are experienced against the expectations and desires of some 
individuals and institutions, then those individuals and institutions may decide that the 
nonviolent direct action is not really nonviolent, but perhaps a kind of provocative, symbolic 
violence.   
However, King aims to argue that, though the nonviolent direct action produces a crisis 
and creative tension, the crisis and tension are not the fault of the nonviolent actors.  He states, 
“we who engage in nonviolent action are not the creators of tension.  We merely bring to the 
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surface the hidden tension that is already alive.  We bring it out into the open where it can be 
seen and dealt with.”  So, though the nonviolent direct action brings this tension to the surface, it 
is not the fault of the actors' actions, but is already there, and is simply being exposed as what it 
already is.   
King’s nonviolent actors are not doing something by doing nothing, and are not atheists 
without a goal, in the sense defined by Žižek.  Instead, King defines a distinction between just 
and unjust laws directly in relation to the existence of “the law of God.”  To eliminate God from 
King's argument would be to eliminate the distinction between just and unjust laws, which is 
needed for justifying nonviolent direct actions.  Just laws are defined, by King, as equivalent to 
God’s laws.  Such a conception of justice also disagrees with Rawls’ principles of justice, 
derived from an original position, behind a veil of ignorance, where fictional participants arrive 
at the principles of justice without any knowledge of a God or religion. 
 Nonetheless, King argues that “one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust law,” and 
“one has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws.”  One has a legal and 
moral responsibility to obey just laws because these “square...with the moral law or the law of 
God,” while “an unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.”  So, for King, 
segregation in particular is unjust because it immorally violates “the law of God,” and “degrades 
human personality.”   
He also writes that segregation treats “persons [as]...things,” and is “not only politically, 
economically and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and sinful.”  Whether or not 
people nonviolently act for and against laws because they do or do not square with God's laws is 
a matter of dispute, since Žižek can reject religion because it tends to mobilize people to act 
toward goals in ways that are not nonviolent, but instead produce mass killings.  That is, 
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invoking God as a means to justifying nonviolent actions does not guarantee that the actors will 
be nonviolent.  Insofar as individuals can disagree on what is just and unjust, godly and ungodly, 
the actions that they engage in can be violent or nonviolent depending on the context of their 
actions, and their beliefs.  So, when King argues that “it is wrong to use immoral means to attain 
moral ends...[and] it is just as wrong, or perhaps even more so, to use moral means to preserve 
immoral ends,” he means to argue in favor of the nonviolence of nonviolent direct actions as a 
moral means used toward moral ends, but since whether an action is nonviolent is disputable, 
whether the action is moral or immoral is also disputable.   
 May, Rawls, Žižek, and King, therefore, each define a kind of nonviolent action that is 
capable of transforming a social-political or economic status quo.  How the action works, 
though, is not necessarily nonviolent, because in order for the action to work, it has to be capable 
of somehow forcing this transformation to occur.  This transformation itself can be defined as a 
kind of violence in relation to context and opposed political, ideological perspectives.  Anyone or 
anything that the so-called nonviolent action is directed against can conclude that the action is 
not really nonviolent.  So, in the following, I briefly discuss Gil Bailie and Hannah Arendt's 
arguments for kinds of nonviolence as useful means toward defeating desires for vengeance and 
violence.  Like May, Rawls, Žižek, and King, though, Arendt's and Bailie's definitions of kinds 
of actions as nonviolent indicate that these actions could only work if they are at least definable 
as some kind of violence from an opposed political, ideological perspective.   
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4.10 The Destructive Violence of Nonviolent Prayer and Forgiveness284 
 Following Girard's view, and a representative of the theological view Žižek likely 
disagrees with, Gil Bailie argues, in Violence Unveiled:  Humanity at the Crossroads, that  
It was religion – archaic religion...[that] is humanity's astonishing 
instrument for turning murder and madness into a sacralized 
bulwark against madness and murder.  More or less refined forms 
of this same recipe for generating social solidarity and lending it 
the requisite solemnity have played a part in cultural existence 
since the dawn of human culture.285   
 
However, he focuses on the issue that “in the foreseeable future, neither religious mystification 
nor the solemn and quasi-religious causes of “history” will sufficiently veil our violence from 
our own eyes nor keep us from seeing the faces of victims.”286  Bailie’s worry is that it may 
happen that the religious veils that hide our own, underlying desires for vengeful violence will 
become unveiled to the extent that the social solidarity brought about in relation to beneficial and 
maleficent kinds of violence will itself be threatened, in an apocalyptic (“unveiling”) way.  His 
view is that “the social stability of...cultures was determined to a considerable degree by the 
success with which they were able to experience and interpret the violence which brought them 
into being as holy.”287  Holy violence, i.e. the sacred sacrifice that binds a society together, is 
beneficial, but Bailie's worry is that people are “floundering” at distinguishing between 
beneficial and maleficent kinds of violence.   
Bailie defines the modern crisis in the following: 
In today's world, both the political right and the political left, if 
they are to remain morally coherent, must speak on behalf of 
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victims...The left justifies or excuses the violence committed by 
the victims of structural violence...The right justifies the violence 
necessary to control crime and excuses its occasional excesses as 
regrettable but unavoidable.  Looking abroad, where the right sees 
“freedom fighters,” the left sees the forces of counter-revolutionary 
oppression.  Where the left sees a liberation movement, the right 
sees terrorists...It is a mistake to think of this as a merely political 
disagreement.  Seen from a larger perspective, it is a 
society...floundering in its attempt to determine whether violence 
is destructive or beneficial.  It is another symptom that we live in a 
world no longer able to make a coherent distinction between good 
and bad violence.288 
 
Of course, Bailie assumes himself to have the correct distinction between good and bad violence.  
His answer to this modern crisis that lies in the failure of people knowing how to distinguish 
between kinds of violence is found in The Lord’s Prayer, where humanity is instructed to 
genuinely pray not be led into temptation because this is what secures “immunity to the 
contagion of desire.”289  In particular, Jesus had taught humanity to pray, “Lead us not into 
temptation.”290  This is similar to the last of the Ten Commandments, found in Exodus 20, which 
states, “you shall not covet your neighbor's house.  You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, or 
his servant, man or woman, or his ox, or his donkeys, or anything that is his.”291  The similarity 
lies in that both tell us not to desire what others show us is desirable because otherwise the 
mimetic rivalry, defined by Girard, ensues and desires for vengeance increase.  One's earnest 
prayer not to be led into temptation is a nonviolent means to eliminating the envious desire that 
leads to mimetic rivalry and apocalyptic violence being unleashed.   
 Bailie adds that, for “innately religious beings” bound together by the violence that 
founds our culture's unity, there are two religious forms of transcendence that we must choose 
                                                          
288 Bailie, 54.  Bailie describes “structural violence” as “the deprivations and indignities to which the poor, the 
underprivileged, racial minorities, and those habituated and socialized to ghetto life are often subjected.” 
289 Ibid. 207, 270. 
290 Ibid. 270. 
291 Ibid. 144. 
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from:  either engage in violence for the sake of transcending (and stopping) violence, or engage 
in prayer for the sake of transcending (and stopping) violence.  Bailie's solution to the modern 
crisis that is the failure to correctly distinguish between kinds of violence, is this nonviolent 
prayer.  However, this prayer, if it defeats the violence by defeating desire, can be considered a 
kind of violence turned against oneself, given the disagreements concerning what counts as 
violence and nonviolence. 
 For example, prayer is assumed to work as a means to defeating temptations.  If one has 
strong desires, then against these, one prays relentlessly and earnestly in order to defeat the 
temptations.  If one is not as strongly tempted to seek vengeance, then less prayer is needed to 
defeat these temptations.  In this sense, the amount a person prays may depend on the strength of 
one’s desires.  The defeat of desire, therefore, is something that is achieved by the force of the 
prayer.  Bailie assumes the prayer to be nonviolent, but capable of defeating desires that can lead 
to violence.  Since the goal is to defeat desires that potentially lead to violence, the use of this 
prayer can be experienced as one’s doing violence against oneself, perhaps in terms of 
psychological or symbolic violence.  If desires are successfully defeated by this prayer, and only 
violence is assumed to be capable of defeating violence, and there is disagreement concerning 
what counts as violence and whether nonviolence is possible, then this prayer can count as a kind 
of violence.  
 Similarly, Hanna Arendt argues in The Human Condition that forgiveness is efficacious 
because it violates one’s desire for vengeance.  She first assumes that violence is necessarily 
involved in anything that humans make.  She writes, “it is true that violence, without which no 
fabrication could ever come to pass, has always played an important role in political schemes and 
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thinking based upon an interpretation of action in terms of making."292  Forgiveness can fabricate 
new relationships between humans, and this means that forgiveness may also involve violence.  
It involves violence because forgiveness violates the desire to seek vengeance, fabricating a 
novel relation to the one forgiven.  She states, “forgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance, 
which acts in the form of re-acting against an original trespass.”293  Rather than enacting their 
desire for vengeance, people can forgive one another for their trespasses, and thereby violate and 
eliminate this desire.  As a means, forgiveness, like the sacrificial kinds of violence, can only 
work as a violation of the desire to seek vengeance, in accordance with one's idea of justice, or 
what kinds of relationships between people should be achieved.  As with the prayer not to be led 
into temptation, truly forgiving someone means violating one's own desire for vengeance, and 
this may occur as a kind of psychological or symbolic violence.  So, for this reason, forgiveness 
can be interpreted as a kind of violence in the same way as the prayer not to be led into 
temptation. 
 
4.11  Conclusion 
 Here, it has been argued that, given context, perspectives, and political, ideological 
disagreements, what counts as a nonviolent means can count as violence.  Disagreements 
concerning how nonviolence works as a means have been outlined, demonstrating the ways in 
which nonviolence can be defined as a kind of violence.  Though there are the core paradigmatic 
examples of violence, and though there are also commonsense views of nonviolence, when 
nonviolence (and violence) is defined as equivalent to other things, such as respect for dignity, 
equality, principles of justice, the result of scapegoating violence, and doing nothing, political 
                                                          
292 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1974 (originally 1958)), 
228. 
293 Ibid. 240. 
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disagreements emerge.  Since even doing nothing, forgiveness, and the prayer not to be led into 
temptation can themselves be considered kinds of violence, the weight of the argument leans 
toward nonviolent actions, refusals to act, and the intention to do nothing always possibly 
counting as kinds of violence.  Violent nonviolence is possible because whether a use of means 
is nonviolent depends upon the contexts related to that use of means, as well as the goals toward 
which the means are utilized.  Because there are diverse contexts in relation to which actions, as 
means, can be considered violent or nonviolent, and because there is disagreement concerning 
the goals toward which nonviolence is utilized, it is always possible to define what would 
otherwise be considered nonviolence as a kind of violence.  So, for these reasons, nonviolence, 
like the concept of violence, is an essentially contested concept for which no politically neutral 
definition is possible.  From the perspective of the person who defines nonviolence, that person’s 
political, ideological assumptions influence how nonviolence is defined, and opposed political 
ideologies can define that nonviolence as a kind of violence. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation has argued that commonsense views of violence and distinctions 
between kinds of violence, including nonviolence, extend the paradigm case core conception of 
violence.  When the concept of violence is extended beyond the paradigmatic examples of 
violence that most everyone agrees count as violence, violence and nonviolence are essentially 
contested concepts for which no politically neutral definition is possible.  It is difficult to 
establish this as a matter of principle, but this dissertation has shown that, inductively, all the 
major philosophical theories of violence depend on political preferences that are highly 
contestable themselves.  A general reason for this might be this:  violence is, in the paradigm 
cases where its wrongness is evident and uncontested, an interpersonal act; notions of violence 
that extend the concept, but claim equivalence with the moral opprobrium attached to the 
paradigmatic cases of violence, also involve interpersonal, or, more broadly, social consequences 
of the acts construed as violence.   
Opposed political ideologies disagree on when an action counts as a kind of violence or 
as a kind of nonviolence, even though there is agreement concerning the wrongness of paradigm 
cases of violence.  Except for these paradigm cases, justifications for violence, and distinctions 
between kinds of violence rely on connections to other things, which are themselves contested, 
such as freedom, justice, power, equality, and dignity.  These are normative terms that 
characterize social outcomes; to act on these terms is to act politically; to act politically is to act 
in terms of political values or ideas.   
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 It has not been argued here that any distinction between kinds of violence or that 
nonviolence is preferable.  Instead, it has only been indicated through an inductive analysis of 
available philosophical accounts of violence that the paradigmatic examples of violence serve as 
the core exemplars in relation to which disagreements arise, but that extended concepts of 
violence depend on political values or ideas and ideologies.  Political ideologies oppose one 
another, and the kinds of violence defined and justified by a political ideology oppose that of 
another political ideology.  This indicates two things. 
 First, in order to avoid the rhetorical pull of political ideologies, paradigmatic examples 
of violence and nonviolence should be the focus of philosophical speculation in political 
philosophy.  Most people consider paradigmatic examples of violence to be wrong.  To 
undertake defining and justifying extended notions of violence would be to attempt to 
rhetorically convince people to engage in actions that they reject.  The paradigmatic examples of 
violence are wrong without the influence of any political ideology defining them as wrong.  
Their wrongness is politically neutral.  No political ideology is needed for the sake of convincing 
people that it is wrong for one person to intentionally behead another person for the sake of 
causing harm and destruction. 
 Second, the distinctions between kinds of violence defined by every political ideology are 
essentially contested.  Every political ideology is suspect, including those that define themselves 
as superior in relation to others, such as liberal ideology does.  Each political ideology aims to 
justify its own uses of violence against opposed political ideologies.  Each positively values the 
kinds of violence that serve to uphold its political ideology.  These evaluations produce 
conditions for enmity, and real violent conflicts that are paradigmatic examples of violence.  If 
political philosophy is to move away from actual, paradigmatic kinds of violence, then it would 
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need to root a theory of violence in something other than contested political concepts.  However, 
the question is whether such a political philosophy could be.  Perhaps, an ahistorical, 
nontraditional, global, and nonviolent kind of cooperation could serve as the foundation for a 
future political philosophy, but it may be difficult for this kind of cooperation to avoid counting 
as a kind of violence, or for a politically neutral argument to be made for it.   
 From here, the future project that this dissertation points to concerns the question whether 
it is possible for a novel political philosophy to be developed that simultaneously addresses the 
wrongness of paradigmatic cases of violence, and avoids justifying kinds of violence.  Perhaps 
all we can do is inductively list examples of paradigmatic cases of violence.  But this does not 
solve the problem of justifiable violence, or of whether it is possible to construct a theory that 
does not itself lead to and justify political conflict.   
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